From pycyn@aol.com Sun Feb 11 06:54:33 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_3); 11 Feb 2001 14:54:30 -0000 Received: (qmail 56315 invoked from network); 11 Feb 2001 14:54:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by m8.onelist.org with QMQP; 11 Feb 2001 14:54:29 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r14.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.68) by mta2 with SMTP; 11 Feb 2001 14:54:29 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r14.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.ea.11396f69 (3982) for ; Sun, 11 Feb 2001 09:54:24 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2001 09:54:24 EST Subject: RE: Imaginary worlds (MORE VERBOSE)(but hoepfully cleaner) To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_ea.11396f69.27b801a0_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: 6.0 sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_ea.11396f69.27b801a0_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I really did try to get this to come over from Word in a readable way, but= =20 Word seems to have a strange idea of what "text" is. Herewith another=20 version, hopefully cleaner -- next step is WordStar's ASCII. (beingcautious) We are a long way from the {su'u} thread indeed now, which= =20 was,recall, about how to talk about the -ness or -ing of an individual in=20 Lojbanand then about what these could possibly mean.=A0So we started with a= n=20 abstract entity, assumed to exist, and asked howto refer to it in Lojban.= =A0 We=20 now seemto be talking about a well-established=A0category of Lojban grammar= ,=20 cmene, and asking some or all of thefollowing questions. =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What do cmene mean?=A0 What is the sense of a cmene?=20 =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 How does a cmene attach to its referent?=20 =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 How do we pick out the right referent of acmene (in this or= any other=20 world)? =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What is essential to an individual who isthe referent of a = cmene?=A0 Is=20 thisconnected to the cmene? =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Are any of these things properties or arethey sui generis? =A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What happens across worlds under thevarious positions on th= ese issues? Andprobably a few more. Background:a world (for now and contrary to Mad Ludwig in his youth) is a=20 bunch of things,and, as an immediate consequence, a whole bunch of sets of= =20 things.=A0 A language is a bunch of words, and, as animmediate consequence,= a=20 bunch of sets of words, and then, related to those, abunch of strings of=20 words.=A0 A languageis supposed to be about a world, we need some connectio= n,=20 an interpretation ofthe language in terms of a world. We start, we think,=20 with one world and assignwords of various sets to various sets of things,=20 including words of one basicset (at least) to things taken individually.=A0= I=20 does not matter in this process what class of words we assign to, say,simpl= e=20 sets, except that the grammar must somehow give rise to strings whichwork o= ut=20 to say "x is a member of s" and "s is included int" and= =20 the like.=A0 Nor does it matterwhich member of this class we assign to a=20 particular simple set, say.=A0 From another class we, equally=20 arbitrarily,assign members to individual things, preumably from a set that= =20 allows sayingthat the things it points to are members and makes it at least= =20 difficult to saythat they have members.=A0 [Cowan can takemy talk about set= s as=20 being about discontinuous individuals, if he wants, withthe corresponding=20 kinds of relations among them.] In ourinitial world, a given thing will belong to some sets and not to othe= rs=20 andwill be the unique member of one set.=A0Many of these sets will have wor= ds=20 from the language assigned to them -or longer expressions that play the sam= e=20 role (as strings come to be analyzed)as words of the appropriate class.=A0= =20 Thesingleton of a given object may, for example, be assigned to a word or=20 phrase -or to several such - or to none --=A0 inthe langauge.=A0 The sets o= f the=20 worldform hierarchies by inclusion and some of the higher sets may get& quot;names" as well as the lower ones (and some at any level may not=20 getnames at all).=A0 Notice how undisciplinedthe connections are here: we w= ant=20 to say a few things but however we assign thewords, we can then pick from a= ll=20 the strings some with appropriate structuresto say this (given two names of= =20 individuals and the name of a two-placerelation, any string that contains t= he=20 three items will do) and, as long as weare consistent about it, it will wor= k. Now,suppose we move to another world and suppose (it's easier when doing=20 this) thatthis world can contain things that also are in the first world, b= ut=20 otherthings as well and not necessarily all the things from the first world= =20 (indeed,not necessarily any of them - apologies to Plantinga's ontological= =20 proof). Wetypically want to be somewhat less arbitrary with our language no= w:=20 we knowwhat kinds of words go with individuals, what with predicates and so= =20 on, so wewill not shift these connections around (there is an alternate=20 approach wherewe keep the same world by shift assignments or connections=20 around, but thatdoesn't improve anything but ontological muddles).