From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Mon Mar 26 08:08:18 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 26 Mar 2001 16:08:18 -0000 Received: (qmail 1249 invoked from network); 26 Mar 2001 16:08:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 26 Mar 2001 16:08:16 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 26 Mar 2001 16:08:16 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Mon, 26 Mar 2001 16:50:42 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Mon, 26 Mar 2001 17:08:57 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 17:08:27 +0100 To: pycyn , lojban Subject: Re: djuno debate (was: RE: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta pc: #> Personally, though, then as now, I would prefer djuno not to #> mean 'know'. I'd like it to mean 'believe' (specifically, for #> X djuno Y to mean "X believes X knows Y") and to differ from #> krici/jinvi in that if X djuno Y then Y is not necessarily true #> but X believes that any right-minded person should also djuno #> Y. Typically this would be because there is overwhelming=20 #> evidence that Y, or because Y is logically entailed by axioms #> or by premises already believed by everyone, and so on. This #> would capture the difference between English "I know that P" #> and "I believe that P": it would be "I know that P" that would #> be translated by "djuno"; that is, "djuno" is the epistemological #> state wrt P of someone who would say "I know that P". # #Though it pains me to toss over 2500 years of hard-slogging philosophical= =20 #work, &'s non-suggestion about {djuno} makes a good deal of sense, certain= ly=20 #as an explication of what the present definition of {djuno} was meant to=20 #convey, with a small amount of contextual help. Those axioms or premises = or=20 #evidence just are the epistemology and, if it is X's epistemology, then X= =20 #presumably believes it and believes that every right-thinking person belie= ves=20 #it and so on. How far this comes from saying that P is true in that=20 #epistemology, I am not sure (I suppose, overwhelming evidence could still = be=20 #wrong, but not, presumably, entailment). I suspect that in enttering the=20 #state of {djuno} , X so modifies the epistemology that P is indeed true in= it=20 #as well. Later evidence may make him revise the epistemology back a bit, = to=20 #drop P, and maybe some of the evidence for it, but then it is a different= =20 #epistemology. So, {jetnu} offers no special problems after all. I should add that thanks to pc & John I now understand DJUNO better, & I don't think there's a conflict between what I said above and the actual meaning of DJUNO. If I say "mi djuno ko'a (fo zo'e)", I'm essentially claim= ing that you can only dispute ko'a if you argue that the ve djuno is invalid. This would contrast with KRICI, where if I say "mi krici ko'a" I am allowin= g that you may arbitrarily and without reason not krici ko'a, and with JINVI, wher= e if I say "my jinvi ko'a" I am allowing that you might not jinvi ko'a, but i= f you don't then it is susceptible to quasirational discussion in which we eventi= ally out to *converge* on a se jinvi.. Sorry for adding 4 more messages to this thread! I'll shut up now & go home= . --And.