From pycyn@aol.com Wed Mar 21 09:44:51 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 21 Mar 2001 17:44:51 -0000 Received: (qmail 95133 invoked from network); 21 Mar 2001 17:43:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 21 Mar 2001 17:43:24 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r14.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.68) by mta2 with SMTP; 21 Mar 2001 17:43:24 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r14.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.44.c4c090b (25098) for ; Wed, 21 Mar 2001 12:42:18 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <44.c4c090b.27ea41f9@aol.com> Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2001 12:42:17 EST Subject: Re: [lojban] Objective Reality & krici (was: Random lojban questions/annoyanc... To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_44.c4c090b.27ea41f9_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_44.c4c090b.27ea41f9_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 3/20/2001 8:09:36 PM Central Standard Time,=20 xod@sixgirls.org writes: > , I return to my original challenge: Show > me a case of a belief without any evidence, for commonly used definitions > of "evidence". >=20 American Heritage: ev=B7i=B7dence n. 1. A thing or things helpful in formin= g a=20 conclusion or judgment:=20 I take it that the things must be propositional since only propositions can= =20 enter into forming a conclusion; ordinary things enter only as they become= =20 the subjects of claims (not necessarily uttered or even consciously=20 formulated). Alternatively, this could be about the causes of judgements=20 (not conclusions, of course), though I doubt that most people would agree= =20 with this (the claim that Berkeley's immaterialsm was caused by his bad=20 toilet training is usually called ridiculous, for example). As written, it= =20 would include the abacus used to calculate the area of a room from the floo= r=20 measurements. Pretty useless, then. Webster Collegiate: 1.a. an outward sign b. something that furnishes proof.= =20=20 a. doesn't seem too relevant, but b. seems spang on, aside from "proof" bei= ng=20 somewhat more than we can usually hope for, so taking that as "gives suppor= t=20 for claims." It does not seem that causes enter into this at all and that seems quite=20 right, contrary to xod's opinion that they are evidence in some cases. So, if we ignore causes, then sense-data claims, e.g., "I have a yellow pat= ch=20 in my visual field," are beliefs that do not have evidence. If asked to=20 justify/give evidence for that belief, the experience can answer at best "I= =20 have this experience" (even "am having") and when asked evidence for this=20 second claim, surely can't do anyhting more than say, "I just am."=20=20 Admittedly, we would ordinarily not ask for evidence in these cases, taking= =20 the experiencer's word for it -- and that, in itself, suggests that we=20 recognize that evicence is not to be called for in these cases. And the sa= me=20 pretty much applies even for more complex cases: "I see a robin on the lawn= "=20 and the like (though, for many of us, "I see a UFO" will probably require=20 evidence and most of the complex cases could be called into question in=20 certain situations). If we let causes in as evidence, then presumably sense-data claims have=20 evidence in this sense. But then the claim that every belief has evidence= =20 becomes trivial, since like every other event, beliefs have causes, hence, = on=20 this view, evidence. And, on the other hand, we find among the evidence fo= r=20 the structure of the benzene molecule Kekule's dream of Ouroboros, which=20 would normally be thought irrelevant. If we restrict the cases where cause= s=20 are evidence to those cases which lack any other kind of evidence, then thi= s=20 appears to be an ad hoc definition, designed simply to make the general cla= im=20 true, despite flying in the face of ordinary usage. so, let's drop causes= =20 once and for all. Then I say that no belief as such has evidence. That is, the status of bei= ng=20 a belief does not in any way depend upon evidence. This is clearer in the= =20 case of {krici} than of "belief," because {krici} overtly has no place for= =20 evidence (or even epistmology) and, in fact, has "not based on evidence"=20 written into the definition (indeed, that is where this all began). The=20 matter of evidence comes up only when the issue is whether the belief is=20 justified, and that presupposes that it is already a belief. People do not= =20 usually (indeed, it is hard to come up with a contrary case) come to their= =20 beliefs on the basis of evidence -- back to the old issue that belief is n= ot=20 volitional, if nothing else. They ahve the beliefs from whatever cause and= =20 then try to justify them as best they can when they are challenged. Even t= he=20 cases of "believing because of the evidence" in fact involves a number of=20 other factors than the evidence itself (believing the evidence being a majo= r=20 one).=20=20 Now, xod's point may be simply what it says on the outside, that there is n= o=20 belief for which there is not evidence, not anything about how one comes to= =20 believe or what constitutes a belief, but an empirical claim about beliefs = in=20 general. I don't know how one would go about proving such a claim. As I=20 have said, there is probably no belief so bizarre but that something could = be=20 taken as evidence for it, maybe even something we accept as true (look at a= ll=20 the things that have been taken as evidence for the existence of God -- or= =20 for God's non-existence, for that matter). I'm not sure that I would want = to=20 buy into this, especially if what one came up with -- for "There is a unico= rn=20 in the garden," say -- is not something that the claimant did not propose. = =20 Nor would I want to accept something whose connection to the claim was also= =20 not something the claimant could explain. I think that the resulting claim= ,=20 for everything thing that x believes there a true claim that x would make a= nd=20 which is plausibly connected to the belief as support, would be hard to pro= ve=20 and might, in fact, be easy to disprove. I believe (let us imagine) that I= =20 have squared the circle. The evidence is a number of scribbled pages which= I=20 claim constitute a proof of the construction I offer. The claim is plausib= ly=20 connected to the belief, but it is false. Does it constitute evidence? If= =20 yes, then we have to drop the "true" part above. And then again, the whole= =20 become trivial: the hoof prints that no one else can find, the gouges that = no=20 one else can see, the white hairs in the bushes, etc. are all evidence for= =20 the unicorn in the garden, even though the claims about them are all false.= =20 So, of course, I can fadge up some evidence, as long as it does not have to= =20 be true. Maybe, what we have in a psychological principle: no one believes anything= =20 unless he believes he has evidence for it. This is more plausible, though= =20 the beliefs of small children might constitute difficult cases (but that ju= st=20 may be the difficulty in formulating those beliefs to begin with) -- or the= y=20 may all come down to "So-and-so told me so." The sense-data cases would=20 also be a difficulty, but, happily, they almost never occur, and, when they= =20 do, there are usually factors about the environment that allow for reasonab= le=20 evidence to be formulated. The obvious possibility for infinite regress ca= n=20 be handled in the deep-sea ship-repair sort of way, taking care of one step= =20 at a time and, provided no circle turns up before, stopping at a point of=20 agreement between challenger and challenged (or, for radical disagreements,= =20 when they get tired).=20=20 =20 --part1_44.c4c090b.27ea41f9_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In a message dated 3/20/2001 8:09:36 PM Central Standard Time,=20
xod@sixgirls.org writes:


