From edward.cherlin.sy.67@aya.yale.edu Sun Jun 24 14:05:49 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Edward.Cherlin.SY.67@aya.yale.edu X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_1_3); 24 Jun 2001 21:05:48 -0000 Received: (qmail 9529 invoked from network); 24 Jun 2001 21:05:48 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 24 Jun 2001 21:05:48 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO snfc21.pbi.net) (206.13.28.241) by mta1 with SMTP; 24 Jun 2001 21:05:48 -0000 Received: from mcp.aya.yale.edu ([216.103.90.93]) by mta5.snfc21.pbi.net (iPlanet Messaging Server 5.1 (built May 7 2001)) with ESMTP id <0GFG004WPD9NXX@mta5.snfc21.pbi.net> for lojban@yahoogroups.com; Sun, 24 Jun 2001 14:05:47 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 14:19:38 -0700 Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: possible worlds In-reply-to: <9h2trn+ea02@eGroups.com> X-Sender: cherlin@postoffice.pacbell.net To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Message-id: <5.1.0.14.0.20010624140243.029b3ce0@postoffice.pacbell.net> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.1 Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=us-ascii References: <4.3.2.7.2.20010622100343.00e4f350@127.0.0.1> From: Edward Cherlin At 01:23 PM 6/23/2001, Adam Raizen wrote: >la lojbab cusku di'e > > > What is the relationship between the event and the sentence in the >English > > phrase "In the event of blah, i will do blecch". There is clearly >some > > relationship between the event and the rest of the sentence, but it >is > > vague what that relationship is other than the event occurring is >necessary. > > > > Thus fau associates an event with a bridi and says that its >occurrence is > > in some way important to the truth of that bridi. Works rather like >the > > English. > >At least with the English, the idiom *does* mean at least that if the >event occurs, the main sentence also occurs. This is ambiguous, but it is commonly a statement of intention, not of fact. We do not have a clear modal logic model in Lojban for the meanings of such statements and the evaluaton of their truth. Modal logics study statements about possibility and necessity, probability, intention, permission, belief, and the like. I can dig out an old textbook and post some notes, if anybody thinks it will help. We also don't have any useful logical model of *impossible* worlds and other weird ontologies. I don't know whether anyone has successfully constructed one, but I could look. Quine wrote about these problems, such as the "square circle" and "Plato's beard" but certainly didn't resolve them.