From arosta@uclan.ac.uk Wed Mar 28 08:36:13 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: arosta@uclan.ac.uk X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_0_4); 28 Mar 2001 16:36:13 -0000 Received: (qmail 97558 invoked from network); 28 Mar 2001 16:35:35 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.27) by l9.egroups.com with QMQP; 28 Mar 2001 16:35:35 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO com1.uclan.ac.uk) (193.61.255.3) by mta2 with SMTP; 28 Mar 2001 16:35:35 -0000 Received: from gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk by com1.uclan.ac.uk with SMTP (Mailer); Wed, 28 Mar 2001 17:17:53 +0100 Received: from DI1-Message_Server by gwise-gw1.uclan.ac.uk with Novell_GroupWise; Wed, 28 Mar 2001 17:35:47 +0100 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 5.5.2 Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2001 17:35:28 +0100 To: pycyn , lojban Subject: Re: djuno: the key issue (was: Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/... Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Disposition: inline From: And Rosta pc: #arosta@uclan.ac.uk writes: #> definitions that differ on one point: for "x1 djuno x2 x3 x4" to be true= , #> does x2 have to be entailed by x4 (Position I), or is it sufficient for = x1=20 #> to believe (possibly erroneously) that x2 is entailed by x4 (Position II= )? #>=20 #> Lojbab says (II), and (II) is what I would advocate too. But I think (I) #> is closer to established usage and also to the views of the Three #> Magi (pc, John & Jorge).> # #Caspar here.=20=20 Caspar, Melchior and Woldemar. #As I said yesterday in defining {jinvi} and {djuno}, the evidence has to=20 #be true in the epistemology and the knower has to believe it=20 #is evidence for the conclusion (weaker than entailment, I think) but=20 #crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology.=20=20 OK. I take this -- "crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology" -- as the essence of what (I) adds to (II). John: #> But I think (I) is closer to established usage and also to the views of = the Three #> Magi (pc, John & Jorge). # #No, I hold (II) as well. So you deny that "crucially, the known must be true in the epistemology"? It is enough that the x1 claim that the known is true? So if on the basis=20 of our common epistemology you believed that Sydney was the capital of Australia, I could say "John djuno that Sydney is the cap. of A, fo our mutual epistemology"? --And.