From pycyn@aol.com Wed Mar 28 06:57:18 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 28 Mar 2001 14:57:18 -0000 Received: (qmail 17529 invoked from network); 28 Mar 2001 14:57:17 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.142) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 28 Mar 2001 14:57:17 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m03.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.6) by mta3 with SMTP; 28 Mar 2001 15:58:21 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m03.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v29.5.) id r.21.96c9ddf (25711) for ; Wed, 28 Mar 2001 09:56:58 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <21.96c9ddf.27f355b9@aol.com> Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2001 09:56:57 EST Subject: Re: djuno: the key issue (was: Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/... To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_21.96c9ddf.27f355b9_boundary" Content-Disposition: Inline X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10501 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_21.96c9ddf.27f355b9_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/28/2001 6:27:17 AM Central Standard Time, arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: > definitions that differ on one point: for "x1 djuno x2 x3 x4" to be true, > does x2 have to be entailed by x4 (Position I), or is it sufficient for x1 > to believe (possibly erroneously) that x1 is entailed by x4 (Position II)? > > Lojbab says (II), and (II) is what I would advocate too. But I think (I) > is closer to established usage and also to the views of the Three > Magi (pc, John & Jorge).> > Caspar here. As I said yesterday in defining {jinvi} and {djuno}, the evidence has to be true in the epistemology and the knower has to believe it is evidence for the conclusion (weaker than entailment, I think) but crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology. Knowledge says there are reasons, but does not put them foreward. It does put foreward a truth claim, however. Depending on how an epistemology is defined, you could hold that the known is entaiiled by the epistemology just because it is true in that epistemology, or you could say that its truth in that epistemology is merely a factual matter, bound in by the strength of evidence. That is not decided in my definitions (and the difference might involve some of residual problems of "know," those cases of jsutified true belief that still aren't knowledge.) --part1_21.96c9ddf.27f355b9_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 3/28/2001 6:27:17 AM Central Standard Time,
arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes:


<It seems to me that the discussion has converged on just two rival
definitions that differ on one point: for "x1 djuno x2 x3 x4" to be true,
does x2 have to be entailed by x4 (Position I), or is it sufficient for x1
to believe (possibly erroneously) that x1 is entailed by x4 (Position II)?

Lojbab says (II), and (II) is what I would advocate too. But I think (I)
is closer to established usage and also to the views of the Three
Magi (pc, John & Jorge).>

Caspar here.  As I said yesterday in defining {jinvi} and {djuno}, the
evidence has to be true in the epistemology and the knower has to believe it
is evidence for the conclusion (weaker than entailment, I think) but
crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology.  Knowledge says there
are reasons, but does not put them foreward.  It does put foreward a truth
claim, however.  Depending on how an epistemology is defined, you could hold
that the known is entaiiled by the epistemology just because it is true in
that epistemology, or you could say that its truth in that epistemology is
merely a factual matter, bound in by the strength of evidence.  That is not
decided in my definitions (and the difference might involve some of residual
problems of "know," those cases of jsutified true belief that still aren't
knowledge.)
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