From pycyn@aol.com Sat Sep 28 15:42:48 2002 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-8_1_1_4); 28 Sep 2002 22:42:48 -0000 Received: (qmail 82698 invoked from network); 28 Sep 2002 22:42:48 -0000 Received: from unknown (66.218.66.217) by m4.grp.scd.yahoo.com with QMQP; 28 Sep 2002 22:42:48 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m01.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.4) by mta2.grp.scd.yahoo.com with SMTP; 28 Sep 2002 22:42:47 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m01.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v34.13.) id r.e6.2f0472ea (4012) for ; Sat, 28 Sep 2002 18:42:42 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2002 18:42:42 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: On what there isn't To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_e6.2f0472ea.2ac78a62_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 7.0 for Windows US sub 10509 From: pycyn@aol.com X-Yahoo-Group-Post: member; u=2455001 X-Yahoo-Profile: kaliputra --part1_e6.2f0472ea.2ac78a62_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/27/2002 5:22:29 PM Central Daylight Time, lojban-out@lojban.org writes: << > Rule of > thumb - if the signs on the road (as opposed to road signs) are in > Welsh, you're in Wales. >> Well, some signs had nothing I would call a vowel, so I'll take that as evidence of Wales. (PWCH, I seem to recall). << There were some interesting threads on zasti some time back (see, for example, http://balance.wiw.org/~jkominek/lojban/9412/msg00373.html). >> I don't remember the old discussion, but I think I would now understand it differently -- or, at least, take up a different position on it. << I tend to go for the "zasti should not be a gismu" view (though I can see some merits in both sides); I just don't see existence as a predicate. >> I think some of this is what is involved in being extranuclear in Parsons' sense. I mean, the English word "exist" is a pefectly good -- and useful -- predicate, and the same seems true for {zasti}, although there are some current problems with that latter. << the only way I can think of making sense of "x exists" is as a semantically incomplete way of saying "x is a member of y", where "y" is usually "the set of entities that can ultimately be said to refer, however vaguely, to some physical state/event," but may have other meanings. "The present king of France" can be said to exist in a more idiosyncratic sense; i.e., "the present king of France is a member of the set of examples used by Bertrand Russell." >> This is a tad muddled -- use/mention as usual in these discussions. "the present king of France" -- the words, not the guy -- is an example in Russell and perhaps by virtue of that the guy has a kind of existence -- what Meinong/Parsons would called "watered down." The same goes on above, that x (the thing) exists is equated with x being a member of a set of things that refer -- and hence are referring expressions, i.e. words, so not (sually) things at all. I suppose that you mean that "x exists" means that x participates in some physical event, which seems to me about right gnerally (except I don't mind have properties exist, say) [BTW -- more taxicab -- the distinction between being and existing tidies up the odd status of events in Lojban: we've said they all exist whether or not they occur, we could now say that non-occurring events be (can be quantified over) but only occurring ones exist -- which again feels about right.] << > Now what doesn't exist? Nothing. It's like asking "What isn't real?" Everything is a real _something_ ; e.g. Hercules is a real hero in Greek mythology, as opposed to Xena, who is a real TV role but not a real greek heroine, AFAIK. Consequently, Xena exists, but this is trivial. >> Yes, this is how things go in Lojban now. We can always (well, almost) find a world (epistemology -- no, for {zasti} it's metaphysics) in which a given thing [context leaper] exists. But notice, that 1) that is different from being real -- though exactly how might take a little work. Many of these things that exist somewhere do not exist here-and-now (and aren't real either), so that current Lojban has to (covertly) shift worlds to talk about them, their names lacking reference in this world. Providing that reference is the point of introducing non-existents. << Surely this is one of those interminable proper noun problems. "Queen Victoria" can refer to the flesh and blood ruler of the physical Britain, or to the character in the book. It's pretty clear in Lojban: "la viktorias." means "that which is named Victoria (after delojbanisation)", and can thus refer to either "that which was named Victoria by Conan Doyle" or "that which is named Victoria by historians." >> Or, indeed, by her parents. Yes, {la viktorias} probbably works somewhat differntly in Lojban from "Victoria" in English. But it cannot refer to that which was named "Victoria" by Conan Doyle because, as of now, there is no such thing. The word "Victoria" might occur in a novel (It doesn't in the Sherlock Holmes stories, I think) but one of the features of novels is that many of the names in them don't refer to anything (that exists). Parsons insists that usually words in novels that ordinarily refer to existing things do so in the novels as well -- usually. But that is not essential to this theory at this point (it just makes somethings easier, with an unexplored ossibbility of making other things harder). The point here is to give names in novels, etc. normal status as referring to things (albeit nonexistent ones). << I'm still unsure of the status of proper nouns, though - despite having explained it glibly in the Lessons, I have no clear idea of the boundary bewteen an arbitrary label and a description. For example, my own name is an arbitrary label, in that my parents did not consciously choose to describe me as "Fame-bright"*, but what about "Dances with Wolves"? Sorry, getting off-topc here ... >> Actually not. The difference is not crucial, however, for the present issue. What is important is that {la} is a subclass of {le} and so assumes that there is something to which the expression refers. --part1_e6.2f0472ea.2ac78a62_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 9/27/2002 5:22:29 PM Central Daylight Time, lojban-out@lojban.org writes:

<<
Rule of
thumb - if the signs on the road (as opposed to road signs) are in
Welsh, you're in Wales.

