Subject: Re: [lojban] RE:su'u

From: And Rosta <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 18:29:47 +0000

#>>> John Cowan <[email-masked]> 02/10/01 06:29pm >>>
#And Rosta scripsit:
#
#> > We can if you
#> > like replace all talk of Socrates with talk of the Socratizer, where
#> > "x1 is a Socratizer" is a predicate that is (intensionally) true of
#> > Socrates and nobody else. But does this really change anything?
#> 
#> Yes it does.
#
#If you mean "Yes, because I can't understand (I) except by taking it
#as a synonym for (II)", then I understand. If you mean that (I) has
#graspably different consequences from (II), then I have not yet
#grasped them.

[BTW, don't you think your parsimony in quoting is sometimes
excessive? Nobody but me is going to remember what '(I)' [names
as labels] and '(II)' [names with senses] are.]

I am satisfied to assert merely "Yes, because I can't understand (I) 
except by taking it #as a synonym for (II)", but in fact as we have
debated off-list in the past, I also think that (I) has graspably 
different consequences from (II). IIRC, the main arguments were
that intensional contexts, such as Ortcutt espionage sentences,
and -- more controversially -- cross-world identification of
individuals work only under (II). (Those are the philosophical
arguments. There are further linguistic arguments that pertain
to English and other natlangs but not to Lojban.)

#> I forget what rigid designation is.
#
#The predicate "married to Gale McGhan" non-rigidly designates me, since
#there are many possible worlds in which it isn't true. But "first son
#of Thomas Cowan and Marianne Schultz" rigidly designates me, since it
#refers to me in every possible world in which I exist at all, and where
#I don't exist it designates nobody.
#I could have married someone else and still been me (hard as that is to
#believe after 20+ years), but the first son of some other parents could
#*not* have been me -- that would be somebody else altogether.

OK. I understand . (I could quibble with your example of the property that
\llegedly rigidly designates you, but I presume it is merely an explanatory 
example.)

#> At any rate, I see no difference
#> between Socratizer and Cat and Gold. It's also the case that Socratizer
#> is, like all (?) categories, fuzzy, so one can find worlds in which
#> something sort of is Socrates/Socratizer but isn't completely.
#
#Sharp/fuzzy, of categories, is quite different from rigid/non-rigid,
#of designations.  

If properties that rigidly designate are taken as defining properties
of intensions, then the fuzziness enters the picture in that intensions
are fuzzy (in the sense that 'membership' -- saisfaction of the
criterial properties -- is a matter of degree).

#But in fact I think all of these categories are sharp.
#Socratizer holds of *that* particular person and nobody else; 

But, I contend, in other worlds, Socratizer may hold of person
X to 95%, of person Y to 5%, and of nobody to 100%.

#Cat holds of the cat individual and nothing else; 

I delay a response pending further explanation of this.

#Gold holds of aggregates
#of atoms with 79 protons and nothing else.  

How about 'mud'?

So in a world in which a blue liquid is composed of
atoms with 79 protons (-- not at all far fetched for a
Star Trek episode), this blue liquid is gold?

#Linguistician, now *that's* a fuzzy category.

At least you admit they exist. (Fuzzy categories, I mean.)

#> I was just seeking an example
#> of something that is a mere label, but am not committed to arguing that
#> mere labels exist.
#
#Aaaak. I may start using this as my .signature.

O dear. As an example of egregiously jesuitical casuistry, I fear, rather
than of coruscating wit.

Anyway, that Aaaak is a bit unfair. After all, if I'm trying to explain a
philosophical position that I myself disagree with, I have no choice but
to give examples of things that some people, but not necessarily me,
believe to exist.

--And.