Subject: Re: [lojban] a construal of lo'e & le'e

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 20:25:32 EST

In a message dated 10/31/2001 10:47:28 AM Central Standard Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> First of all, hang on: if what you're saying is addressed to me, then I had 
> explicitly
> said to John that I don't think lo'e should be understood in terms of 
> typicality
> or averageness -- at least not definitionally.
> 

aHAH! Though I should have known it from past performance, I did entirely 
miss that what And was about was not explaining {lo'e} but rather proposing 
an entirely new use for {lo'e}, which he seems to think is not presently 
being adequately -- or appropriately -- employed. Thus, all of my comments 
about prototype theory not doing a good job of capturing typicality or 
averageness were irrelevant to his arguments(I wish And had noted that 
earlier; it might have shortened the time before I saw what he was about). 
So, "it doesn't explain 'typical'" is out; what is left?

1. Could Lojban advantageously use prototype theory? Yes. there are a 
variety of theoretical and even practical questions for which some version of 
other of prototype theory seems the most illumination approach: type-token, 
eme-allo, work and particular copy, to cite three that have come up over the 
years in Lojban.

2. Does Lojban already have the means to deal with these? Yes and no. It 
could easily create predicates that would cover these cases (a few are even 
around, I think, from previous efforts) and thus talk about the problem 
pretty clearly. This has not been done systematically in Lojban. And --and 
I take this to be And's point -- there is no consistent way to display the 
results of this discussion when it is relevant: no way to show -- when it is 
important -- whether we are talking about the highest prototype letter a or 
the particular smudge of ink at this point on this page -- or any of the 
prototypes (or versions, depending) in between. And, of course, no way to 
avoid making the distinction when it doesn't make a difference.

3. Is there a clear prototype theory? Wellll. As such things 
(philosophical or linguistic theories) go, several pretty clear ones, all 
similar enough to handle most of the same problems similarly, different 
enough to allow arguments about hard cases.

4. Does prototype theory require a new ontology? Not necessarily. Most say 
something vaguely like what And has (even more vaguely) presented, but some 
claim this is merely a convenience and then (try to?) unpack it in terms of 
various machines of linguistics or logic (finite state automata, 
transformations, Adjukeiwicz cancellation grammars, ....), whiles others 
really seem to believe the stuff they say (though what they say is rarely 
blatantly self-contradictory). 

5. Does this mean that prototypes should replace typicals as the referents 
of {lo'e} expressions? Not obviously. On the one hand, it is not clear that 
prototypes are nearly as common as typicals as points we want to make or 
distinctions that cause problems. Further, it is not clear that gadri are 
the appropriate way to make prototype/version distinctions: these are 
relative distinctions after all, not absolute ones (like genus/species 
outside biological taxonomy), with a series of prototypes/versions between 
top and bottom (though usually transitively settled, so that this smudge on 
this page is a version of the letter a (as well as of my a's, script a's, 
italic a's ....). Of course, there is the other side; that, since typicals 
are not really individuals, they should not be represented by gadri at all. 
But much the same can be said about several versions of prototypes.
In short, now that I understand what And is about, I am no closer to thinking 
he has made his case than I was before, I just know what the case is.