From pycyn@aol.com Mon Feb 12 10:08:56 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_3); 12 Feb 2001 18:08:33 -0000 Received: (qmail 46816 invoked from network); 12 Feb 2001 18:08:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 12 Feb 2001 18:08:32 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r02.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.2) by mta2 with SMTP; 12 Feb 2001 18:08:32 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r02.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.f8.73d41aa (2169) for ; Mon, 12 Feb 2001 13:08:21 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 13:08:21 EST Subject: More damn imaginary world stuff To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_f8.73d41aa.27b98095_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: 6.0 sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_f8.73d41aa.27b98095_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable cowan: <>=A0 =A0=A0 =20 > True, but to the point, perfect foreknowledge does imply the lack of choi= ce. I meant to say "choice", not "causation".=A0=A0 The point of the envelope example was to show that even though I foreknew that you would take the $1 mil instead of drinking the battery acid, your choice was perfectly unconstrained by me.> No, you meant "causation" -- you don't constrain the choice (though you may= =20 have forced it a bit), but if you KNOW which choice he will make, then he=20 does not have a choice. For, if he takes the other option, your prediction= =20 was wrong and you, consequently, did not know it at all. Just a logical=20 point: a knows that p =3D> p xod: Well, that is a position, but not one that corresponds well with ordinary=20 usage, of which logic tries to make as much sense as possible. The issue = is=20 not doing it over but doing instead. is a=20 classic modal ambiguity and the sense in which it is obviously true does no= t=20 cut offthe possibility that I could have done something else then. =20 ["positive correlation"?] In most societies, behavior is not enough, but a variety of circumstantial= =20 items enter in, at least one of which is a plausible case that someone coul= d=20 have done otherwise (often even in very remote senses -- look at the Leopol= d & Loeb verdicts). Not just Medieval (and not really Medieval either). I always start=20 Philosophy of Religion by pointing out how little the God we are going to=20 talk about has to do with the God that comes up on Sunday-Saturday-Friday. = =20 In spite of Neo-Platonism being a heresy in all Western Monotheisms, it=20 pretty much won the game in theology and philosophy. Of course, you are le= ft=20 with the question of whether anything less than The One is really worthy of= =20 worship, since it might be a mere lickspittle in the hierarchy of gods. every stement false IN THAT WORLD is true IN THAT SAME WORLD. Not really. The idea was that there are two classes of facts, ones that are true in this world but might be false in another (John's marriage), and others that must be false everywhere (2 + 2 =3D 5). But since other worlds do not exist, this isn't an issue.> Well, the other "worlds" do help exlain what is peculiar about "2+2=3D5"=20 compared to "I am the Pope," why one is easy to conceive and the other is = at=20 least a whole lot harder, if not impossible. No. It may be that any deviation from the actual laws of physics (known an= d=20 unknown) is physically impoossible -- that no world could actually exist in= =20 any other way -- but that is far from LOGICAL impossibility, that the laws= =20 imply, in themselves, a contradiction. The point is that we do talk as though there were other ways that things=20 might be and such talk seems often to make sense, even important sense. So= ,=20 let's see what we can do to find out what kind of sense it makes and what a= re=20 the conditions for its making that sense. Possible worlds are a nice ficti= on=20 for doing this, since we can set them up and examine the effects of various= =20 restrictions on them on the truth conditions of what we say using them. We= =20 can then come back to wwhat ordinary peple say and poiint out what conditio= ns=20 make certain things true or even plausible and in this way get a better gra= sp=20 on what a person is saying. Ideally, we also get people to be more careful= =20 about what they say. And maybe give up saying some things altogether -- or= =20 at least thinking that there is any useful content to it. We can't but that doesn't mean that it isn't -- or that it is, of course. = =20 Knowing and proving and being are three very different things. The last=20 guess I read was that the physical universe is deterministic but that=20 complete predictions are inherently impossible because of indetectable=20 parameters on initial conditions (Chinese butterflies). Today balvi came up clear as a bell (well, not quite because of the purple = on=20 black, but something different from This Site Ain't Playin') Thanks. --part1_f8.73d41aa.27b98095_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable cowan:
<>=A0 =A0=A0 <Foreknowledge, even perfect foreknowledge, doesn= 't imply causation.>=20
> True, but to the point, perfect foreknowledge does imply the lack = of choice.

