From pycyn@aol.com Sun Oct 07 12:47:30 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 7 Oct 2001 19:47:30 -0000 Received: (qmail 43633 invoked from network); 7 Oct 2001 19:47:30 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 7 Oct 2001 19:47:30 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m09.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.164) by mta3 with SMTP; 7 Oct 2001 19:47:29 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.7.) id r.60.14e4f0a7 (18710) for ; Sun, 7 Oct 2001 15:47:21 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <60.14e4f0a7.28f20b49@aol.com> Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 15:47:21 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] fancu To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_60.14e4f0a7.28f20b49_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_60.14e4f0a7.28f20b49_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 10/6/2001 10:15:49 PM Central Daylight Time,=20 jjllambias@hotmail.com writes: <> >=A0 Would not those that are > > equivalent always be rephraseable so as to fit the matrix? > >Yeah, but they might not be the one he knows, thinks of, etc. etc.=A0 The >intensional problem that extension-claim theory has. Almost every answer >actually has an extension-claim equivalent, which somebody might think of,= =20 >so >set-of answers covers that case, but is not restricted to it.=A0 We are re= ady >for a wide range of possibilities in each case, not just the one. > I would still like to see an example. How could {la djan djuno le > du'u makau broda} mean that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a brode} > but not that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a broda}? Could you give > an example? >=20 I suppose you mean in a case where ko'a ca'a broda. What propositions have= =20 the property {du'u makau broda} ? Certainly {du'u ko'a broda}, but also=20 {du'u ko'a cmima le extension of zo broda} , maybe even {le extension-of zo= =20 broda cu pamei ko'a} and, of course, any other names or descriptions that f= it=20 ko'a in context in {du'u ... broda} and any properties equivalent to broda = in=20 {du'u ko'a ...} Actually, it probably does involve {kau} because the best way to treat dire= ct=20 questions is as special cases of indirect ones, subordinate to {ko xusra}.= =20 Putting the indirect question within a direct question does not seem to mes= s=20 things up much. Sticking with the assertive form, "John knows whether you= =20 have stopped beating your wife," would, in the case where the presuppositio= ns=20 are not met, mean that John knows that the presuppositions are not met, tha= t=20 the correct answer is {na'i}. So, the total senstence is simply true or=20 false, not itself in violation of a presupposition (well, those=20 presuppositions, anyhow). OK. But if it is only the speaker, then he can build in the completeness. --part1_60.14e4f0a7.28f20b49_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 10/6/2001 10:15:49 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambia= s@hotmail.com writes:

<> >=A0 Would not those that are
> > equivalent always be rephraseable so as to fit the matrix?
>
>Yeah, but they might not be the one he knows, thinks of, etc. etc.= =A0 The
>intensional problem that extension-claim theory has. Almost every a= nswer
>actually has an extension-claim equivalent, which somebody might th= ink of,=20
>so
>set-of answers covers that case, but is not restricted to it.=A0 We= are ready
>for a wide range of possibilities in each case, not just the one.

I would still like to see= an example. How could {la djan djuno le
du'u makau broda} mean that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a brode}
but not that {la djan djuno le du'u ko'a broda}? Could you give
an example?

I suppose you mean in a case where ko'a ca'a broda. What proposit= ions have the property {du'u makau broda} ? Certainly {du'u ko'a brod= a}, but also {du'u ko'a cmima le extension of zo broda} , maybe even {le ex= tension-of zo broda cu pamei ko'a} and, of course, any other names or descr= iptions that fit ko'a in context in {du'u ... broda} and any properties equ= ivalent to broda in {du'u ko'a ...}

<But it doesn't involve kau. Is {la djan djuno le du'u xukau do
co'u darxi le do speni} true when you have never beaten her and
John knows it? I think "Does John know whether you have stopped
beating your wife?" has the same failures as "Have you stopped
beating your wife?", so {na'i} cannot be part of the set of
answers covered by the indirect question. It will also be
answered with {na'i}, not with {go'i}.>

Actually, it probably does involve {kau} because the best way to treat = direct questions is as special cases of indirect ones, subordinate to {ko x= usra}. Putting the indirect question within a direct question = does not seem to mess things up much. Sticking with the assertive for= m, "John knows whether you have stopped beating your wife," would, in the c= ase where the presuppositions are not met, mean that John knows that the pr= esuppositions are not met, that the correct answer is {na'i}. So, the= total senstence is simply true or false, not itself in violation of a pres= upposition (well, those presuppositions, anyhow).

<Well, at least I agree with him that it is not the
knower/believer/opinion-holder that has to agree. It is no-one
within the text that uses the {le}-description. It is the speaker
and to some extent the listener.>

OK. But if it is only the speaker, then he can build in the compl= eteness.

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