From pycyn@aol.com Sun Mar 25 11:49:55 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 25 Mar 2001 19:49:55 -0000 Received: (qmail 90058 invoked from network); 25 Mar 2001 19:49:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 25 Mar 2001 19:49:54 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m05.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.8) by mta2 with SMTP; 25 Mar 2001 19:49:54 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m05.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.f2.897334d (2613) for ; Sun, 25 Mar 2001 14:49:34 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 14:49:34 EST Subject: Re: djuno debate (was: RE: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.) To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_f2.897334d.27efa5ce_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_f2.897334d.27efa5ce_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/24/2001 4:21:26 PM Central Standard Time, a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes: > Personally, though, then as now, I would prefer djuno not to > mean 'know'. I'd like it to mean 'believe' (specifically, for > X djuno Y to mean "X believes X knows Y") and to differ from > krici/jinvi in that if X djuno Y then Y is not necessarily true > but X believes that any right-minded person should also djuno > Y. Typically this would be because there is overwhelming > evidence that Y, or because Y is logically entailed by axioms > or by premises already believed by everyone, and so on. This > would capture the difference between English "I know that P" > and "I believe that P": it would be "I know that P" that would > be translated by "djuno"; that is, "djuno" is the epistemological > state wrt P of someone who would say "I know that P". > Though it pains me to toss over 2500 years of hard-slogging philosophical work, &'s non-suggestion about {djuno} makes a good deal of sense, certainly as an explication of what the present definition of {djuno} was meant to convey, with a small amount of contextual help. Those axioms or premises or evidence just are the epistemology and, if it is X's epistemology, then X presumably believes it and believes that every right-thinking person believes it and so on. How far this comes from saying that P is true in that epistemology, I am not sure (I suppose, overwhelming evidence could still be wrong, but not, presumably, entailment). I suspect that in enttering the state of {djuno} , X so modifies the epistemology that P is indeed true in it as well. Later evidence may make him revise the epistemology back a bit, to drop P, and maybe some of the evidence for it, but then it is a different epistemology. So, {jetnu} offers no special problems after all. --part1_f2.897334d.27efa5ce_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/24/2001 4:21:26 PM Central Standard Time,
a.rosta@dtn.ntl.com writes:


Personally, though, then as now, I would prefer djuno not to
mean 'know'. I'd like it to mean 'believe' (specifically, for
X djuno Y to mean "X believes X knows Y") and to differ from
krici/jinvi in that if X djuno Y then Y is not necessarily true
but X believes that any right-minded person should also djuno
Y. Typically this would be because there is overwhelming
evidence that Y, or because Y is logically entailed by axioms
or by premises already believed by everyone, and so on. This
would capture the difference between English "I know that P"
and "I believe that P": it would be "I know that P" that would
be translated by "djuno"; that is, "djuno" is the epistemological
state wrt P of someone who would say "I know that P".

Though it pains me to toss over 2500 years of hard-slogging philosophical
work, &'s non-suggestion about {djuno} makes a good deal of sense, certainly
as an explication of what the present definition of {djuno} was meant to
convey, with a small amount of contextual help.  Those axioms or premises or
evidence just are the epistemology and, if it is X's epistemology, then X
presumably believes it and believes that every right-thinking person believes
it and so on.  How far this comes from saying that P is true in that
epistemology, I am not sure (I suppose, overwhelming evidence could still be
wrong, but not, presumably, entailment). I suspect that in enttering the
state of {djuno} , X so modifies the epistemology that P is indeed true in it
as well.  Later evidence may make him revise the epistemology back a bit, to
drop P, and maybe some of the evidence for it, but then it is a different
epistemology.  So, {jetnu} offers no special problems after all.
--part1_f2.897334d.27efa5ce_boundary--