From pycyn@aol.com Fri Sep 13 14:07:32 2002 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_1_1_3); 13 Sep 2002 21:07:32 -0000 Received: (qmail 16245 invoked from network); 13 Sep 2002 21:07:31 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.218) by m3.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 13 Sep 2002 21:07:31 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r06.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.102) by mta3.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 13 Sep 2002 21:07:31 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r06.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v34.10.) id r.68.259d7022 (4584) for ; Fri, 13 Sep 2002 17:07:26 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <68.259d7022.2ab3ad8d@aol.com> Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2002 17:07:25 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: I like chocolate To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_68.259d7022.2ab3ad8d_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 10509 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Group-Post: member; u=2455001 X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra --part1_68.259d7022.2ab3ad8d_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/13/2002 2:45:04 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes: << > {lo'e broda} is special in that it does not instantiate {da}. > {broda lo'e brode} does not logically entail {broda da}, the > way {broda la djan} does. In this respect it is like {broda > zi'o} which also does not entail {broda da}. > >> Yes, I see that that is the analogy you are using. But it is a bad one. {lo'e broda} des not go to bound form because, although it is a surface sumti, it is not a surface referring word. {zi'o} on the other hand does not quantify up because it is not a sumti at all -- we don't quantify over {se} or {ui} or (closest) {i}. << "I like sofas, but there's just no sofa that I like", while contradictory at some psychological level, is not logically contradictory. >> If the "sofas" here is {lo'e sfofa}, whether this is contradictory or not will depend upon just what {lo'e} means -- it clearly will not work with "typical" and probably not with "average." Clearly "ideal" presents no problems, but I am unsure about "stereotypical." And, of course, I still have no idea just where your usage fits into all of this. << >?! Your {lo'e} is more general that Lojban's?! If {nelci lo'e cakla} were restricted to liking some particular kind of chocolate, (ordinary, was it?) then yes, my {lo'e} is more general, as it's only about chocolate, not about typical chocolate, ordinary chocolate or any other restriction on the concept of chocolate. >> I suspect this is a terminological muddle (again). I meant that Lojban opens up a broad possibility for things that can be true of {lo'e broda}, anything that is typical across the set of broda, and I have been taking your position to be that {lo'e broda} does was restricted to inherent (or close on) properties of the members of that set. And it still does seem to be that way, since the relevant set of properties seem to be just those very close to inherent in being chocolate. Lacking the details yet of your {lo'e}, I can't translate it out (I'm not sure I can translate any of these into more explicit Lojban) but the Lojban form of your sentence would be something like "Typically, if I were to have (probably eat) a piece of chocolate, I would like it." In this context, the "typical" goes not on the chocolate but on the whole situation. I don't think that is always true, though I have trouble coming up with clear counter examples. I sometimes think that {lo'e cinfo cu xabju la frikas} will do, but then I think that is just "Typically, if a thing were a lion, then it would live in Africa." But neither of these restricts the sorts of properties that may be involved -- or the cases that count for the truth of the claim, but rather allow for a broad range of possibly true sentence. I would take it that, in your case, {lo'e cinfo cu xabju la frikas} is much less certainly true, since, even zoos aside, lions live, and can and have lived, in lots of other places (currently only India/Pakistan, but once at the gates of Rome and Athens). But, of course, I am not sure, since I don't know what yours means. << >Does {mi >nelci lo'e sfofa} means something like (we can prise out the details later) >"I would like anything that had the properties delimited in {lo'e sfofa}"? If your "anything" there is not a {da}, ok. But we don't have anything in Lojban to stand for that English "anything" (other than {lo'e}). >> The "anything" is just {roda}, I think, but it is in an intensional contexts of sentence length at least. Notice that this sentence is to explain {lo'e}, so {lo'e} has no place in it -- its components have been spread over the whole sentence. {lo'e broda} is ultimately an improper symbol in Russell's sense -- when the semantics are laid out, there is nothing to correspond to that symbol, but the whole sentence works. (cf descriptions in Russell, which are improper symbols, so that "the king of France is bald" "really" is "there is something that is a king of France and is such that any thing that is a king of France is identical with it, and it is bald." -- with various additional fillips as complications arose.) But worse because the expansion is intensional (always?) --part1_68.259d7022.2ab3ad8d_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/13/2002 2:45:04 PM Central Daylight Time, jjllambias@hotmail.com writes:

