Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.

From: "Bob LeChevalier (lojbab)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2001 15:36:40 -0500

At 06:52 PM 03/27/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
>Lojbab:
>At 05:00 PM 03/26/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
>[....]
>#>Whether this means that *I* can truthfully say "ko'a djuno fe homosexuality-
>#>is-a-sin fo fundamentalist-jegvo-dogma", I'm not sure. I suppose the answer
>#>is Yes.
>#
>#It seems key to me that ANYONE should be able to say that truthfully if
>#indeed ko'a is satisfied with the dogma as a means of establishing truth.
>
>Hmm. So we haven't resolved this after all. If I don't accept that the
>ve djuno entails the se djuno, but the x1 does believe that the
>ve djuno entails the se djuno, then according to you I can honestly
>describe this by DJUNO. How would this differ from BIRTI and
>JINVI?

birti requires no epistemology whatsoever. It is, to me, an emotional 
certainty that need have no basis outside of itself. a predication on 
birti itself might be a veldjuno.

The difference to me between djuno and jinvi is in the x1s attitude towards 
the x2. If I jinvi something, I am admitting subjectivity and indeed the 
possibility of error as to whether x2 is indeed true or whether x2 is 
justified by x4. When I claim to know/djuno something by epistemology x4, 
I am not admitting that I could reach any other truth by that veldjuno.

lojbab

>
>
>#>I should add, BTW, that this conclusion would contradict both Bob
>#>Chassell's message on this point & my response to it.
>#
>#I'm not sure how.
>
>Because I (mis)understood Bob to be saying that the ve djuno is how
>the x1 comes to know the x2. How x1 comes to know x2 has no bearing
>on whether x2 is true or true if another body of propositions are true..
>
>#>That is, contra Bob, the ve djuno is not how you come to know the se djuno
>#>but rather the body of propositions such that their truth entails the
>#>truth of the x2.
>#
>#No, because that would entail only logically consistent
>#epistemologies. One of the ways that X can djuno P while Y can djuno not-P
>#is to use a logically inconsistent epistemology (which fundamentalist-dogma
>#may qualify for %^). Dreams and astrology are both classically used
>#veldjuno that yielded differing or even contradictory seldjuno to different
>#djuno.
>
>Firstly, the propositions "my neighbour's dog told me P" and "everything
>my neighbour's dog tells me is true" do logically entail P, so dreams and
>astrologoy could be handled in a logically consistent way -- perhaps.
>
>But, secondly, if they can't be handled in a logically consistent way, how
>can I distinguish instances of DJUNO from instances of BIRTI,
>or JINVI, or KRICI? (I did venture an answer to this question myself,
>while noting that it appears to conflict with entrenched usage.)
>
>#They thus very poorly are communicated through jetnu, which supports no
>#observer dependency on the truth. jetnu needs a self-consistent 
>epistemology.
>#
>#Using krici instead of djuno seems to me to deny that the veldjuno is a
>#valid source of evidence for truth or at least admits to skepticism as to
>#that claim.
>
>Quite. The question is whether if one is indeed thus skeptical one can
>nonetheless honestly use DJUNO. My inclination, given current usage,
>would be to use JINVI.
>
>--And.

--
lojbab [email-masked]
Bob LeChevalier, President, The Logical Language Group, Inc.
2904 Beau Lane, Fairfax VA 22031-1303 USA 703-385-0273
Artificial language Loglan/Lojban: http://www.lojban.org