From pycyn@aol.com Fri Feb 23 10:22:20 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 23 Feb 2001 18:19:52 -0000 Received: (qmail 79014 invoked from network); 23 Feb 2001 18:01:56 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 23 Feb 2001 18:01:56 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-d08.mx.aol.com) (205.188.157.40) by mta2 with SMTP; 23 Feb 2001 18:01:56 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-d08.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.5c.79641a5 (3930) for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2001 13:01:49 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <5c.79641a5.27c7ff8d@aol.com> Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2001 13:01:49 EST Subject: Widdicombe Fair goes on To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_5c.79641a5.27c7ff8d_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: 6.0 sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_5c.79641a5.27c7ff8d_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en Xorxes: Summary: an individual per se has a logically proper name - rarely >pronounced, if ever - whose sense is the individual's vishesha (NOT a >property but a function across worlds). [...] >So, the line between what is >merely a fact about something or class and what is essential to its being >that thing or class is fuzzy at best I agree about the classes, but doesn't the same thing happen with individuals? If I say "If I were every man" then I need to consider a world where a lot of individuals of the real world are mapped into one. Or if I say "I wish I could be two different people at the same time" I need a world where my vishesha maps me into two individuals. So if visheshas can split and merge so easily, the line between what is an individual with a logically proper name and what isn't seems to be as fuzzy as for classes. Is it a problem to take individuals to be as conventional as classes?> Yes and no. For one thing, neither is conventional per se: an individual i= s=20 just that in fact and a class is just the collection of individuals (for=20 now). What is conventional or at least not decided by nature is what is=20 characteristic of that individual or class. A class has certain members an= d=20 we decide to call this the class of dogs. We could have picked other class= -=20 with more, fewer, or somewhat different members -- as that of dogs. And i= n=20 another world, this same class may not be the class of dogs, even though it= =20 has the same individuals as members. For one thing, in that other world, t= he=20 same individuals may not have the same attributes as they do in this. If w= e=20 then say that they are therefore not the same individuals ("Hey, a is a bro= wn=20 dog here and over there it is a grey cat") then the notion of "same=20 individual" also gets conventional. But the model I set up does not take=20 that course. The fuzzy individual approach is hard to use in "If Socrates= =20 were a 19th century Irish washerwoman, ..." but then nothing works too well= =20 there and solid individuals has problems with cases of personal splitting.= =20 Maikl: <--but i wonder: by what rationale is any object in LE ZASTI MUNJE deemed to correspond to another object in LE CUMKI MUNJE? Evidently because of our propensity to imagine when we have made a choice, everything else but that choice remains the same in this world, & presumably every other...thus obviating the need to rename everything as we go...but i think the things bearing these same names, are now different. As Carlyle said, "Story is linear, action is solid."> Once we get the visheshas in place, we don't really need that they actually= =20 be the same thing, when counterpart theory (read in parentheses throughout= =20 the summary). Your talle of how this might come about is, of course, just= =20 the tense-based possible worlds system. It gets the kinds of minimal chang= es=20 that hypotheticals are often about. It doesn't really matter if the things= =20 in the two worlds are ontically different if they share the identical=20 histories up to the crucial moment. Well, I wouldn't think of these as two things: the static hierarchical grid= =20 of names just is Platonism (and not just its medieval development) and the= =20 notion of ontic priorities is only just recently (and not everywhere even=20 now) been slipping away: usuns still be the crown of creations most ways mo= st=20 days. What is less evident nowadays is that there is an eternally given gr= id=20 (actually a number of trees which all descend in various directions from a= =20 single stem, Being-Its-Own-Self) and what we do is find which of the things= =20 are currently exemplified and which not (missing links on the Great Chain o= f=20 Being or unicorns or ....) Remember that God is so good that he could not=20 selfishly deprive any possible thing of existence, so if it doesn't exist=20 here and now it must mbe somewhen and somewhere. But I would like to keep=20 {klesi} to its mathematical purity (which is Platonic enough, Lord knows) a= nd=20 probably keep {sidbo} out of it altogether. Off topic: I say (I don=E2=80=99t know why) =E2=80=9Cthe Pri=E2=80=9D as we= ll as =E2=80=9Cthe P.R.I.=E2=80=9D for=20 the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution. --part1_5c.79641a5.27c7ff8d_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en Xorxes:
Summary: an individual per se has a logically proper name - rarely
>pronounced, if ever - whose sense is the individual's vishesha (NOT= a
>property but a function across worlds).
[...]
>So, the line between what is
>merely a fact about something or class and what is essential to its= being
>that thing or class is fuzzy at best

