Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

From: And Rosta <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 16:42:41 +0100

pc:
#>>> <[email-masked]> 09/23/01 07:05pm >>>
#In a message dated 9/22/2001 4:43:32 PM Central Daylight Time, [email-masked] 
#writes:
#> In a message dated 9/22/2001 1:25:58 PM Central Daylight Time, 
#> [email-masked] writes: 
#> >> da zo'u la djan jinvi/krici tu'odu'u da -extension tu'odu'u 
#>> ce'u pa moi merko -president 
#>> 
#>> -- i.e. as not substantively different from the treatment of djuno. 
#>> 
#> 
#> Not so: the corresponding analysis would be 
#> {da de poi du'u da extension of ledu'u ce'u pamoi merko president zo'u la 
#> djan jinvi de} 
#> However, in working the details of this out, I see that it does work as 
#> well as well in this case as in the {djuno} one. I keep forgetting that 
#> when you say "extension" you mean the propositions that such-and-such is 
#> the extension, not the set itself (I think this ahs been a problem for a 
#> while -- back to whether the things that go in for {makau} are answers).  
#> I'll try to remember this is the extension-claim theory, not the extension 
#> theory, which is very different. 
# 
#But then next morning, looking at it again, I see that it is very different, 
#for I doubt that John (even this one) even thinks about "the extension of " 
#some property. In fact, I doubt that most people, who use indirect question 
#all the time, would even understand the locution. So, if the property is 
#within the scope of the believing, where, because of intensioonality, it has 
#to be that property and not something incidentally equivalent to it, then I 
#would say that it was very rarely the case that anyone had an opinion about 
#who the first American President was. But, of course, the other version, 
#which moves the property outside still works ok.

Jorge raised this objection at the time that I originally made the proposal.
My answer is that if the extension-claim analysis correctly characterizes
the logic of indirect questions, then if John knows that 'Bill' is the answer
to 'Who went', then John knows that {Bill} is the extension of the
category of goers.

However, there is a valid case not quite covered by my extension-claim
analysis. An example is where John knows that Chelsea is Bill's
daughter but doesn't know that Bill has no other daughters [by Hillary,
that is, I hasten to add, having watched the splendid Primary Colours
twice in the last week). So, as it were, John knows who Bill's daughters 
are, but doesn't know he knows. The extension-claim analysis can 
handle John's actual beliefs thus:

la djan djuno tu'odu'u da cmima tu'o -extension be tu'odu'u la bil patfuce'u

And the version where we deintensionalize our description of John's
knowledge can, I very very very tentatively think, be done thus:

da poi ke'a du'u de -extension tu'odu'u la bil patfu ce'u zo'u la djan djuno da

I am very much not convinced that this solution is valid, but if it isn't, it's just a
further instance of the more general problem of how to refer to se djuno
and se jinvi extensionally rather than intensionally, and any solution of
the more general problem will also resolve the residual problems with the
extension-claim analysis.

As an example of the general problem, how do you say "John knows
that Bill is not king of France", when John has never had the thought
"Bill is not king of France"? And likewise for krici/jinvi.

--And.