Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

From: And Rosta <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 13:44:05 +0100

>>> <[email-masked]> 09/25/01 10:28pm >>>
[email-masked] writes:
#> #Well, it is quite possible that John knows that Bill went, without knowing 
#> #that "Bill" is the answer to the question "Who went?" for the very reason 
#> you 
#> #note later, that he never thought of the question. It is also not at all 
#> #clear that the equation of the two things John knows works intensionally.
#> 
#> As I said in my previous message, the problem applies to djuno and 
#> jinvi/krici
#> generally -- the "John knows/believes Bill is not king of France" ambiguity.
#> So I won't accept this as a fault specifically of the extension-claim 
#
#The point is that the set-of-answers theory does not have this problem in the 
#case of questions -- or, at least, has it in what seems a more tractable 
#form. This needs a bit more work, perhaps, but it can deal with some of the 
#indirect question problems that seem to raise this issue on the 
#extension-claim view, without raising the messy questions. An advantage, I 
#think.
#
#<Okay. "Bill knows who went" normally means Bill knows every answer,
#i.e. {la djan djuno ro du'u la bil patfu makau}, on the set-of-answers 
#interpretation.>
#
#I am not perfectly sure about that, though it seems likely. But I think its 
#likelihood is Gricean, full disclosure of all relevant information you know.  
#I have no trouble imagining situation where I would give a "know" for less 
#than perfect information (knowing where someone lives if it get the right 
#town, for example). And isn't it nice of Lojban to allow for these useful 
#distinctions that are so hard in English?
#
#<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here.
#
#True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the general
#solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.>
#
#I'm not sure it will, since you keep having to fall back into intensional 
#context "is a property/ proposition that..." and set-of-answers does not.
#
#<#Notice that there appears to be no de-intensionalization problem here.
#
#True, but the deintensionalization problem is a general one, and the general
#solution will extend to the extension-claim analysis.>
#
#But the old, "does John really have thoughts about the extensions of 
#properties?" problem is still there, and it doesn't arise if all that is 
#claimed is that there is something that is in fact an answer to "Who is Bill 
#father to?" and that John knows.
#
#<But let's not get too hung up on this, or accept it as a valid solution. >
#You'll be reieved to know that I am not and do not. And worry a bit about you.

I understand & agree that the intensionality problem does not arise with the
set of answers analysis. However, since this problem is a general problem
of all cognitive predicates, it is hardly a defect of the extension-claim analysis
that it patterns with other cognitive predicates and, accordingly, suffers from
the intensionality problem.

#<First off I want to know how to render the two readings of "John 
#knows/believes that
#Bill is not king of France" -- the intensional reading (which is the current 
#Lojban
#one) and the extensional reading, where John's beliefs are such that were they
#true, Bill would not be king of France>
# Well, this is not a problem about indirect questions, since it does not seem 
#to arise for my theory, so I think I'll skip it, after asking "in what 
#language am I to render these?" since that seems a crucial question for how 
#to do it.  

render in Lojban

#Notice, by the way, that if John knows that Bill is not the king 
#of France, that is enough to guarantee that Bill is not the king of France.  
#So the issue is about belief only. But then I do not understand it, for 
#clearly, if John's belief that Bill is not the king of France is true, then 
#Bill is not the king of France. My turn to be missing something here.  
#Expatiate, please.

For example, if John believes that there is no king of France and if
that belief is true, then it follows that Bill is not king of France. So
in the 'extensional' sense Bill believes that Bill is not king of France,
even if John has never thought "Bill is not king of France". For
John to believe that in the 'intensional' sense, J must have
thought "B is not king of France". Likewise for the example
"J believes/knows 34567891234234521234353642 is not prime".

--And.