From pycyn@aol.com Tue Oct 30 17:20:47 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_0_0_1); 31 Oct 2001 01:20:47 -0000 Received: (qmail 98871 invoked from network); 31 Oct 2001 01:20:47 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by 10.1.1.222 with QMQP; 31 Oct 2001 01:20:47 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m02.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.5) by mta1 with SMTP; 31 Oct 2001 01:20:47 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m02.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v31_r1.8.) id r.15d.345830a (659) for ; Tue, 30 Oct 2001 20:20:43 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <15d.345830a.2910abeb@aol.com> Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 20:20:43 EST Subject: Re: [lojban] observatives & a construal of lo'e & le'e To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_15d.345830a.2910abeb_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10535 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra --part1_15d.345830a.2910abeb_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 10/30/2001 2:59:24 PM Central Standard Time,=20 arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > I meant "count as a macrosyntagm", a licit maximal syntactic unit. (But=20 > actually that wouldn't work, because lojban syntactic units go up to=20 > text level.) >=20 And it will conflict with what you mean by sentence elsewhere. We probably= =20 should avoid the word altogether. Since the normal meaning of {zo'e} (if that locution has any sense at all) = is=20 "the obvious thing," the observative use seem perfectly normal. Context m= ay=20 force the "currently observed" meaning or some other, just as it always doe= s. <#{lo gerku} could mean "Lo! A dog", while {le gerku} could mean #"Lo! The dog".> # #Well, it is not a sentence, and I suspect a bit of subconscious punning to= =20 #get to this reading (it was surely present when the idea was first present= ed=20 #-- so far as I know -- in '76 or so).=A0=20 I don't understand the punning.> Lo (gadri and voici) <#Oddly, the object of observation is always {le} by definition, so the pun= =20 fails. "lo! the dog" =3D "le gerku is here" "lo! a dog" =3D "here, da gerku" For the latter, the object of observation is not a dog but a soa of there=20 being a dog.>=20=20 MMfpfhmpf! I'm sure you meant something by this but the combination of=20 macreons and impossible translations and the word "soa" (in what language o= r=20 short for what I cannot tell) lost the point completely. =20=20 Well, I'm glad we agree on how it works and whether it is good that it does= .=20=20 As to whether it is exceptional, that is going to depend on things we just= =20 don't agree on, like where there are bridi in sentences and what is in them= =20 and what the rules are about quantifiers in them (indeed, whether there are= =20 rules of this sort). However, a flip through some notes shows that the poi= nt=20 about sumti with {tu'a} has been made repeatedly since the invention of=20 {tu'a} (and before as part of the argument for it, once subject rasing was= =20 acknowledged) in threads with topics like "subject raising", "intensional=20 contexts," "unicorn hunting," "I want a nail," and probably many others. Since those topics tend to occur at least once a year, "relatively attentiv= e"=20 seems unsupported (the more so since you were often a participant in the=20 discussions). Others have done significantly better and you might have copied them or at= =20 least referenced them. Most of them actually do agree with me on the cruci= al=20 point, that what separates the occasional good prototype theory from the=20 dreck is having a clear sense of what the relation is between prototype and= =20 version, something you have singularly failed to provide. As for having=20 their own gadri, they may well have their own predicates but it remains to = be=20 shown that there is any need for a special gadri for prototypes: why not ju= st=20 {lo prototype of}? <# # #Whoa!=A0 You can (or could in certain situations) see, touch and smell ME,= but=20 #I am not a me prototype in any interesting sense.=A0=20 Yes, you are.> Of what? Me? No, I am all of me, not a prototype or a version either. Yo= u=20 can call worm theory prototype theory if you want, but calling a dog's tail= a=20 leg doesn't make it a leg. They are structurally very different. <#That works for an individual, but not for a natural kind (let=20 #alone a {le} group). This is not coming across as an ontology now, so much= =20 as=20 #a verbal formula that covers several ontologies that inherently have nothi= ng=20 #to do with one another.=A0 That judgment may turn out to be wrong (see=20 #Lesniewski's mereology), but it sure needs a lot of work to make it=20 plausible. I think you're setting unreasonably high philosophical standards here.> My standard is about as low as possible and still be a standard. Tell me h= ow=20 prototype theory works to explain {lo'e gerku} in a way that gets it right= =20 and that does not depend upon alaready knowing everything needed about lo'e= =20 gerku. That is, show me that prototype theory provides an explanation,=20 rather than an obfuscation. Where? Not in any of your remarks so far. And it certainly does not seem = ot=20 be {lo'e} A large part of the reason for the negative answer above < Is their conceptual essence adequately understood? Yes.>=20 Again, aside from your assurance (poorly evidenced) that you understand it = --=20 and a bunch of other anonymous folk do too -- no evidence has been presente= d,=20 not even a coherent description (though several incompatible partial ones). <#What is the relation between the prototype and the version by virtue of=20 which=20 #the version is a version of the prototype, rather than something else. Ah. Resemblance, is the usual answer.> Yes, it has been since Plato, and has been recognizably inadequate since=20 then, too (even Flatsy his own self noticed it). Any two things resemble o= ne=20 another -- and are different from one another, what describes the relevant = =20 resemblance and dfifferences here? <#<#and of course means that=20 ##the individual has properties that none of its versions has and=20 #conversely).=A0=20 # #I think this is held (by prototype theorists) to not be the case. I would= =20 #favour #going along with that view in the interpretation of {lo'e broda}, and taki= ng #{lo'e/tu'o du'u ce'u broda} to be the Platonic essence.> # #Yes, but HOW would they do it?=A0=20 sorry -- do what?> Explain the relation between prototype and version, such that the differenc= es=20 did not matter. Well, I use what I need. Notice that set-of-answers question theory involv= es=20 a nice chunk of prototypes essentially -- the answers which syntactically=20 match the question and factually meet the preconditions: the versions are (= as=20 usual) all the semo-pragmatic contextuallly licit variants -- maybe includi= ng=20 translations (let's leave them out). Maybe if I know what the capital letter and the odd syntax meant, I would b= e=20 a bit better off. Can you explain that at least? The short answer in=20 Lojban, as you know, is that you don't avoid quantifiers but treating a=20 category as an individual is dirt simple (at least compared to treating an= =20 individual as an individual). Finding a gadri that really caught a real=20 individual (assuming that there are some) seems much more pressing than the= =20 other problems. Sets seem to be the only idnividuals that are recotnized=20 unequivocally in Lojban. But then context has to decide. You keep moving in cases where context say= s=20 we aren't shifting at all (and, indeed, where there is no context and hence= =20 no movement). People do need to brush up on their Grice a bit in these discussions, rathe= r=20 than picking examples out of the blue and insisting that they show somethin= g=20 "on certain construals". What do they mean in the context provided or in t= he=20 normal context? =20 --part1_15d.345830a.2910abeb_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 10/30/2001 2:59:24 PM Central Standard Time, arosta@uc= lan.ac.uk writes:


