Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 17:28:02 EDT

In a message dated 9/25/2001 12:02:12 PM Central Daylight Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> #Well, it is quite possible that John knows that Bill went, without knowing 
> #that "Bill" is the answer to the question "Who went?" for the very reason 
> you 
> #note later, that he never thought of the question. It is also not at all 
> #clear that the equation of the two things John knows works intensionally.
> 
> As I said in my previous message, the problem applies to djuno and 
> jinvi/krici
> generally -- the "John knows/believes Bill is not king of France" ambiguity.
> So I won't accept this as a fault specifically of the extension-claim 
> 

The point is that the set-of-answers theory does not have this problem in the 
case of questions -- or, at least, has it in what seems a more tractable 
form. This needs a bit more work, perhaps, but it can deal with some of the 
indirect question problems that seem to raise this issue on the 
extension-claim view, without raising the messy questions. An advantage, I 
think.

<Okay. "Bill knows who went" normally means Bill knows every answer,
i.e. {la djan djuno ro du'u la bil patfu makau}, on the set-of-answers 
interpretation.>

I am not perfectly sure about that, though it seems likely. But I think its 
likelihood is Gricean, full disclosure of all relevant information you know. 
I have no trouble imagining situation where I would give a "know" for less 
than perfect information (knowing where someone lives if it get the right 
town, for example). And isn't it nice of Lojban to allow for these useful 
distinctions that are so hard in English?

<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here.

True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the general
solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.>

I'm not sure it will, since you keep having to fall back into intensional 
context "is a property/ proposition that..." and set-of-answers does not.

<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here.

True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the general
solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.>

But the old, "does John really have thoughts about the extensions of 
properties?" problem is still there, and it doesn't arise if all that is 
claimed is that there is something that is in fact an answer to "Who is Bill 
father to?" and that John knows.

<But let's not get too hung up on this, or accept it as a valid solution. >
You'll be reieved to know that I am not and do not. And worry a bit about you.

<First off I want to know how to render the two readings of "John 
knows/believes that
Bill is not king of France" -- the intensional reading (which is the current 
Lojban
one) and the extensional reading, where John's beliefs are such that were they
true, Bill would not be king of France>
Well, this is not a problem about indirect questions, since it does not seem 
to arise for my theory, so I think I'll skip it, after asking "in what 
language am I to render these?" since that seems a crucial question for how 
to do it. Notice, by the way, that if John knows that Bill is not the king 
of France, that is enough to guarantee that Bill is not the king of France. 
So the issue is about belief only. But then I do not understand it, for 
clearly, if John's belief that Bill is not the king of France is true, then 
Bill is not the king of France. My turn to be missing something here. 
Expatiate, please.