=A0 Are o= ther=20 types of connections also more restricted - can weassign any member of the= =20 set-words class to any old set, and so on? Iif we lookdownward to the membe= rs=20 of the set, it seems we can: sets in the new world,will, after all, likely= =20 not have the same members as any old -world set, giventhe the two worlds=20 don't have exactly the same things in them.=A0 But if we look at the level = of=20 the set andhigher, we see that there are limits to this freedom.=A0 The set= we=20 call "red," for example, in the new worldmust, like the set red i= n=20 the old, be disjoint from a number of other disjointsets, called "gree= n,& quot; 'blue," and so on, and fall under anotherset "colored"= =20 and that under "spatial," and on up.=A0 The structure has to come= =20 over, though theparticular sets are not fixed.=A0 (Wewould be totally lost = in a=20 world described by "Suppose red were not acolor,..." though=20 admittedly less by "Suppose a whale were not amammal." -the notio= n=20 of "essential" in this sense is indeedscalar rather than polar.)= =A0=20 When wecome to similar questions about individuals and names, we notice we= =20 havealready given the game away a bit.=A0 Wetalk about the same thing in bo= th=20 worlds before we have names for it in atleast one and before we have=20 considered what classes it has to be in (whatpredicates it satisfies).=A0 T= hat=20 is, wecan identify the individual independently of what we say about it at= =20 all, andwe do that because of its uniqueness, its vishesha, say, the means= =20 whereby wefind the thing in any world it is in (and find out it is not in t= he=20 worlds itis not in).=A0 Now we have a whole seriesof questions to ask about= =20 assigning names and the like to this individual inthe new world.=A0=20 1. Doesit have to get the same name as in the old world?=A0 Usually not: ro= ses=20 and the like, y'know. 2. Doesit have to have the same properties - or some set of identical=20 properties (andthus impose some further restrictions on assigning names to= =20 sets) as in the oldworld?=A0 Again, probably not - we canimagine everything= =20 changed in hypotheticating. 3. Doeswhatever gets the name this thing had in this world in the next worl= d=20 have tohave (some set of ) the same properties as this thing had in this=20 world in thenext world?=A0 Still probably not - forone thing, the name may = not=20 be used at all in world 2 or not used for anythingin that world at least=20 (Cowan is a character in world 2 fiction, just as Holmes- a perfectly nice= =20 guy in world 2 - is in world 1).=A0 But further we want to be able to suppo= se=20 worlds in which someonecalled Cowan is a master detective, without supposin= g=20 the Cowan, the one weknow, ever is.=20 Somethinghas gang aglee here.=A0 It would seem thatnothing could be made to= =20 follow from any hypothetical contrary-to-fact:"If Socrates were and Irish washerwoman, ..." th= en=20 what?=A0 The person who is called"Socrates" is world 1 might well= be=20 an Irish washerwoman in world 2,but, lacking in that world all of the=20 characteristics Socrates had in world 1,might do absolutely anything at all= ,=20 without clarifying the issue the hypotheticalhad in mind.=A0 Similarly, an= =20 Irishwasherwoman might be named Socrates in world 2 without it telling us=20 anythinguseful (except about, maybe, some Irishman's sense of humor).=A0 Wh= at=20 we are really interested in, it turnsout on careful examination is: 4. Whatrestrictions are placed on a thing that satisfies in world 2 some=20 descriptionthat in world 1 was=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0satisf= ied=A0 by the holder of=20 thename?=A0 Essence, vishesha, is justnumerical identity and a useful sense= of=20 a name (it solves the problem of why"Venus =3D Venus" is necessar= y=20 while "Hesperus =3D Phosphorus"is not), but carries no properties= =20 with it.=A0On the other hand, the name, per se, carries neither properties= =20 nornumerical identity and so is useless for most hypotheticals, which come= =20 down tolaws, relations among predicates eventually.=A0The predicate thus co= mes=20 in somehow - and how else but by description? None ofthis makes a name ordinarily a disguised description - nor a rigid=20 designator,for that matter.=A0 But in hyptheticatingcontext, the (well, a)= =20 connotation of the name comes to function as its sense,the means to pick ou= t=20 the right person in the new world, so that we can thenargue for or from som= e=20 law or observation, what someone like Socrates in (oftennot very clearly)=20 specified ways would do as an Irish washerwoman.=A0 So our intererest is=20 neitehr in the thingnor the name, but in something two removes from either.= =A0=20 --part1_ea.11396f69.27b801a0_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I really did try to get this to come over from Word in a readable way, bu= t=20
Word seems to have a strange idea of what "text" is.  Herewith ano= ther=20
version, hopefully cleaner -- next step is WordStar's ASCII.