I meant to say "choice", not "causation".=A0=A0 The point of the envelo= pe
example was to show that even though I foreknew that you would take
the $1 mil instead of drinking the battery acid, your choice was
perfectly unconstrained by me.>
No, you meant "causation" -- you don't constrain the choice (though you= may=20
have forced it a bit), but if you KNOW which choice he will make, then = he=20
does not have a choice.  For, if he takes the other option, your p= rediction=20
was wrong and you, consequently, did not know it at all.  Just a l= ogical=20
point: a knows that p =3D> p

xod:
<This is a completely meaningless sentence. C The
notion of "doing it over again" is meaningless. It does not correspond = to
anything in reality.>
Well, that is a position, but not one that corresponds well with ordina= ry=20
usage, of which logic tries to make as much sense as possible.  &n= bsp;The issue is=20
not doing it over but doing instead.  <You can only do one thin= g! > is a=20
classic modal ambiguity and the sense in which it is obviously true doe= s not=20
cut offthe possibility that I could have done something else then.

<Moral strictures and legal punishments appear to have a negative
correlation against certain kinds of behaviors. That's all the
justification that is necessary,>=20
["positive correlation"?]
In most societies, behavior is not enough, but a variety of circumstant= ial=20
items enter in, at least one of which is a plausible case that someone = could=20
have done otherwise (often even in very remote senses -- look at the Le= opold &
Loeb verdicts).

<The medieval conceptions of the Yahweh are the troublesome ones. Al= l this
rot about all-knowing, all-powerful. If you postulate powerful, wise
beings, worthy of worship, you don't run into such problems, although y= ou
may find it difficult to prove their existence.>
Not just Medieval (and not really Medieval either).  I always star= t=20
Philosophy of Religion by pointing out how little the God we are going = to=20
talk about has to do with the God that comes up on Sunday-Saturday-Frid= ay.  
In spite of Neo-Platonism being a heresy in all Western Monotheisms, it= =20
pretty much won the game in theology and philosophy.  Of course, y= ou are left=20
with the question of whether anything less than The One is really worth= y of=20
worship, since it might be a mere lickspittle in the hierarchy of gods.

<So I suppose you are asking whether there is a world in which
> every stement false IN THAT WORLD is true IN THAT SAME WORLD.


Not really. The idea was that there are two classes of facts, ones that
are true in this world but might be false in another (John's marriage),
and others that must be false everywhere (2 + 2 =3D 5). But since other
worlds do not exist, this isn't an issue.>
Well, the other "worlds" do help exlain what is peculiar about "2+2=3D5= "=20
compared to "I am the Pope,"  why one is easy to conceive and the = other is at=20
least a whole lot harder, if not impossible.

<It is entirely possible that ANY deviation from our known laws of p= hysics
involves a logical contradiction.>
No.  It may be that any deviation from the actual laws of physics = (known and=20
unknown) is physically impoossible -- that no world could actually exis= t in=20
any other way -- but that is far from LOGICAL impossibility, that the l= aws=20
imply, in themselves, a contradiction.

<I fail to see how speculation on the properties and differences bet= ween
worlds that DO NOT exist can help us understand anything in this one. T= hey
do not, and in a real sense could not exist! If we want to tie our logi= c
to observed reality and derive useable results, we are obliged to ignor= e
such fiction.>
The point is that we do talk as though there were other ways that thing= s=20
might be and such talk seems often to make sense, even important sense.=  So,=20
let's see what we can do to find out what kind of sense it makes and wh= at are=20
the conditions for its making that sense.  Possible worlds are a n= ice fiction=20
for doing this, since we can set them up and examine the effects of var= ious=20
restrictions on them on the truth conditions of what we say using them.=  We=20
can then come back to wwhat ordinary peple say and poiint out what cond= itions=20
make certain things true or even plausible and in this way get a better= grasp=20
on what a person is saying.  Ideally, we also get people to be mor= e careful=20
about what they say.  And maybe give up saying some things altoget= her -- or=20
at least thinking that there is any useful content to it.

<If we cannot get clean predictions, how can we prove the future is
completely determined?.>
We can't but that doesn't mean that it isn't -- or that it is, of cours= e.  
Knowing and proving and being are three very different things.  Th= e last=20
guess I read was that the physical universe is deterministic but that=20
complete predictions are inherently impossible because of indetectable= =20
parameters on initial conditions (Chinese butterflies).

Today balvi came up clear as a bell (well, not quite because of the pur= ple on=20
black, but something different from This Site Ain't Playin')  Than= ks.
--part1_f8.73d41aa.27b98095_boundary--