From cancrians@xxxxx.xxxx Sat Apr 3 11:04:38 1999 X-Digest-Num: 104 Message-ID: <44114.104.570.959273824@eGroups.com> Date: Sat, 3 Apr 1999 16:04:38 -0300 From: "Pablo Stafforini" From: Robin Turner > > coi rodoi > > {.o'i} long theoretical piece - delete if you're not interested in > semantics! > > This current discussion on semantics has got me onto my favourite > hooby-horse, categorisation theory. Briefly, there are two opposing > interpretations of categorisation, with a few people like Adrienne Lehrer, > Ray Jackendoff and, of course, myself, sitting (sometimes > uncomfortably) in > the middle. In the one camp, we have what we can call "classical > semantics", which assumes that complex concepts can be broken down into > simple features, which constitute the "meaning" of the word, in > the sense of > its truth conditions (which is not always the way the word is used - such > things are removed to the lowly realm of pragmatics). > > For example, the English word "woman" refers to a category WOMAN, > having the > features [+HUMAN][+FEMALE][+ADULT]. In other words, if the statements > > H(x) > F(x) > A(x) > > are all true, then > > W(x) > > is true. Similarly, for Turkish KADIN, {H(x) ^ F(x) ^ ~V(x)} => K(x) , > where V -> "is a virgin". > > In the other camp, we have the cognitivist, fuzzy, prototype-based, "all > thought is metaphorical" people - George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and > the rest. > From this point of view, WOMAN is a category resting on a > prototypical idea > of "woman", maybe with metaphorical extensions and associations. > Categories > are fuzzy, and some members are more central to the category than others - > to give Eleanor Rosch's celebrated example, a robin is more of a bird than > an ostrich. > > However, as Anna Wierzbicka has pointed out, this doesn't explain why an > ostrich is still definitely a bird, and a bat is not. We > therefore need to > be careful when dealing with, in her words, "the fashionable > prejudice that > human thinking is 'fuzzy'." Looking at WOMAN, the feature [+ADULT] is > derived from a category, ADULT, that is fuzzy (except in strictly legal > terms) so you may sometimes be unsure as to whether to call a particular > female human a "woman" or a "girl", but the other two features are pretty > unfuzzy - an adult female bird is definitely not a woman, and when Captain > Kirk says of the Enterprise, "she is a beautiful woman, and I > love her," he > is being obviously and deliberately metaphorical (in this case in order to > confuse a hostile alien). The problem is that one cannot always, or even > often, deduce the boundaries of a category from its prototype. Margaret > Thatcher is, many would claim, some way removed from the > prototype of WOMAN > ({zo'o} or even of HUMAN), but, (zo'onai} she definitely _is_ a woman, > whereas many people who possess more of the features of a > prototypical woman > are excluded from the category because of the rather obvious fact > that they > are male. > > What I have proposed is a division of features into "defining" > and "typical" > features (similar to Lehrer's "obligatory" and "optional" features). Thus > WOMAN has the defining features [+HUMAN][+FEMALE][+ADULT] and a > whole bundle > of typical features, such as [-VIRGIN][+BREASTS] etc. etc. I also divided > features into those which may change status and those which are > pretty much > invariable (e.g. [+ADULT] is a weak defining feature, since there are some > situations where it doesn't apply. > > So how does all this apply to defining gismu, lujvo etc.? I would argue > that a gismu definition gives the defining features of a category, but not > its typical features, except perhaps in cases where one of the sumtiplaces > has a default value. Thus if I say {lo ninmu} I simply mean > [+HUMAN][+FEMALE] and am not making claims about anything else. If, > however, I say {lo'e ninmu} - typical woman- or {le'e ninmu} - > stereotypical woman, that's when things get really fuzzy and culturally > specific, because I am drawing on a a load of typical features > which are not > present in the gismu definition. {lo'e ninmu} is bound to have different > meanings in different cultures, even amongst native speakers of Lojban, if > such beings ever come into existence. And of course, if I say > {le ninmu}, I > could mean just about anything, though Gricean maxims demand that it be > something pretty closely related to {lo ninmu}, if not the same thing, and > Lojban etiquette demands that I mark it with {pe'a} if it is > definitely not > female or humanoid in any way. > > When it comes down to the lexicographical business of writing > authoritative > definitions for gismu, we will (as I think Pablo said) run into serious > problems when we move outside English. For those who weren't > around during > the infamous {djuno} debate - the definition of {djuno} is: > > x1 knows fact(s) x2 (du'u) about subject x3 by epistemology x4 > > Unfortunately, while the word "know" in English normally implies that what > you know is true, the equivalent words in many other languages do > not (e.g. > in Turkish you can say "dog^ru biliyorsam" - "?if I know rightly"). This > led to a massive string on whether you could use {djuno} for > something which > is false. > > What this indicates is that before going multilingual with the gismu list > (which it is high time we did) we need to think carefully about our > lexicography. One solution would be to adopt a feature-based analysis of > the gismu involved, using features which are, as far as possible, > consistent > across cultures. An alternative would be to use the Natural > Semantic Model > proposed by Anna Wierzbicka, which aims to define terms using a limited > number of universally accepted words (I think the current total > is 90). I'm > actually pretty sceptical about Wierzbicka's view of semantics, but > lexicographically speaking, NSM makes a lot of sense. > > None of this, of course, will provide us with rock-solid definitions which > are universally applicable - this kind of thing only existed in a > pre-Wittgensteinian universe. Nevertheless, I think a bit of semantic > analysis now might save us a lot of grief later. >