>>
Well, some signs had nothing I would call a vowel, so I'll take that as evidence of Wales. (PWCH, I seem to recall).


<<
There were some interesting threads on zasti some time back (see, for
example, http://balance.wiw.org/~jkominek/lojban/9412/msg00373.html). 
>>
I don't remember the old discussion, but I think I would now understand it differently -- or, at least, take up a different position on it.

<<
I tend to go for the "zasti should not be a gismu" view (though I can see
some merits in both sides); I just don't see existence as a predicate.
>>
I think some of this is what is involved in being extranuclear in Parsons' sense.  I mean, the English word "exist" is a pefectly good -- and useful -- predicate, and the same seems true for {zasti}, although there are some current problems with that latter.

<<
the only way I can think of making sense of "x exists" is as a
semantically incomplete way of saying "x is a member of y", where "y" is
usually "the set of entities that can ultimately be said to refer,
however vaguely, to some physical state/event," but may have other
meanings.   "The present king of France" can be said to exist in a more
idiosyncratic sense; i.e., "the present king of France is a member of
the set of examples used by Bertrand Russell."
>>
This is a tad muddled -- use/mention as usual in these discussions. "the present king of France" -- the words, not the guy -- is an example in Russell and perhaps by virtue of that the guy has a kind of existence -- what Meinong/Parsons would called "watered down."  The same goes on above, that x (the thing) exists is equated with x being a member of a set of things that refer -- and hence are referring expressions, i.e. words, so not (sually) things at all.  I suppose that you mean that "x  exists" means that x participates in some physical event, which seems to me about right gnerally (except I don't mind have properties exist, say) [BTW -- more taxicab -- the distinction between being and existing tidies up the odd status of events in Lojban: we've said they all exist whether or not they occur, we could now say that non-occurring events be (can be quantified over) but only occurring ones exist -- which again feels about right.]

<<
> Now what doesn't exist?

Nothing.  It's like asking "What isn't real?"  Everything is a real
_something_ ; e.g. Hercules is a real hero in Greek mythology, as
opposed to Xena, who is a real TV role but not a real greek heroine,
AFAIK. Consequently, Xena exists, but this is trivial.
>>
Yes, this is how things go in Lojban now.  We can always (well, almost) find a world (epistemology  -- no,  for {zasti} it's metaphysics) in which a given thing [context leaper] exists.  But notice, that 1) that is different from being real -- though exactly how might take a little work.  Many of these things that exist somewhere do not exist here-and-now (and aren't real either), so that current Lojban has to (covertly) shift worlds to talk about them, their names lacking reference in this world.  Providing that reference is the point of introducing non-existents.

<<
Surely this is one of those interminable proper noun problems.  "Queen
Victoria" can refer to the flesh and blood ruler of the physical
Britain, or to the character in the book.  It's pretty clear in Lojban:
"la viktorias." means "that which is named Victoria (after
delojbanisation)", and can thus refer to  either "that which was named
Victoria by Conan Doyle" or "that which is named Victoria by
historians."
>>
Or, indeed, by her parents.  Yes, {la viktorias}  probbably works somewhat differntly in Lojban from "Victoria" in English.  But it cannot refer to that which was named "Victoria" by Conan Doyle because, as of now, there is no such thing.  The word "Victoria" might occur in a novel (It doesn't in the Sherlock Holmes stories, I think) but one of the features of novels is that many of the names in them don't refer to anything (that exists).  Parsons insists that usually words in novels that ordinarily refer to existing things do so in the novels as well -- usually.  But that is not essential to this theory at this point (it just makes somethings easier, with an unexplored ossibbility of making other things harder).  The point here is to give names in novels, etc. normal status as referring to things (albeit nonexistent ones).

<<
I'm still unsure of the status of proper nouns, though -
despite having explained it glibly in the Lessons, I have no clear idea
of the boundary bewteen an arbitrary label and a description.  For
example, my own name is an arbitrary label, in that my parents did not
consciously choose to describe me as "Fame-bright"*, but what about
"Dances with Wolves"?  Sorry, getting off-topc here ...
>>
Actually not.  The difference is not crucial,  however, for the present issue.  What is important is that {la} is a subclass of {le} and so assumes that there is something to which the expression refers.



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