Subject: Re: djuno: the key issue (was: Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/...

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2001 09:56:57 EST

In a message dated 3/28/2001 6:27:17 AM Central Standard Time, 
[email-masked] writes:

> <It seems to me that the discussion has converged on just two rival
> definitions that differ on one point: for "x1 djuno x2 x3 x4" to be true,
> does x2 have to be entailed by x4 (Position I), or is it sufficient for x1 
> to believe (possibly erroneously) that x1 is entailed by x4 (Position II)?
> 
> Lojbab says (II), and (II) is what I would advocate too. But I think (I)
> is closer to established usage and also to the views of the Three
> Magi (pc, John & Jorge).>
> 
Caspar here. As I said yesterday in defining {jinvi} and {djuno}, the 
evidence has to be true in the epistemology and the knower has to believe it 
is evidence for the conclusion (weaker than entailment, I think) but 
crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology. Knowledge says there 
are reasons, but does not put them foreward. It does put foreward a truth 
claim, however. Depending on how an epistemology is defined, you could hold 
that the known is entaiiled by the epistemology just because it is true in 
that epistemology, or you could say that its truth in that epistemology is 
merely a factual matter, bound in by the strength of evidence. That is not 
decided in my definitions (and the difference might involve some of residual 
problems of "know," those cases of jsutified true belief that still aren't 
knowledge.)