Subject: Re: [lojban] fancu

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 15:47:21 EDT

In a message dated 10/6/2001 10:15:49 PM Central Daylight Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

<> >  Would not those that are
> > equivalent always be rephraseable so as to fit the matrix?
>
>Yeah, but they might not be the one he knows, thinks of, etc. etc.  The
>intensional problem that extension-claim theory has. Almost every answer
>actually has an extension-claim equivalent, which somebody might think of, 
>so
>set-of answers covers that case, but is not restricted to it.  We are ready
>for a wide range of possibilities in each case, not just the one.
> I would still like to see an example. How could {la djan djuno le
> du'u makau broda} mean that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a brode}
> but not that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a broda}? Could you give
> an example?
> 

I suppose you mean in a case where ko'a ca'a broda. What propositions have 
the property {du'u makau broda} ? Certainly {du'u ko'a broda}, but also 
{du'u ko'a cmima le extension of zo broda} , maybe even {le extension-of zo 
broda cu pamei ko'a} and, of course, any other names or descriptions that fit 
ko'a in context in {du'u ... broda} and any properties equivalent to broda in 
{du'u ko'a ...}

<But it doesn't involve kau. Is {la djan djuno le du'u xukau do
co'u darxi le do speni} true when you have never beaten her and
John knows it? I think "Does John know whether you have stopped
beating your wife?" has the same failures as "Have you stopped
beating your wife?", so {na'i} cannot be part of the set of
answers covered by the indirect question. It will also be
answered with {na'i}, not with {go'i}.>

Actually, it probably does involve {kau} because the best way to treat direct 
questions is as special cases of indirect ones, subordinate to {ko xusra}. 
Putting the indirect question within a direct question does not seem to mess 
things up much. Sticking with the assertive form, "John knows whether you 
have stopped beating your wife," would, in the case where the presuppositions 
are not met, mean that John knows that the presuppositions are not met, that 
the correct answer is {na'i}. So, the total senstence is simply true or 
false, not itself in violation of a presupposition (well, those 
presuppositions, anyhow).

<Well, at least I agree with him that it is not the
knower/believer/opinion-holder that has to agree. It is no-one
within the text that uses the {le}-description. It is the speaker
and to some extent the listener.>

OK. But if it is only the speaker, then he can build in the completeness.