Re: [lojban] Re: semantic primes

["Jorge Llambías" <jjllambias@gmail.com>]

On 3/23/06, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > And the thesis that a language can be
> > > > "completely defined" must
> > > > be taken as self-evident?
> > >
> Well, I don't know about your experience, of
> course, but in my experience, difficult concepts
> can be -- and are -- defined in terms of more
> basic ones and, if pushed on, the process
> eventually comes down to something where I say
> "Gee, if you don't know what that means, I don't
> see how I could explain it to you."

We're going in circles now. I certainly agree that
difficult concepts can and are explained in terms
of more basic ones, to any degree required under
the circumstances. I thought we had agreed about
that.

But these explanations are never complete definitions,
they are simply good enough for all practical purposes.

For example, I find the cited NSM definition of "X loves Y"
very clever, perspicuous and interesting, but I would
never call it complete or definitive.

> > Or that every concept is itself undefinable in
> > the strong sense.
>
> Ah, now that is an interestingly different point.
>  But it does seem that at least some are, even in
> a strong sense (short of "everything is
> definable").

For example? Would you say that any of the cited
definitions are final and undisputable?

 This position is not going to get
> much traction, since it makes systematic
> semantics impossible.  It may eventually turn out
> to be true, of course, but it is way too early to
> consider it seriously.  And in the mentime we
> seem to be generating a lot of counterevidence
> (not merely in NSM but in other semantic theories
> as well).

I think systematic semantics is very useful. I don't
think it requires complete and final definitions to
be possible.

> > > Thus, pooling these resources, we
> > > get a set of undefinable concepts in terms of
> > > which all the others are defined.
> >
> > That's the main NSM hypothesis. Attractive, but
> > highly unlikely
> > from my perspective.
>
> What part of the argument leading to this point
> do you either not understand or disagree with
> (and, if the latter, what is your counter case)?

I disagree with the premise that complete and final
definitions of concepts are possible. Only definitions
good enough for some purpose are possible. Or at
least those are the ones we have available. We don't
seem to have any definite and final definition available.

> > Well, without the notion of complete definition
> > everything else seems to fall apart.
>
> But it is essential to the notion of definition
> as intended in semantic theory.  Now, you can say
> "Screw semantic theory" but the argument is one
> within semantic theory, so for that field the
> dismissal is not available.

Is semantic theory is impossible without complete
definitions? Why can't there be a semantic theory
based on approximate, good enough for a purpose,
definitions?

> > > But notice that your
> > > definition is not one of the canonical form
> > and
> > > the NSMers insist that the sentential forms
> > > allowed are as much a part of the system as
> > the
> > > concepts.
> >
> > That's another good way out. I suppose the
> > "canonical form" is
> > something too complicated to explain in a few
> > lines?
>
> Au contraire, in any given language and for each
> word, it is a simple expression that is available
> to every competent speaker of the language (say
> adult or some such neutral criterion).

And how is "X is the opposite of good" not available to
every competent speaker of English?

mu'o mi'e xorxes