, I return to my original= challenge: Show
me a case of a belief without any evidence, for commonly used definitio= ns
of "evidence".

American Heritage: ev=B7i=B7dence n. 1. A thing or things helpful in fo= rming a=20
conclusion or judgment:=20
I take it that the things must be propositional since only propositions= can=20
enter into forming a conclusion; ordinary things enter only as they bec= ome=20
the subjects of claims (not necessarily uttered or even consciously=20
formulated).  Alternatively, this could be about the causes of jud= gements=20
(not conclusions,  of course), though I doubt that most people wou= ld agree=20
with this (the claim that Berkeley's  immaterialsm was caused by h= is bad=20
toilet training is usually called ridiculous, for example).  As wr= itten, it=20
would include the abacus used to calculate the area of a room from the = floor=20
measurements.  Pretty useless, then.
Webster Collegiate: 1.a. an outward sign b. something that furnishes pr= oof.  
a. doesn't seem too relevant, but b. seems spang on, aside from "proof"= being=20
somewhat more than we can usually hope for, so taking that as "gives su= pport=20
for claims."
It does not seem that causes enter into this at all and that seems quit= e=20
right, contrary to xod's opinion that they are evidence in some cases.

So, if we ignore causes, then sense-data claims, e.g., "I have a yellow= patch=20
in my visual field," are beliefs that do not have evidence.  If as= ked to=20
justify/give evidence for that belief, the experience can answer at bes= t "I=20
have this experience" (even "am having") and when asked evidence for th= is=20
second claim, surely can't do anyhting more than say, "I just am." &nbs= p;
Admittedly, we would ordinarily not ask for evidence in these cases, ta= king=20
the experiencer's word for it -- and that, in itself, suggests that we= =20
recognize that evicence is not to be called for in these cases.  A= nd the same=20
pretty much applies even for more complex cases: "I see a robin on the = lawn"=20
and the like (though, for many of us, "I see a UFO" will probably requi= re=20
evidence and most of the complex cases could be called into question in= =20
certain situations).

