Re: [lojban] Re: Speaker specificity: {.i da'i na vajni}

[And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com>]

Dustin Lacewell, On 30/09/2014 22:51:
> I have -never- used {le} to indicate a non-veridical description.
[...]
> {le} has always existed as a Definite Article for me.

If {le}'s definition as "in-mind" and "nonveridical" stands (and clearly not everybody thinks it should), {le} must be a Definite Article. If you nixed "nonveridical" and kept "in-mind" then "le broda" would mean not "the broda" but "certain broda", which is also a useful candidate meaning.

To you, Dustin, I would say the same as I said to selpa'i: the definite article, by its very nature, introduces a nonveridical description. The description is not part of the propositional content of the main illocution but instead constitutes the propositional content of an autonomous illocution of identification. Therefore, without realizing it, you have always used {le} to indicate a non-veridical description. The reason you and selpa'i thought otherwise is that you have apparently understood 'nonveridical' in a way that is etymologically appropriate but contextually and technically inappropriate, namely as constituting something like a lack of necessary adherence to literalness, whereas in the context of discussion of definite descriptions it has the different more technical sense I explained above.

> The example I habitually provide is, imagine some men are hanging out
> by a water-cooler and some women walking past hear them making sexist
> remarks. One women isn't going to confuse the other by saying
> something like "Those dogs are disgusting".

Equally the speaker could say "Those disgusting ones are dogs", where the less literal predicate is the main predicate outside the definite description. Regardless of the literalness or figurativeness of either sentence, the part that is outside the definite description is what is asserted (so is technically veridical), while the part that is inside the definite description is not asserted (so is technically nonveridical) but rather serves to identify the referent.

Incidentally, I agree with cognitive linguistics that there is no natural clear-cut cognitive distinction between literalness and figurativeness. Lojbanists who think it is feasible (or even desirable) to insist on always marking deviations from literalness are chasing a mirage. Veridicality in the technical sense has nothing to do with spurious literalness but rather with the logical structure, where I understand the logical structure to include illouctionary oerators.

--And.


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