Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

From: And Rosta <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:59:10 +0100

>>> <[email-masked]> 10/03/01 03:26am >>>
[email-masked] writes:
#> pc:
#> > [email-masked] writes: 
#> > "da zo'u There is a proposition p such that p is true just in case da 
#> is 
#> > extension of tu'odu'u ce'u klama kei and John believes that p" 
#> > 
#> > Well, in one sense it is hard to complain about this, since it covers 
#> > the extension/intension problem nicely. I am now off again worrying 
#> > about what soert of thing the extension of {tu'o du'u ce'u klama kei} 
#> > is, as a result of a discussion on some other topic. 
#
#My extreme bad! This turns out to be, on examination, true so long as John 
#has one true belief and one false one, regardless of what the beliefs are 
#about. If da is the extension of whatever then this claim and the true 
#belief are both true, so the one just in case the other. so there is one true 
#just in case the extension-claim is. On the othre hand, if the extension 
#claim is false, then it iff the false belief is true, so something iff the 
#extension claim. But the extension claim is either true or false and on 
#either option, there is something John believes and that is true iff the 
#extension claim is. So, the claim holds absolutely. The joys of a logical 
#language!   

I presume then that you no longer consider 

John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman orator

to be unproblematic.

What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which y is 
true?), but you're an old hand at this stuff, so I'll wait on your suggestion.

--And.