<<
{lo'e broda} is special in that it does not instantiate {da}.
{broda lo'e brode} does not logically entail {broda da}, the
way {broda la djan} does. In this respect it is like {broda
zi'o} which also does not entail {broda da}.
>
>

Yes, I see that that is the analogy you are using.  But it is a bad one.  {lo'e broda} des not go to bound form because, although it is a surface sumti, it is not a surface referring word.  {zi'o} on the other hand does not quantify up because it is not a sumti at all -- we don't quantify over {se} or {ui} or (closest) {i}.

<<
"I like sofas, but there's just no sofa that I like",
while contradictory at some psychological level, is not
logically contradictory.
>>
If the "sofas" here is {lo'e sfofa}, whether this is contradictory or not will depend upon just what {lo'e} means  -- it clearly will not work with "typical" and probably not with "average."  Clearly "ideal" presents no problems, but I am unsure about "stereotypical."  And, of course, I still have no idea just where your usage fits into all of this.

<<
>?! Your {lo'e} is more general that Lojban's?!

If {nelci lo'e cakla} were restricted to liking some particular
kind of chocolate, (ordinary, was it?) then yes, my {lo'e}
is more general, as it's only about chocolate, not about
typical chocolate, ordinary chocolate or any other restriction
on the concept of chocolate.
>>
I suspect this is a terminological muddle (again).  I meant that Lojban opens up a broad possibility for things that can be true of {lo'e broda}, anything that is typical across the set of broda, and I have been taking your position to be that {lo'e broda} does was restricted to inherent (or close on) properties of the members of that set. And it still does seem to be that way, since the relevant set of properties seem to be just those very close to inherent in being chocolate.  Lacking the details yet of your {lo'e}, I can't translate it out (I'm not sure I can translate any of these into more explicit Lojban) but the Lojban form of your sentence would be something like "Typically, if I were to have (probably eat) a piece of chocolate, I would like it."  In this context, the "typical" goes not on the chocolate but on the whole situation.  I don't think that is always true, though I have trouble coming up with clear counter examples. I sometimes think that {lo'e cinfo cu xabju la frikas} will do, but then I think that is just "Typically, if a thing were a lion, then it would live in Africa."  But neither of these restricts the sorts of properties that may be involved -- or the cases that count for the truth of the claim, but rather allow for a broad range of possibly true sentence.  I would take it that, in your case, {lo'e cinfo cu xabju la frikas} is much less certainly true, since, even zoos aside, lions live, and can and have lived, in lots of other places (currently only India/Pakistan, but once at the gates of Rome and Athens).  But, of course, I am not sure, since I don't know what yours means.

<<
>Does {mi
>nelci lo'e sfofa} means something like (we can prise out the details later)
>"I would like anything that had the properties delimited in {lo'e sfofa}"?

If your "anything" there is not a {da}, ok. But we don't have
anything in Lojban to stand for that English "anything"
(other than {lo'e}).
>>
The "anything" is just {roda}, I think, but it is in an intensional contexts of sentence length at least.  Notice that this sentence is to explain {lo'e}, so {lo'e} has no place in it -- its components have been spread over the whole sentence.  {lo'e broda} is ultimately an improper symbol in Russell's sense -- when the semantics are laid out, there is nothing to correspond to that symbol, but the whole sentence works.
(cf descriptions in Russell, which are improper symbols, so that "the king of France is bald" "really" is "there is something that is a king of France and is such that any thing that is a king of France is identical with it,  and it is bald."  -- with various additional fillips as complications arose.)  But worse because the expansion is intensional (always?)
 --part1_68.259d7022.2ab3ad8d_boundary--