From pycyn@aol.com Mon Jun 25 01:32:12 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_1_3); 25 Jun 2001 08:32:12 -0000 Received: (qmail 45965 invoked from network); 25 Jun 2001 08:32:11 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l10.egroups.com with QMQP; 25 Jun 2001 08:32:11 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-r05.mx.aol.com) (152.163.225.101) by mta1 with SMTP; 25 Jun 2001 08:32:11 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-r05.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v30.22.) id r.112.c0ff77 (26119) for ; Mon, 25 Jun 2001 04:32:08 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: <112.c0ff77.28685108@aol.com> Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2001 04:32:08 EDT Subject: Re: [lojban] Re: possible worlds To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_112.c0ff77.28685108_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10519 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_112.c0ff77.28685108_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 6/24/2001 4:13:08 PM Central Daylight Time, edward.cherlin.sy.67@aya.yale.edu writes: > We do not have a clear modal logic model in Lojban for the meanings of such > statements and the evaluaton of their truth. Modal logics study statements > about possibility and necessity, probability, intention, permission, > belief, and the like. I can dig out an old textbook and post some notes, if > anybody thinks it will help. > > We also don't have any useful logical model of *impossible* worlds and > other weird ontologies. I don't know whether anyone has successfully > constructed one, but I could look. Quine wrote about these problems, such > as the "square circle" and "Plato's beard" but certainly didn't resolve > Probably don't have them because logicians have tended to multiply the possibilities without coming down very hard for one of them as right. Prior always used to insist that it was the logicians' job to do just that, leaving it to experts in whatever to decide what was right. But there are precious few experts in most of the areas that modal logic encompasses -- indeed, few recognized areas, even. Lojban has gotten along with an informal notion of "possible worlds" -- which I now think may be a mistake -- and an even less clear notion of a situation (which allows some work, at least, with impossible worlds). I am inclined -- in keeping with the almost concurrent thread -- to see the need for more inquiry into the purposes for which language is used. As Cherlin points out, a lot of contrary-to-fact comments are intentions, not descriptions. Others are simply disguised generalizations (whatever those are). Others may be more like hopes. But we don't seem to know much about what the range of possibilities is here yet, nor how they are characterized, nor how they are represented in languages already fully developed. I think there is a good deal of work in the area of Chapters 13 and 14 (and, I suppose, 9, 10 and 11) before we have a reasonably satisfactory understanding. Oh and serious thoughts about what happens in English and other languages we live in as well. --part1_112.c0ff77.28685108_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In a message dated 6/24/2001 4:13:08 PM Central Daylight Time,
edward.cherlin.sy.67@aya.yale.edu writes:

We do not have a clear modal logic model in Lojban for the meanings of such
statements and the evaluaton of their truth. Modal logics study statements
about possibility and necessity, probability, intention, permission,
belief, and the like. I can dig out an old textbook and post some notes, if
anybody thinks it will help.

We also don't have any useful logical model of *impossible* worlds and
other weird ontologies. I don't know whether anyone has successfully
constructed one, but I could look. Quine wrote about these problems, such
as the "square circle" and "Plato's beard" but certainly didn't resolve
them.

Probably don't have them because logicians have tended to multiply the
possibilities without coming down very hard for one of them as right. Prior
always used to insist that it was the logicians' job to do just that, leaving
it to experts in whatever to decide what was right. But there are precious
few experts in most of the areas that modal logic encompasses -- indeed, few
recognized areas, even.
Lojban has gotten along with an informal notion of "possible worlds" -- which
I now think may be a mistake -- and an even less clear notion of a situation
(which allows some work, at least, with impossible worlds). I am inclined --
in keeping with the almost concurrent thread -- to see the need for more
inquiry into the purposes for which language is used. As Cherlin points out,
a lot of contrary-to-fact comments are intentions, not descriptions. Others
are simply disguised generalizations (whatever those are). Others may be
more like hopes. But we don't seem to know much about what the range of
possibilities is here yet, nor how they are characterized, nor how they are
represented in languages already fully developed. I think there is a good
deal of work in the area of Chapters 13 and 14 (and, I suppose, 9, 10 and 11)
before we have a reasonably satisfactory understanding. Oh and serious
thoughts about what happens in English and other languages we live in as well.
--part1_112.c0ff77.28685108_boundary--