From pycyn@aol.com Tue Sep 25 15:06:11 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_3_2_2); 25 Sep 2001 22:06:11 -0000 Received: (qmail 56464 invoked from network); 25 Sep 2001 21:47:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by m8.onelist.org with QMQP; 25 Sep 2001 21:47:49 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m02.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.5) by mta2 with SMTP; 25 Sep 2001 21:47:48 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m02.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.9b.1b793584 (4446) for ; Tue, 25 Sep 2001 17:47:35 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <9b.1b793584.28e25576@aol.com> Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 17:47:34 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_9b.1b793584.28e25576_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_9b.1b793584.28e25576_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/25/2001 12:02:12 PM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > First > off I want to know how to render the two readings of "John knows/believes > that > Bill is not king of France" -- the intensional reading (which is the > current Lojban > one) and the extensional reading, where John's beliefs are such that were > they > true, Bill would not be king of France. > Oh ho! (what is Lojban for "taxicab rejoinder," ?"l'esprit de l'escalier"? or some such). I now see the point. John has never considered the question whether Bill is the king of France let alone formulated the belief that he is not. So, on the intensional view -- what I take the lojban {la djan jinvi le du'u ...} to mean, it is false that John believes/opines this (though this might make an interesting case to rpovide some separation between these two other than just the evidentiary one). On the other hand, John may well have beliefs that entail that Bill is not the king of France and the entailment may be one that John could work out easily -- even unconsciously -- were he to direct his attention to the matter. So there is a sense in which John does already believe that Bill is not the king of France (he believes, for example, that France does not have a king). I don't see exactly how this is an intensional-extensional problem; it seems to be more a problem about how to say the latter case -- something like {ka'e} or some stronger for: "doesn't but should to be consistent and complete." I don't think there is directly a sense of "believe" or "opine" or {krici/jinvi} that directly allows the claim that he does belive this to be true. But, again, this is not intensional-extension, since there is no claim to the effect that Bill is not the king of France such that John believes it either. --part1_9b.1b793584.28e25576_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/25/2001 12:02:12 PM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:

First
off I want to know how to render the two readings of "John knows/believes that
Bill is not king of France" -- the intensional reading (which is the current Lojban
one) and the extensional reading, where John's beliefs are such that were they
true, Bill would not be king of France.

Oh ho! (what is Lojban for "taxicab rejoinder," ?"l'esprit de l'escalier"? or some such).
I now see the point. John has never considered the question whether Bill is the king of France let alone formulated the belief that he is not. So, on the intensional view -- what I take the lojban {la djan jinvi le du'u ...} to mean, it is false that John believes/opines this (though this might make an interesting case to rpovide some separation between these two other than just the evidentiary one). On the other hand, John may well have beliefs that entail that Bill is not the king of France and the entailment may be one that John could work out easily -- even unconsciously -- were he to direct his attention to the matter. So there is a sense in which John does already believe that Bill is not the king of France (he believes, for example, that France does not have a king).
I don't see exactly how this is an intensional-extensional problem; it seems to be more a problem about how to say the latter case -- something like {ka'e} or some stronger for: "doesn't but should to be consistent and complete." I don't think there is directly a sense of "believe" or "opine" or {krici/jinvi} that directly allows the claim that he does belive this to be true. But, again, this is not intensional-extension, since there is no claim to the effect that Bill is not the king of France such that John believes it either. --part1_9b.1b793584.28e25576_boundary--