Subject: Re: [lojban] krici

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2001 08:31:50 EST

In a message dated 3/22/2001 4:58:59 PM Central Standard Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> <Specifically, the word
> "evidence" has two usages.
> 
> Usage one is the informational basis for a belief. (velji'i?)
> 
> Usage two is the quality of the informational basis for a belief.
> (jezvelji'i?) This is invoked chiefly when criticising the evidence of
> another. People will say "you have no evidence for that"; a sentence
> which, using usage one reads "the evidence you are using has insufficient
> quality".>
> 

Nope. For the criticism to be effective, the word has to be used in the same 
meaning. And here it clearly is. x is evidence for y requires at least that 
x be true and that it be in a support relationship to y. What the critic is 
saying is that one or the other of these conditions is not met. Typically, 
of course, it will be that the critic thinks that the claimed evidence is 
false, but, as in my argument here, he may also hold that the "evidence" does 
not support the claim, even if it is true. I freely admit that people do act 
as xod describes, but don't agree that that is evidence of two meanings. 
Indeed, the disagreement xod presents is surely going to go about the truth 
of the putative evidence and its logical relationship to the claim, showing 
that the two disputants are on the same page. Were they using different 
meanings, the argument would diverge radically as they pursued different 
relevances. What will emerge in this argument is that they simply believe 
different things to be true. This will become more apparent in Lojban than 
in English, of course, since the epistemologies involved in {jetnu} will 
become the focus fairly early on. I suppose you could argue that "evidence" 
has a different meaning for the two, but it is a "for you" / "for me" 
difference, not the one xod describes (though later noting that it is a "to 
you"/ "to me" point).

xod also has an overly optimistic view of the relationship between evidence 
and belief
(and we, in opposition, have taken an overly pessimistic one). For many 
people on many issues (I would say for everybody on some issues) beleive 
comes without (even despite) evidence, though, if pressed later, as xod does, 
they will come up with some piece they take to be good evidence for a 
position they held before they ever heard of it. Belief often leads to a 
search for evidence, as often as the other way round.

You might find it interesting to read some of the works of Arthur Peacocke, 
who just won this year's Templeton Prize. He is a rather prestigious 
scientist and also an Anglican priest and theologian (there seem to be quite 
a few of those lately -- and earlier on too) and he lays out the scienist's 
case for theism rather well. It is, of course, the old Design Argument with 
all the latest frills, but it is a rather pretty case for all that.

As often, xorxes has made a valuable distinction: we all agree, I think, 
that people almost always can give reasons for their beliefs, what they take 
as evidence, but xod wants to claim further that the reasons that they give 
the causes of their beliefs or, at least, explain why they have the beliefs 
they have. This, as xorxes' examples show, is often pretty clearly not the 
case.