Subject: Re: [lojban] Set of answers encore

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2001 14:32:38 EDT

In a message dated 10/3/2001 11:50:14 AM Central Daylight Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> I presume then that you no longer consider 
> 
> John believes p such that p is true just in case Tully is a great roman 
> orator
> 
> to be unproblematic.

I'd go so far as to say I think it is just flat hopelessly wrong. As noted, 
under really minimal real-world conditions it is always true.

> 
> What sort of remedies can you see? My instinct would be to go for
> possible worlds (x is a world of which p is true iff x is a world of which 
> y is 
> 

Alas, all the possible world notions are themselves intensional (they are 
*possible* worlds after all), so this doesn't help with an extensional 
reading. I am inclined at the moment to go with questions as a primitive 
notion and take two things that successfully answer (are true members of) the 
same question as being intersubstitutable. But even as I say this I start 
seeing problems, so I am gong to pass for this round.