From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Oct 10 10:10:02 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_4_1); 10 Oct 2001 17:10:02 -0000 Received: (qmail 32554 invoked from network); 10 Oct 2001 17:09:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by 10.1.1.222 with QMQP; 10 Oct 2001 17:09:53 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 10 Oct 2001 17:09:48 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Wed, 10 Oct 2001 17:46:53 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Wed, 10 Oct 2001 18:19:43 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2001 18:19:17 +0100 To: pycyn , lojban Subject: Re: [lojban] "knowledge as to who saw who" readings Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta Is there some way we can characterize this middle ground, narrower than ext= ensional, broader than intensional, so that we can all get a sense of what = it is and how to recognize it?=20 As I see it, we need to be able to express -- through different constructio= ns -- both a narrowish intensional reading and a broadish extensional readi= ng, which seems to me (on the basis of superficial thought) to be handlable= by truth-conditions. I take your point about your version of Set-of-Answers, but it doesn't seem to help us in the more general problem of reporting the beliefs of others. The problem is: how do I describe John's belief when I know its truthcondit= ions but not its particular propositional and intensional form? --And. >>> 10/10/01 05:19pm >>> In a message dated 10/9/2001 9:07:53 AM Central Daylight Time,=20 arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > I continue to feel much disquiet about these issues. I think we have to b= e > able to describe the beliefs of others in terms of truth-conditional=20 > equivalence, > so that "J believes that not either p or q" is equivalent to "J believes= =20 > that > not p and not q", for instance. Without this ability, many claims we woul= d > want to make about what others believe would be stronger than we would > want, and also subject to other problems that we would often want to > avoid (notably, what counts as sufficient fidelity, when a bridi represen= ts=20 > a=20 > belief?). We need both intensional and extensional descriptions of belief= s. >=20 Actually, we need something different from either, narrower that extensiona= l,=20 broader than intensional. Extensional lets in everything that happens to b= e=20 coextensive with what you want on this world, including all the things want= ed=20 but also an indeterminate amount of junk -- even vyapti lets in all the stu= ff=20 that happens to fit the same s-t coordinates, so allows in a lot of=20 irrelevant microscopic and atomic stuff. Intensions on the other hand deal= =20 with only definitional equivalence,as it were, not the incidentals of this= =20 life that might be allowed to count in some cases of knowing, say.=20=20 (Incidentally, the "not either p or q" - "both not p and not q" passes the= =20 intensional test as well as the extensional.). One of the initial advantages of set-of-answers theory (my version, I think= =20 not xorxes' completely) is that it provides for this middle ground in the=20 notion of an answer to the question. This advantage dims somewhat if you=20 then try to unpack that notion in rigorous categories, for it is inherently= =20 pragmatic and Gricean, depending upon the background knowledge of all=20 involved, the presuppositions of the speaker and probably the listener (to = a=20 lesser extent), and some operational notion of epistemic imperatives as=20 appled to the particular case (is this where knowing a=3Db and Fa means you= =20 ought to know Fb?). Still, it does meet the purpose and some unpacking can= =20 be done in aprticular cases at elast. So, that is some progress from the de= ad=20 ends of pure extension and pure intension, which are doomed to empirical=20 failure.