From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Oct 03 09:50:16 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 3 Oct 2001 16:48:14 -0000 Received: (qmail 17593 invoked from network); 3 Oct 2001 16:48:14 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by 10.1.1.221 with QMQP; 3 Oct 2001 16:48:14 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 3 Oct 2001 16:50:15 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Wed, 3 Oct 2001 17:27:20 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:59:30 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:59:10 +0100 To: pycyn , lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta >>> 10/03/01 03:26am >>> a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes: #> pc: #> > arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:=20 #> > "da zo'u There is a proposition p such that p is true just in case d= a=20 #> is=20 #> > extension of tu'odu'u ce'u klama kei and John believes that p"=20 #> >=20 #> > Well, in one sense it is hard to complain about this, since it covers= =20 #> > the extension/intension problem nicely. I am now off again worrying=20 #> > about what soert of thing the extension of {tu'o du'u ce'u klama kei}= =20 #> > is, as a result of a discussion on some other topic.=20 # #My extreme bad! This turns out to be, on examination, true so long as Joh= n=20 #has one true belief and one false one, regardless of what the beliefs are= =20 #about. If da is the extension of whatever then this claim and the true=20 #belief are both true, so the one just in case the other. so there is one t= rue=20 #just in case the extension-claim is. On the othre hand, if the extension= =20 #claim is false, then it iff the false belief is true, so something iff the= =20 #extension claim. But the extension claim is either true or false and on=20 #either option, there is something John believes and that is true iff the=20 #extension claim is. So, the claim holds absolutely. The joys of a logica= l=20 #language!=20=20=20 I presume then that you no longer consider=20 John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman o= rator to be unproblematic. What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which = y is=20 true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggesti= on. --And.=20