(beingcautious) We are a long way from the {su'u} thread indeed now, wh= ich=20
was,recall, about how to talk about the -ness or -ing of an individual = in=20
Lojbanand then about what these could possibly mean.=A0So we started wi= th an=20
abstract entity, assumed to exist, and asked howto refer to it in Lojba= n.=A0 We=20
now seemto be talking about a well-established=A0category of Lojban gra= mmar,=20
cmene, and asking some or all of thefollowing questions.
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What do cmene mean?=A0 What is the sense of a cmene?=20
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 How does a cmene attach to its referent?=20
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 How do we pick out the right referent of acmene (in thi= s or any other=20
world)?
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What is essential to an individual who isthe referent o= f a cmene?=A0 Is=20
thisconnected to the cmene?
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Are any of these things properties or arethey sui gener= is?
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 What happens across worlds under thevarious positions o= n these issues?
Andprobably a few more.
Background:a world (for now and contrary to Mad Ludwig in his youth) is= a=20
bunch of things,and, as an immediate consequence, a whole bunch of sets= of=20
things.=A0 A language is a bunch of words, and, as animmediate conseque= nce, a=20
bunch of sets of words, and then, related to those, abunch of strings o= f=20
words.=A0 A languageis supposed to be about a world, we need some conne= ction,=20
an interpretation ofthe language in terms of a world. We start, we thin= k,=20
with one world and assignwords of various sets to various sets of thing= s,=20
including words of one basicset (at least) to things taken individually= .=A0I=20
does not matter in this process what class of words we assign to, say,s= imple=20
sets, except that the grammar must somehow give rise to strings whichwo= rk out=20
to say "x is a member of s" and "s is includ= ed int" and=20
the like.=A0 Nor does it matterwhich member of this class we assign to = a=20
particular simple set, say.=A0 From another class we, equally=20
arbitrarily,assign members to individual things, preumably from a set t= hat=20
allows sayingthat the things it points to are members and makes it at l= east=20
difficult to saythat they have members.=A0 [Cowan can takemy talk about= sets as=20
being about discontinuous individuals, if he wants, withthe correspondi= ng=20
kinds of relations among them.]
In ourinitial world, a given thing will belong to some sets and not to = others=20
andwill be the unique member of one set.=A0Many of these sets will have= words=20
from the language assigned to them -or longer expressions that play the= same=20
role (as strings come to be analyzed)as words of the appropriate class.= =A0=20
Thesingleton of a given object may, for example, be assigned to a word = or=20
phrase -or to several such - or to none --=A0 inthe langauge.=A0 The se= ts of the=20
worldform hierarchies by inclusion and some of the higher sets may get&= amp;
quot;names" as well as the lower ones (and some at any level m= ay not=20
getnames at all).=A0 Notice how undisciplinedthe connections are here: = we want=20
to say a few things but however we assign thewords, we can then pick fr= om all=20
the strings some with appropriate structuresto say this (given two name= s of=20
individuals and the name of a two-placerelation, any string that contai= ns the=20
three items will do) and, as long as weare consistent about it, it will= work.