I agree about the classes, but doesn't the same thing happen
with individuals? If I say "If I were every man" then I need
to consider a world where a lot of individuals of the real
world are mapped into one. Or if I say "I wish I could be
two different people at the same time" I need a world where
my vishesha maps me into two individuals. So if visheshas can
split and merge so easily, the line between what is an
individual with a logically proper name and what isn't seems
to be as fuzzy as for classes. Is it a problem to take
individuals to be as conventional as classes?>

Yes and no.  For one thing, neither is conventional per se: an ind= ividual is=20
just that in fact and a class is just the collection of individuals (fo= r=20
now).  What is conventional or at least not decided by nature is w= hat is=20
characteristic of that individual or class.  A class has certain m= embers and=20
we decide to call this the class of dogs.  We could have picked ot= her class -=20
with more, fewer, or somewhat different members --  as that of dog= s.  And in=20
another world, this same class may not be the class of dogs, even thoug= h it=20
has the same individuals as members.  For one thing, in that other= world, the=20
same individuals may not have the same attributes as they do in this. &= nbsp;If we=20
then say that they are therefore not the same individuals ("Hey, a is a= brown=20
dog here and over there it is a grey cat") then the notion of "same=20
individual" also gets conventional.  But the model I set up does n= ot take=20
that course.  The fuzzy individual approach is hard to use in "If = Socrates=20
were a 19th century Irish washerwoman, ..." but then nothing works too = well=20
there and solid individuals has problems with cases of personal splitti= ng.=20

Maikl:
<--but i wonder: by what rationale is any object in LE ZASTI
MUNJE deemed to correspond to another object in LE CUMKI MUNJE?
Evidently because of our propensity to imagine when we have
made a choice, everything else but that choice remains the same
in this world, & presumably every other...thus obviating the need
to rename everything as we go...but i think the things bearing
these same names, are now different. As Carlyle said, "Story is
linear, action is solid.">

Once we get the visheshas in place, we don't really need that they actu= ally=20
be the same thing, when counterpart theory (read in parentheses through= out=20
the summary).  Your talle of how this might come about is, of cour= se, just=20
the tense-based possible worlds system.  It gets the kinds of mini= mal changes=20
that hypotheticals are often about.  It doesn't really matter if t= he things=20
in the two worlds are ontically different if they share the identical=20
histories up to the crucial moment.

<Two things we use the same words for: that ad hoc mapping of
creatures we found or found out about, to a single, static hierarchical= grid=20
of names; & the whole medieval development
of Platonism, that wanted to discover a system of ontic priorities
within the reconceptualization of words as self-existent super-
natural entities. I think for the former, fu'ivla are more
appropriate; for the latter, it would be best not to plug a lot
of philosophical baggage into KLESI (or SIDBO!), but rather begin
with (if possible) restating those premises in Lojban first, then
developing a natively lojbanic way of relating the arguments that
were used, without equating latin terms to lojban>

Well, I wouldn't think of these as two things: the static hierarchical = grid=20
of names just is Platonism (and not just its medieval development) and = the=20
notion of ontic priorities is only just recently (and not everywhere ev= en=20
now) been slipping away: usuns still be the crown of creations most way= s most=20
days.  What is less evident nowadays is that there is an eternally= given grid=20
(actually a number of trees which all descend in various directions fro= m a=20
single stem, Being-Its-Own-Self) and what we do is find which of the th= ings=20
are currently exemplified and which not (missing links on the Great Cha= in of=20
Being or unicorns or ....) Remember that God is so good that he could n= ot=20
selfishly deprive any possible thing of existence, so if it doesn't exi= st=20
here and now it must mbe somewhen and somewhere. But I would like to ke= ep=20
{klesi} to its mathematical purity (which is Platonic enough, Lord know= s) and=20
probably keep {sidbo} out of it altogether.

Off topic: I say (I don=E2=80=99t know why) =E2=80=9Cthe Pri=E2=80=9D a= s well as =E2=80=9Cthe P.R.I.=E2=80=9D for=20
the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution. --part1_5c.79641a5.27c7ff8d_boundary--