From a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com Fri Oct 12 10:13:16 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0); 12 Oct 2001 17:10:08 -0000 Received: (qmail 4482 invoked from network); 12 Oct 2001 17:09:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by 10.1.1.224 with QMQP; 12 Oct 2001 17:09:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO mta07-svc.ntlworld.com) (62.253.162.47) by mta3 with SMTP; 12 Oct 2001 17:12:31 -0000 Received: from andrew ([62.255.41.197]) by mta07-svc.ntlworld.com (InterMail vM.4.01.03.00 201-229-121) with SMTP id <20011012171229.LLP710.mta07-svc.ntlworld.com@andrew> for ; Fri, 12 Oct 2001 18:12:29 +0100 Reply-To: To: Subject: RE: [lojban] "knowledge as to who saw who" readings Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 18:11:49 +0100 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2910.0) In-Reply-To: <8e.1c63254d.28f79841@aol.com> Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 From: "And Rosta" X-Yahoo-Profile: andjamin PC: > arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > Okay. So intensional descriptions of beliefs are independent of > propositional form. But we do still need a way to describe beliefs > when we know their truthconditions but not their intensional form. > > Well, the problem is that there truth conditions don't enter in to > the issue when we are dealing with beliefs, the intension determines > the extension, to be sure, but the converse does not hold nor play > any role. It is pretty clear that knowing truth conditions will > never be adequate for doing anything inside intensional contexts, and > all your proposals seem to be trying to use truth conditions for just > that. I'm not sure what you mean by "adequate"; certainly we can't do without having a way to represent intensional forms of beliefs, but at the same time I think we can't do without having a way to represent extensional forms of beliefs, and I don't readily see the snag: what's wrong with saying "the truth conditions of p are blahblahblah and John believes p"? > original message to see where I went wrong), which was that lo > -extension-member-claim (etc.) should be defined as proposition that > is truthconditionally equivalent to tu'odu'u da cmima tu'o -extension > be tu'odu'u ce'u viska ce'u, etc. The intention, then, is that given > "la djon jinvi/djuno lo -extension-member-claim be tu'odu'u ce'u > viska ce'u", we know the truthconditions of John's belief but not > its intensional form. Is that clear? > > I likened it to your set-of-answers approach because it too does not > specify the intensional form of answers.> > > But your approach still does not get over the extension-intension > gap. You just know extensional equivalence and that says nought > about intensional anything (well, if they are not extensionally > equivalent, they are not intensionally either). I agree (I think -- I can't ever be sure we understand one another right) that my approach says nought about intensional anything. But I don't see that as a problem. > The set of answers > apporach, since it deals only with answers, can come close to taking > each answer as intensionally equivalent to some model answer on the > basis of an extensional equivalence. But that still doesn't > completely solve the intension problem, since there will be model > answers which are extensionally equivalent but not intensionally so > and so can't be intersubstituted: correct descriptions and names, for > example. I don't understand everything you say, but I had taken it as one of the strengths of the xorxesian set-of-answers approach that it isn't intensional (or so I understood). > 3, you offered: > > #SA3b. la djon djuno tu'odu'u ri djuno ro jetnu du'u makau viska makau > > but I think you will agree that there is an intensional (and probably > also truthconditional) difference between John knowing that nobody but > Bill went, and, on the other hand, John knowing that for every > goer he knows that they went. So SA3 is still not satisfactory.> > > The question clearly asks only for the latter and the claim that it > asks for more is dubious, Griceanly. If he gives the complete list > and stops, we give him full marks, whether or not he goes on wiht > "and nobody else." The "and nobody else" is as separate a piece of > knowledge as is the individual listed items and so needs a separate > clause (another dubious aspect of the "extension claim" theory). If I ask "Who was at the party?" I may be satisfied if you tell me names of some of the people at the party (so you give me knowledge of the Scenario 1 sort) or it may be that I'm satisfied only if you give me Scenario 3 sort of knowledge. From the point of view of the questioner/knower, Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are indistinguishable. However, from the point of view of someone who has Scenario 3 knowledge, they are distinguishable. In our discussion it is useful to keep Scenario 2 under consideration, so as to make sure it is distinct from Scenario 3. So, to reply to what you say, I think the "and nobody else" is implied by an answer that is understood to be exhaustive. --And.