From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Mon Sep 23 06:15:35 2002
Return-Path: <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>
X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk
X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com
Received: (EGP: mail-8_1_1_3); 23 Sep 2002 13:15:35 -0000
Received: (qmail 20935 invoked from network); 23 Sep 2002 13:15:35 -0000
Received: from unknown (66.218.66.218)
  by m14.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 23 Sep 2002 13:15:35 -0000
Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3)
  by mta3.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 23 Sep 2002 13:15:35 -0000
Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer);
  Mon, 23 Sep 2002 13:43:18 +0100
Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk
  with Novell_GroupWise; Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:15:51 +0100
Message-Id: <sd8f2217.006@gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk>
X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 14:15:27 +0100
To: lojban <lojban@yahoogroups.com>
Subject: notes on conventional implicature (was Re: tu'o usage
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Disposition: inline
From: And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>
X-Yahoo-Group-Post: member; u=810630
X-Yahoo-Profile: andjamin

Lionel Vidal <nessus@free.fr> 09/23/02 08:40am >>>
[....]
#> > {lo pa broda naku brode} =3D {su 'o lo pa broda naku brode}
#> > =3D {naku zu'o ro lo pa broda cu brode} =3D {ro lo pa broda na brode}
#> I don't agree that the last 2 are equivalent to the first 2, since
#> the first 2 mean:
#> ge su'o broda na ku brode gi lo'i broda cu pa mei
#> and the second two mean:
#> na ku ge ro broda cu brode gi lo'i broda cu pa mei
#
#I agree and so now we reach the problem that bothered me for a while:
#consider {OUTER lo INNER broda na brode}
#Would you say that this is true when:
# the brode relationship is false
# or the cardinality of the underlying set of broda given by INNER is fals=
e
# or the cardinality of the broda involved in the relationship given
# by OUTER is false
#(with of course inclusive or).

That's a convoluted question! But now that I work out what you're
saying, surely the answer is a totally uncontroversial Yes. Oh, hang
on -- I see what you meant. You are asking if each of the conditions
is sufficient to make the sentence true (-- my first reading was that
you were asking if one of the conditions was sufficient to make the
sentence true). Okay -- my answer is Yes, though not an uncontroversial
Yes -- I'm still waiting to hear from pc his reasons for saying No.

#I would say yes and this invalidates my previous claims on the implication
#of the broda referent existence when using {na}.
#And so {tu'o}, because of its lesser sensitivity to the problems
#negations involve, seems indeed useful to me now: thank you
#for your patient explanations.

Wow! I can't remember the last time I ever persuaded anybody of
anything on this list!

#and:
#>This is because
#>Lojban makes little if any use of presupposition/conventional
#>implicature (outside of UI, at least),
#pc:
#>I thnk that there are a variety of facts that suggest that internal
#>quantification is presuppositional
#
#Sorry, I may have a problem with my english there: I am not sure of
#what you mean with 'presupposition implicature'.

There is a linguistic phenomenon variously called 'presupposition'
(and older but still current term) and 'conventional implicature'
(following the work of H. P. Grice -- see Wiki). I prefer the latter
term (and I don't want to get into arguments about whether
presupposition is different from conventional implicature).
What this phenomenon involves is that something is contained
in the linguistically-encoded meaning of the sentence, yet
is outside the scope of what is asserted. A classic way of
testing this is to apply negation, which does not cancel
conv-implic. So for example,=20

1 "He is poor but happy"

means

2 "[unasserted:] There is an incongruity between being poor and=20
being happy=20
and I assert that he is poor and happy"

while

3 "He isn't poor but happy"

means

4 "[unasserted:] There is an incongruity between being poor and=20
being happy=20
and I assert that he isn't poor and happy"

and not

5 "It is not the case that [unasserted:] There is an incongruity between=20
being poor and being happy=20
and I assert that he is poor and happy"
=20
(There is a phenomenon called 'metalinguistic negation' -- Lojban na'i
-- which in English involves special intonation and the appropriate
context -- which can cancel conv-implic; cf.

6. He isn't 'poor BUT happy'; he's poor AND happy.

)

Lojban definitely has conventional implicature:
* some UI
* "le broda" is equivalent to=20
"[unasserted:] da poi ro lu'a ke'a broda .... [asserted:] ro lu'a da"
However, these are special cases. Other debated cases have been
resolved against conv-implic. For example, in English the object of
"know" is conventionally-implicated to be true: "She didn't know he
was bald" still implicates that "he was bald", but in Lojban it doesn't.

--And.