Now,suppose we move to another world and suppose (it's easier when doin= g=20
this) thatthis world can contain things that also are in the first worl= d, but=20
otherthings as well and not necessarily all the things from the first w= orld=20
(indeed,not necessarily any of them - apologies to Plantinga's ontologi= cal=20
proof). Wetypically want to be somewhat less arbitrary with our languag= e now:=20
we knowwhat kinds of words go with individuals, what with predicates an= d so=20
on, so wewill not shift these connections around (there is an alternate= =20
approach wherewe keep the same world by shift assignments or connection= s=20
around, but thatdoesn't improve anything but ontological muddles).=A0 A= re other=20
types of connections also more restricted - can weassign any member of = the=20
set-words class to any old set, and so on? Iif we lookdownward to the m= embers=20
of the set, it seems we can: sets in the new world,will, after all, lik= ely=20
not have the same members as any old -world set, giventhe the two world= s=20
don't have exactly the same things in them.=A0 But if we look at the le= vel of=20
the set andhigher, we see that there are limits to this freedom.=A0 The= set we=20
call "red," for example, in the new worldmust, like t= he set red in=20
the old, be disjoint from a number of other disjointsets, called &q= uot;green,&
quot; 'blue," and so on, and fall under anotherset "c= olored"=20
and that under "spatial," and on up.=A0 The structure= has to come=20
over, though theparticular sets are not fixed.=A0 (Wewould be totally l= ost in a=20
world described by "Suppose red were not acolor,..." = though=20
admittedly less by "Suppose a whale were not amammal.&quot= ; -the notion=20
of "essential" in this sense is indeedscalar rather t= han polar.)=A0=20
When wecome to similar questions about individuals and names, we notice= we=20
havealready given the game away a bit.=A0 Wetalk about the same thing i= n both=20
worlds before we have names for it in atleast one and before we have=20
considered what classes it has to be in (whatpredicates it satisfies).= =A0 That=20
is, wecan identify the individual independently of what we say about it= at=20
all, andwe do that because of its uniqueness, its vishesha, say, the me= ans=20
whereby wefind the thing in any world it is in (and find out it is not = in the=20
worlds itis not in).=A0 Now we have a whole seriesof questions to ask a= bout=20
assigning names and the like to this individual inthe new world.=A0=20
1. Doesit have to get the same name as in the old world?=A0 Usually not= : roses=20
and the like, y'know.
2. Doesit have to have the same properties - or some set of identical=20
properties (andthus impose some further restrictions on assigning names= to=20
sets) as in the oldworld?=A0 Again, probably not - we canimagine everyt= hing=20
changed in hypotheticating.
3. Doeswhatever gets the name this thing had in this world in the next = world=20
have tohave (some set of ) the same properties as this thing had in thi= s=20
world in thenext world?=A0 Still probably not - forone thing, the name = may not=20
be used at all in world 2 or not used for anythingin that world at leas= t=20
(Cowan is a character in world 2 fiction, just as Holmes- a perfectly n= ice=20
guy in world 2 - is in world 1).=A0 But further we want to be able to s= uppose=20
worlds in which someonecalled Cowan is a master detective, without supp= osing=20
the Cowan, the one weknow, ever is.=20
Somethinghas gang aglee here.=A0 It would seem thatnothing could be mad= e to=20
follow from any hypothetical
contrary-to-fact:"If Socrates were and Irish washerwoman, ...&= amp;quot; then=20
what?=A0 The person who is called"Socrates" is world = 1 might well be=20
an Irish washerwoman in world 2,but, lacking in that world all of the=20
characteristics Socrates had in world 1,might do absolutely anything at= all,=20
without clarifying the issue the hypotheticalhad in mind.=A0 Similarly,= an=20
Irishwasherwoman might be named Socrates in world 2 without it telling = us=20
anythinguseful (except about, maybe, some Irishman's sense of humor).= =A0 What=20
we are really interested in, it turnsout on careful examination is:
4. Whatrestrictions are placed on a thing that satisfies in world 2 som= e=20
descriptionthat in world 1 was=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0sa= tisfied=A0 by the holder of=20
thename?=A0 Essence, vishesha, is justnumerical identity and a useful s= ense of=20
a name (it solves the problem of why"Venus =3D Venus"= is necessary=20
while "Hesperus =3D Phosphorus"is not), but carries n= o properties=20
with it.=A0On the other hand, the name, per se, carries neither propert= ies=20
nornumerical identity and so is useless for most hypotheticals, which c= ome=20
down tolaws, relations among predicates eventually.=A0The predicate thu= s comes=20
in somehow - and how else but by description?
None ofthis makes a name ordinarily a disguised description - nor a rig= id=20
designator,for that matter.=A0 But in hyptheticatingcontext, the (well,= a)=20
connotation of the name comes to function as its sense,the means to pic= k out=20
the right person in the new world, so that we can thenargue for or from= some=20
law or observation, what someone like Socrates in (oftennot very clearl= y)=20
specified ways would do as an Irish washerwoman.=A0 So our intererest i= s=20
neitehr in the thingnor the name, but in something two removes from eit= her.=A0=20
--part1_ea.11396f69.27b801a0_boundary--