Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: brivla for 'intend'

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 11:44:36 EDT

Oh, goodie! A real philosophical problem!
1. "Intend" is often an excuse word: "I intended to do it, but...." or "I 
ended up doing that, but I intended to do tother" (Often also said as "meant 
to"). This is mainly in the past tense, although there is a present tense 
use to explain why I haven't done it *yet*. I don't suppose this is a sense 
we particularly want in Lojban -- except incidentally to some better meaning. 

2. This, incidentally, is partly the intersection of {zukte} and {gasnu}: I 
zukte this to achieve that, but I gasnu the other, see my old request for the 
ut verb: x did y to achieve w but got z -- where y is something "under x's 
control" and w and z are consequences that involve other factors. Most of 
the motivation the twitch actions that I talked about earlier (something 
about {cmila}?) lies in trying to work out what *is* under the agent's 
control (and even these require functioning plumbing -- but that is internal 
to the agent, even if not part of his "will"). 

3. Where "intend" is not an excuse, it is directly a commitment ({nupre}? 
with a blanked x3?) and, somewhat less directly, a plan ({platu}, but I am 
not sure just what goes into x2 and x3), though explicit details ({platu2}?) 
need not be forthcoming. The commitment is conditional, at least in the sense 
that circumstances can override it even when it is still technically possible 
to fulfill it. And, of course, attempts to fulfill the commitment may end in 
failure and achieving quite the opposite results (see 1. 1 and 2).

4. It is independent of wanting and wishing and desiring, except in so far 
as it is goal-specifying and many (most?) goals are wanted or wished for or 
desired. As cases have shown, something can be intended that is not w/w/d 
(or, at least, not directly -- another notion fraught with muddles: how 
distinguish direct w/w/d from indirect, when most w/w/d are wanted (etc.) as 
means to some further w/w/d: happiness, if nothing else). 

5. Most of this is separate from the notion of doing something 
intentionally. Doing what one intends to do is usually acting intentionally, 
but not all (maybe even very few) intentional acts are doing what one 
intended. Acting intentionally requires only being aware of what one is 
doing and of (cripes, here come the load again) willing to do it (or, at 
least, consenting to its being done thus: the monothelite problem). Thus 
both acts of a somnambulist while somnambulating and of a person whose muscle 
activity is being controlled by a machine somewhere are excluded from 
"intentional acts." Nor are unknown factors to count: Oedipos intentionally 
slew the haughty old fart at the crossroads and did not intentionally slay 
his father. Of course, he did not intend to slay the old fart either -- it 
either all happened too fast to form plans and commitments or at least he 
just meant to teach him a lesson in civility.

6. Note how "intentional" slides in and out of "intensional." Goals, 
purposes, and even the ways in which acts are mentioned are intensional 
contexts (as all of the potential Lojban gismu show -- calling for a {nu} 
phrase), involving objects only as under some description, not per se.