From pycyn@aol.com Sun Oct 07 12:47:29 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 7 Oct 2001 19:45:22 -0000 Received: (qmail 63230 invoked from network); 7 Oct 2001 19:45:21 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by 10.1.1.223 with QMQP; 7 Oct 2001 19:45:21 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m09.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.164) by mta3 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 19:47:27 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.34.1bf2ed7f (18710) for ; Sun, 7 Oct 2001 15:47:23 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <34.1bf2ed7f.28f20b4b@aol.com> Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 15:47:23 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] NU semantics To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_34.1bf2ed7f.28f20b4b_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_34.1bf2ed7f.28f20b4b_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/7/2001 1:46:55 AM Central Daylight Time, gordon.dyke@bluewin.ch writes: > The truth and amount > abstractors are clear enough, so are those in the za'i series, but what is > the difference between > > leka brode > lenu brode > leli'i brode > lesi'o brode > ledu'u brode > > a ka has to be supported by some nu for it to be true, this is also the case > Whoa! What does it mean to say that a ka is true? And what does it mean to say that it has to be supported by some nu (is suppose you mean {nu} in particular, not just any old NU). A ka phrase is just a reference to a property (or quality or -- terminology went crazy here a while back); it is neither true nor false. A propeperty (broda, say) may belong to or characterize a thing (ko'a, say) and that would make the proposition du'u ko'a broda true and would mean that the event nu ko'a broda occurs. {li'i} and {si'o} are still being disputed, but li'i koa' broda seeems at one guess to be something that only applies to ko'a and si'o seems to be something mental (just rough first approximations). > > could these interpretations be possible? > > leka brode du lenu ka'e brode > ledu'u brode du lenu ca'a brode > lesi'o brode du lenu nu'o brode > leli'i brode du lenu pu'i brode > No. The difference are not modal at all (or so only as remote consequences of more fundamental differences): the notions of property, proposition, event, experience and idea, while not perfectly explaining the meanings of the abstractors, go a long way in the right direction and do not involve modalities. (Oops, I just thought of a way that the last three might actually seem to involve modalities. All I can say is that, at least for {nu}, that equation does not work.) --part1_34.1bf2ed7f.28f20b4b_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 10/7/2001 1:46:55 AM Central Daylight Time, gordon.dyke@bluewin.ch writes:

The truth and amount
abstractors are clear enough, so are those in the za'i series, but what is
the difference between

leka brode
lenu brode
leli'i brode
lesi'o brode
ledu'u brode

a ka has to be supported by some nu for it to be true, this is also the case
for the others.

Whoa! What does it mean to say that a ka is true? And what does it mean to say that it has to be supported by some nu (is suppose you mean {nu} in particular, not just any old NU). A ka phrase is just a reference to a property (or quality or -- terminology went crazy here a while back); it is neither true nor false. A propeperty (broda, say) may belong to or characterize a thing (ko'a, say) and that would make the proposition du'u ko'a broda true and would mean that the event nu ko'a broda occurs. {li'i} and {si'o} are still being disputed, but li'i koa' broda seeems at one guess to be something that only applies to ko'a and si'o seems to be something mental (just rough first approximations).

could these interpretations be possible?

leka brode du lenu ka'e brode
ledu'u brode du lenu ca'a brode
lesi'o brode du lenu nu'o brode
leli'i brode du lenu pu'i brode

No. The difference are not modal at all (or so only as remote consequences of more fundamental differences): the notions of property, proposition, event, experience and idea, while not perfectly explaining the meanings of the abstractors, go a long way in the right direction and do not involve modalities. (Oops, I just thought of a way that the last three might actually seem to involve modalities. All I can say is that, at least for {nu}, that equation does not work.)
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