If we let causes in as evidence, then presumably sense-data claims have= =20
evidence in this sense.  But then the claim that every belief has = evidence=20
becomes trivial, since like every other event, beliefs have causes, hen= ce, on=20
this view, evidence.  And, on the other hand, we find among the ev= idence for=20
the structure of the benzene molecule Kekule's dream of Ouroboros, whic= h=20
would normally be thought irrelevant.  If we restrict the cases wh= ere causes=20
are evidence to those cases which lack any other kind of evidence, then= this=20
appears to be an ad hoc definition, designed simply to make the general= claim=20
true, despite flying in the face of ordinary usage.  so, let's dro= p causes=20
once and for all.

Then I say that no belief as such has evidence.  That is, the stat= us of being=20
a belief does not in any way depend upon evidence.  This is cleare= r in the=20
case of {krici} than of "belief,"  because {krici} overtly has no = place for=20
evidence (or even epistmology) and, in fact, has "not based on evidence= "=20
written into the definition (indeed, that is where this all began). &nb= sp;The=20
matter of evidence comes up only when the issue is whether the belief i= s=20
justified, and that presupposes that it is already a belief.  Peop= le do not=20
usually (indeed, it is hard to come up with a contrary case) come to th= eir=20
beliefs on the basis of evidence  -- back to the old issue that be= lief is not=20
volitional, if nothing else.  They ahve the beliefs from whatever = cause and=20
then try to justify them as best they can when they are challenged. &nb= sp;Even the=20
cases of "believing because of the evidence" in fact involves a number = of=20
other factors than the evidence itself (believing the evidence being a = major=20
one).  

Now, xod's point may be simply what it says on the outside, that there = is no=20
belief for which there is not evidence, not anything about how one come= s to=20
believe or what constitutes a belief, but an empirical claim about beli= efs in=20
general.  I don't know how one would go about proving such a claim= .  As I=20
have said, there is probably no belief so bizarre but that something co= uld be=20
taken as evidence for it, maybe even something we accept as true (look = at all=20
the things that have been taken as evidence for the existence of God --= or=20
for God's non-existence, for that matter).  I'm not sure that I wo= uld want to=20
buy into this, especially if what one came up with -- for "There is a u= nicorn=20
in the garden," say -- is not something that the claimant did not propo= se.  
Nor would I want to accept something whose connection to the claim was = also=20
not something the claimant could explain.  I think that the result= ing claim,=20
for everything thing that x believes there a true claim that x would ma= ke and=20
which is plausibly connected to the belief as support, would be hard to= prove=20
and might, in fact, be easy to disprove. I believe (let us imagine) tha= t I=20
have squared the circle.  The evidence is a number of scribbled pa= ges which I=20
claim constitute a proof of the construction I offer.  The claim i= s plausibly=20
connected to the belief, but it is false.  Does it constitute evid= ence?  If=20
yes, then we have to drop the "true" part above.  And then again, = the whole=20
become trivial: the hoof prints that no one else can find, the gouges t= hat no=20
one else can see, the white hairs in the bushes, etc. are all evidence = for=20
the unicorn in the garden, even though the claims about them are all fa= lse.=20
So, of course, I can fadge up some evidence, as long as it does not hav= e to=20
be true.

Maybe, what we have in a psychological principle: no one believes anyth= ing=20
unless he believes he has evidence for it.  This is more plausible= ,  though=20
the beliefs of small children might constitute difficult cases (but tha= t just=20
may be the difficulty in formulating those beliefs to begin with) -- or= they=20
may all come down to "So-and-so told me so."   The sense-data= cases would=20
also be a difficulty, but, happily, they almost never occur, and, when = they=20
do, there are usually factors about the environment that allow for reas= onable=20
evidence to be formulated.  The obvious possibility for infinite r= egress can=20
be handled in the deep-sea ship-repair sort of way, taking care of one = step=20
at a time and, provided no circle turns up before, stopping at a point = of=20
agreement between challenger and challenged (or, for radical disagreeme= nts,=20
when they get tired).  
=20
--part1_44.c4c090b.27ea41f9_boundary--