I meant "count as a macro= syntagm", a licit maximal syntactic unit. (But=20
actually that wouldn't work, because lojban syntactic units go up to=20
text level.)


And it will conflict with what you mean by sentence elsewhere.  We= probably should avoid the word altogether.

<Right. A normal-zo'e x1 in main bridi cannot be elided. Where norma= l-zo'e
=3D zo'e with its normal meaning.>

Since the normal meaning of {zo'e} (if that locution has any sense at a= ll) is "the obvious thing,"  the observative use seem perfectly normal= .  Context may force the "currently observed" meaning or some other, j= ust as it always does.

<#{lo gerku} could mean "Lo! A dog", while {le gerku} could mean
#"Lo! The dog".>
#
#Well, it is not a sentence, and I suspect a bit of subconscious punnin= g to=20
#get to this reading (it was surely present when the idea was first pre= sented=20
#-- so far as I know -- in '76 or so).=A0=20

I don't understand the punning.>

Lo (gadri and voici)

<#Oddly, the object of observation is always {le} by definition, so = the pun fails.

"lo! the dog" =3D "le gerku is here"
"lo! a dog" =3D "here, da gerku"

For the latter, the object of observation is not a dog but a soa of the= re being
a dog.>  
MMfpfhmpf!  I'm sure you meant something by this but the combinati= on of macreons and impossible translations and the word "soa" (in what lang= uage or short for what I cannot tell) lost the point completely.

<None of this is so obvious as to not need mentioning. Based on my t= ime in
Lojbanistan I'd say that the main point of sumti-raising is to be brief= er or
vaguer than would be the case if the full bridi were used in stead of t= he
raised sumti.=20

This argument is a bit of waste of time, though. I think tu'a is more u= seful
if it blocks the usual quantification rules, so the only thing we disag= ree about
is whether this makes it exceptional.>  

Well, I'm glad we agree on how it works and whether it is good that it = does.  As to whether it is exceptional, that is going to depend on thi= ngs we just don't agree on, like where there are bridi in sentences and wha= t is in them and what the rules are about quantifiers in them (indeed, whet= her there are rules of this sort).  However, a flip through some notes= shows that the point about sumti with {tu'a} has been made repeatedly sinc= e the invention of {tu'a} (and before as part of the argument for it, once = subject rasing was acknowledged) in threads with topics like "subject raisi= ng", "intensional contexts," "unicorn hunting," "I want a nail," and probab= ly many others.

<I don't know if this is discussed in the Refgram. If there's no doc= umentation
anywhere, then it's hard to settle this thing. I say what I say based o= n=20
a decade of relatively attentive reading of this list, but even if in a= ny
verifiable sense I am correct, the consensus I report is destroyed by
your dissent, and the new situation is that there is no consensus>

Since those topics tend to occur at least once a year, "relatively atte= ntive" seems unsupported (the more so since you were often a participant in= the discussions).

