From pycyn@aol.com Sun Jul 01 19:35:57 2001 Return-Path: X-Sender: Pycyn@aol.com X-Apparently-To: lojban@yahoogroups.com Received: (EGP: mail-7_2_0); 2 Jul 2001 02:35:57 -0000 Received: (qmail 14242 invoked from network); 2 Jul 2001 02:35:57 -0000 Received: from unknown (10.1.10.26) by l8.egroups.com with QMQP; 2 Jul 2001 02:35:57 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO imo-m09.mx.aol.com) (64.12.136.164) by mta1 with SMTP; 2 Jul 2001 02:35:56 -0000 Received: from Pycyn@aol.com by imo-m09.mx.aol.com (mail_out_v30.22.) id r.ac.172a2e07 (4013) for ; Sun, 1 Jul 2001 22:35:55 -0400 (EDT) Message-ID: Date: Sun, 1 Jul 2001 22:35:54 EDT Subject: Not talking about imaginary worlds To: lojban@yahoogroups.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_ac.172a2e07.2871380a_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 6.0 for Windows US sub 10519 From: pycyn@aol.com --part1_ac.172a2e07.2871380a_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit One reason for not trying to discuss the current problem in terms of imaginary worlds or possible worlds and the like is that we often talk about such worlds in a completely assertive, non-hypothetical way: "Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street." This is a true statement, asserted as such, without any subjunctive or contrary-to-fact fididddling, yet there never was such a person or such an address in the real world; it is all literally contrary to fact. Worse, within such discussion we can also deal with the real world in a "contrary-to-fact, subjunctive," way: "If Holmes had pursued Jack the Ripper, the gracious lady would have taken back the emerald." What is crucial, then, is not the nature of the world involved, but of what we are doing with it. In one case we are attempting to describe it correctly and we simply assert that it is thus-and-so and face the consequences of being right or wrong. And in the other case, the "subjunctive, contrary-to-fact"? At least some of the time, the act is speculation -- abstraction, extra-or-interpolation. I am not sure that this covers all the cases of sentences that are not now true but are not recommended nor preferred, but it covers many of them. I am also unsure just what "speculation" means in practical terms. Arguments suggest that there are specultive truths and falsehoods, but history suggests that, outside of the hard sciences, where the speculation can be realized, determining which is which is not easy. In general, the rules are rather unclear, moore or less like the rules of interpretation rather than experiment. Indeed one common use for such speculation is to build on an interpretation toward possible experiment. She gives me a look, which I interpret in a certain way. Assuming that that interpretation is correct, then, if I were to do so-and-so, she would do such-and-such. Now, so-and-so is something I can do without too much commitment, so I can now test my interpretation (assuming my speculation is reasonably correct). What is missing -- and always has been except in special cases -- is good rules for when speculation is correct. Outside of the hard sciences, we have to rely on imprecise terms (about a person's character, say), vague and uncertain generalities (about what people of that sort do in certain types of situations -- and [rarely explicit] what situations they will see as of that type) and the like. And these generalizations -- an even the personality types (to stick with that kind of case) -- are themselves often presented as speculative: "If type x is in situation y, he would... ." Some of this may be inherently a closed language game, without a necessary return to the real world, of the sort that logic gives with closing the indirect proof or science gives with an actual experiment. So how do we mark speculation in Lojban? Are there other non-assertive uses not dealt with? --part1_ac.172a2e07.2871380a_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit One reason for not trying to discuss the current problem in terms of
imaginary worlds or possible worlds and the like is that we often talk about
such worlds in a completely assertive, non-hypothetical way: "Sherlock Holmes
lived at 221B Baker Street."  This is a true statement, asserted as such,
without any subjunctive or contrary-to-fact fididddling, yet there never was
such a person or such an address in the real world; it is all literally
contrary to fact. Worse, within such discussion we can also deal with the
real world in a "contrary-to-fact, subjunctive," way: "If Holmes had pursued
Jack the Ripper, the gracious lady would have taken back the emerald."
What is crucial, then, is not the nature of the world involved, but of
what we are doing with it.  In one case we are attempting to describe it
correctly and we simply assert that it is thus-and-so and face the
consequences of being right or wrong.  And in the other case, the
"subjunctive, contrary-to-fact"? At least some of the time, the act is
speculation -- abstraction, extra-or-interpolation.  I am not sure that this
covers all the cases of sentences that are not now true but are not
recommended nor preferred, but it covers many of them.  I am also unsure just
what "speculation" means in practical terms. Arguments suggest that there are
specultive truths and falsehoods, but history suggests that, outside of the
hard sciences, where the speculation can be realized, determining which is
which is not easy.  In general, the rules are rather unclear, moore or less
like the rules of interpretation rather than experiment.  Indeed one common
use for such speculation is to build on an interpretation toward possible
experiment.  She gives me a look, which I interpret in a certain way.  
Assuming that that interpretation is correct, then, if I were to do
so-and-so, she would do such-and-such.  Now, so-and-so is something I can do
without too much commitment, so I can now test my interpretation (assuming my
speculation is reasonably correct).
What is missing -- and always has been except in special cases -- is good
rules for when speculation is correct.  Outside of the hard sciences, we have
to rely on imprecise terms (about a person's character, say), vague and
uncertain generalities (about what people of that sort do in certain types of
situations -- and [rarely explicit] what situations they will see as of that
type) and the like.  And these generalizations -- an even the personality
types (to stick with that kind of case) -- are themselves often presented as
speculative: "If type x is in situation y, he would... ." Some of this may be
inherently a closed language game, without a necessary return to the real
world, of the sort that logic gives with closing the indirect proof or
science gives with an actual experiment.
      So how do we mark speculation in Lojban?
      Are there other non-assertive uses not dealt with? --part1_ac.172a2e07.2871380a_boundary--