Subject: Not talking about imaginary worlds

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2001 22:35:54 EDT

One reason for not trying to discuss the current problem in terms of 
imaginary worlds or possible worlds and the like is that we often talk about 
such worlds in a completely assertive, non-hypothetical way: "Sherlock Holmes 
lived at 221B Baker Street." This is a true statement, asserted as such, 
without any subjunctive or contrary-to-fact fididddling, yet there never was 
such a person or such an address in the real world; it is all literally 
contrary to fact. Worse, within such discussion we can also deal with the 
real world in a "contrary-to-fact, subjunctive," way: "If Holmes had pursued 
Jack the Ripper, the gracious lady would have taken back the emerald."
What is crucial, then, is not the nature of the world involved, but of 
what we are doing with it. In one case we are attempting to describe it 
correctly and we simply assert that it is thus-and-so and face the 
consequences of being right or wrong. And in the other case, the 
"subjunctive, contrary-to-fact"? At least some of the time, the act is 
speculation -- abstraction, extra-or-interpolation. I am not sure that this 
covers all the cases of sentences that are not now true but are not 
recommended nor preferred, but it covers many of them. I am also unsure just 
what "speculation" means in practical terms. Arguments suggest that there are 
specultive truths and falsehoods, but history suggests that, outside of the 
hard sciences, where the speculation can be realized, determining which is 
which is not easy. In general, the rules are rather unclear, moore or less 
like the rules of interpretation rather than experiment. Indeed one common 
use for such speculation is to build on an interpretation toward possible 
experiment. She gives me a look, which I interpret in a certain way. 
Assuming that that interpretation is correct, then, if I were to do 
so-and-so, she would do such-and-such. Now, so-and-so is something I can do 
without too much commitment, so I can now test my interpretation (assuming my 
speculation is reasonably correct).
What is missing -- and always has been except in special cases -- is good 
rules for when speculation is correct. Outside of the hard sciences, we have 
to rely on imprecise terms (about a person's character, say), vague and 
uncertain generalities (about what people of that sort do in certain types of 
situations -- and [rarely explicit] what situations they will see as of that 
type) and the like. And these generalizations -- an even the personality 
types (to stick with that kind of case) -- are themselves often presented as 
speculative: "If type x is in situation y, he would... ." Some of this may be 
inherently a closed language game, without a necessary return to the real 
world, of the sort that logic gives with closing the indirect proof or 
science gives with an actual experiment.
So how do we mark speculation in Lojban?
Are there other non-assertive uses not dealt with?