From pycyn@aol.com Mon Oct 01 12:52:03 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 1 Oct 2001 19:52:03 -0000 Received: (qmail 76883 invoked from network); 1 Oct 2001 19:52:03 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by 10.1.1.222 with QMQP; 1 Oct 2001 19:52:03 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r09.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.105) by mta3 with SMTP; 1 Oct 2001 19:52:03 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.170.1bc4eb9 (3926) for ; Mon, 1 Oct 2001 15:51:50 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <170.1bc4eb9.28ea2355@aol.com> Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2001 15:51:49 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_170.1bc4eb9.28ea2355_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_170.1bc4eb9.28ea2355_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/1/2001 1:21:22 PM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > #An interesting rule; whence cometh it? > > A mixture of mutually-reinforcing reason and lojban tradition. > > We insist that the scope of the quantification of {lo} be determinate. > The how-to-say-its work out easiest if {lo} is bound in the localmost. > > As for {le}, it is in the nature of specificity that it works that way, > so there was no decision to take. > > #mi senva le nu le melba cu cinba mi > > I am guessing (correct me if I'm wrong) that you mean to say that that > sentence has a reading that is not equivalent to > > le melbi goi ko'a mi senva le nu ko'a cenba mi > > If so, I don't see it. I can't think of any way of reading the one sd true > and the other as false, for some context. > > Just to preempt a possible round of exchanges, "le" is sometimes > glossed as "the speaker knows which". This is merely indicative rather than > definitional, if {le} is truly defined as +specific. Its actual definition > is that > Well, again we probably disagree about what is definitional and what is illustrative. The Refgram gives it as +specific. It doesn't say that and it certainly doesn't explain what that is supposed to mean, but it does say that it is characterized by specificity and explains that as "the speaker knows what he is talking about." And of course the referent has to be fixed for the truth value to be determined (that is true even for "there is an x"). But the speaker has it fixed and so can determine it. The point of the example is, of course, that there is no beauty such that I dreamed she kissed me; she was only a dream beauty, after all. So moving the {le} outside is as improper as moving any other quantified expression out is. Now, you may say that intensional contexts don't count, but, as the saying has gone, it seems unfair if you don't mention that intensional contexts don't count. But what about {ga noda jinga gi le jinga cu lebna roda}? In a way that is not equally applicable to {lo jinga}? I need to see the case made on more than your say-so and a mass of "determinate/specific" argle-bargle. Go back to basics, as you are wont to suggest, and show it. --part1_170.1bc4eb9.28ea2355_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/1/2001 1:21:22 PM Central Daylight Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:


#An interesting rule; whence cometh it?  

A mixture of mutually-reinforcing reason and lojban tradition.

We insist that the scope of the quantification of {lo} be determinate.
The how-to-say-its work out easiest if {lo} is bound in the localmost.

As for {le}, it is in the nature of specificity that it works that way,
so there was no decision to take.

#mi senva le nu le melba cu cinba mi

I am guessing (correct me if I'm wrong) that you mean to say that that
sentence has a reading that is not equivalent to

  le melbi goi ko'a mi senva le nu ko'a cenba mi

If so, I don't see it. I can't think of any way of reading the one sd true
and the other as false, for some context.

Just to preempt a possible round of exchanges, "le" is sometimes
glossed as "the speaker knows which". This is merely indicative rather than definitional, if {le} is truly defined as +specific. Its actual definition is that
the referent must be fixed before the truth-conditions can be evaluated.


Well, again we probably disagree about what is definitional and what is illustrative.  The Refgram gives it as +specific. It doesn't say that and it certainly doesn't explain what that is supposed to mean, but it does say that it is characterized by specificity and explains that as "the speaker knows what he is talking about."  And of course the referent has to be fixed for the truth value to be determined (that is true even for "there is an x").  But the speaker has it fixed and so can determine it.

The point of the example is, of course, that there is no beauty such that I dreamed she kissed me; she was only a dream beauty, after all.  So moving the {le} outside is as improper as moving any other quantified expression out is.  Now, you may say that intensional contexts don't count, but, as the saying has gone, it seems unfair if you don't mention that intensional contexts don't count.  But what about {ga noda jinga gi le jinga cu lebna roda}?  In a way that is not equally applicable to {lo jinga}?  I need to see the case made on more than your say-so and a mass of "determinate/specific" argle-bargle. Go back to basics, as you are wont to suggest, and show it. --part1_170.1bc4eb9.28ea2355_boundary--