<I have done my best to explain.=20

So you think prototype theory is bad statistics or worse Platonism: so = be it,
but there are plenty of people who don't agree with you, or who nonethe= less
find it valuable; they should not be denied their gadri.>

Others have done significantly better and you might have copied them or= at least referenced them.  Most of them actually do agree with me on = the crucial point, that what separates the occasional good prototype theory= from the dreck is having a clear sense of what the relation is between pro= totype and version, something you have singularly failed to provide.  = As for having their own gadri, they may well have their own predicates but = it remains to be shown that there is any need for a special gadri for proto= types: why not just {lo prototype of}?

<#<I see
#touch and smell the pc prototype, so prototypes aren't inherently abst= ract
#(-- I understand Platonic categories to be inherently abstract).>
#
#Whoa!=A0 You can (or could in certain situations) see, touch and smell= ME, but=20
#I am not a me prototype in any interesting sense.=A0=20

Yes, you are.>

Of what?  Me?  No, I am all of me, not a prototype or a versi= on either.  You can call worm theory prototype theory if you want, but= calling a dog's tail a leg doesn't make it a leg.  They are structura= lly very different.

<#That works for an individual, but not for a natural kind (let=20
#alone a {le} group). This is not coming across as an ontology now, so = much as=20
#a verbal formula that covers several ontologies that inherently have n= othing=20
#to do with one another.=A0 That judgment may turn out to be wrong (see= =20
#Lesniewski's mereology), but it sure needs a lot of work to make it pl= ausible.

I think you're setting unreasonably high philosophical standards here.&= gt;

My standard is about as low as possible and still be a standard.  = Tell me how prototype theory works to explain {lo'e gerku} in a way that ge= ts it right and that does not depend upon alaready knowing everything neede= d about lo'e gerku.  That is, show me that prototype theory provides a= n explanation, rather than an obfuscation.

<Is there a linguistic case for prototype-theoretic gadri? Yes.>
Where?  Not in any of your remarks so far.  And it certainly = does not seem ot be {lo'e}
<Are their logical properties well-understood or well-defined? No.&= gt;
A large part of the reason for the negative answer above

< Is their conceptual essence adequately understood? Yes.>=20
Again, aside from your assurance (poorly evidenced) that you understand= it -- and a bunch of other anonymous folk do too -- no evidence has been p= resented, not even a coherent description (though several incompatible part= ial ones).

<#What is the relation between the prototype and the version by virt= ue of which=20
#the version is a version of the prototype, rather than something else.

Ah. Resemblance, is the usual answer.>

Yes, it has been since Plato, and has been recognizably inadequate sinc= e then, too (even Flatsy his own self noticed it).  Any two things res= emble one another -- and are different from one another, what describes the= relevant  resemblance and dfifferences here?

<#<#and of course means that=20
##the individual has properties that none of its versions has and=20
#conversely).=A0=20
#
#I think this is held (by prototype theorists) to not be the case. I wo= uld=20
#favour
#going along with that view in the interpretation of {lo'e broda}, and = taking
#{lo'e/tu'o du'u ce'u broda} to be the Platonic essence.>
#
#Yes, but HOW would they do it?=A0=20

sorry -- do what?>
Explain the relation between prototype and version, such that the diffe= rences did not matter.

<let's assume you know the literature but
still think the theory's crap -- well, then, lots of people don't, and = they have
language rights too!>
Well, I use what I need.  Notice that set-of-answers question theo= ry involves a nice chunk of prototypes essentially -- the answers which syn= tactically match the question and factually meet the preconditions: the ver= sions are (as usual) all the semo-pragmatic contextuallly licit variants --= maybe including translations (let's leave them out).

<I am unsure whether "we can come of with an expression meaning "is = a/the=20
prototype of" to express this ontology". How do we avoid quantification= and
treat a category as an individual? That's where, as I see it, the gadri= is needed.
Someone prototype-theory-minded doesn't want to be faffing about choosi= ng
among different quantifiers etc. when they want to refer to Lion.>

Maybe if I know what the capital letter and the odd syntax meant, I wou= ld be a bit better off.  Can you explain that at least?  The shor= t answer in Lojban, as you know, is that you don't avoid quantifiers but tr= eating a category as an individual is dirt simple (at least compared to tre= ating an individual as an individual).  Finding a gadri that really ca= ught a real individual (assuming that there are some) seems much more press= ing than the other problems.  Sets seem to be the only idnividuals tha= t are recotnized unequivocally in Lojban.

<This is fair enough: you wish for indicators of shifting realms and= ontologies.
But the lojbanic way is to make such things optional.>

But then context has to decide.  You keep moving in cases where co= ntext says we aren't shifting at all (and, indeed, where there is no contex= t and hence no movement).
People do need to brush up on their Grice a bit in these discussions, r= ather than picking examples out of the blue and insisting that they show so= mething "on certain construals".  What do they mean in the context pro= vided or in the normal context?







=20



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