Re: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all}

["Maxim Katcharov" <maxim.katcharov@gmail.com>]

To clear something up: I don't want a situation-independant antecedent.

On 5/15/06, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> --- Maxim Katcharov <maxim.katcharov@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > There were no other stones on the table
> > mentioned, and so I was
> > operating under the absolutely reasonable
> > assumption that there were
> > none.
>
> The fact that they are not mentioned does not
> mean that they are not there; thjey may be

If I thought that they were there, I would properly restrict to them.
But they were not mentioned, so I assumed that they were not there.

You're saying that the situation can vary, so the same restrictions
would not apply to every situation. This is obvious to me. My complete
restriction applies to /this/ situation, where there are /no/ extra
stones on the table, and the players were /not/ playing three
simultaneous games, and [...]. If any of these complexities existed, I
would account for them by adding one or two additional restrictions.

Stop changing the situation, adding to it, or assuming that it's
vague. It isn't vague, and it doesn't change, and it's perfectly
reasonable for me to assume that if there were no other stones on the
table mentioned in any part of aleks's discussion, that there were
indeed none in that situation.

Ironically, your persistance in providing multiple interpretations of
aleks's writing stems from the fact that aleks was not (could not be)
precise in describing exactly what the setting was, and what his
speakers were saying. If he had some effective means of doing this (as
I propose) you wouldn't be telling me of all the ways that his
description could be interpreted.

> irrelevant to what the speaker wants to say and
> still be in the environement, a possible source
> of confusion to the unwary.  Note, by the way,
> that "stones" here presumably means "playing
> piece," since, depending on the game and the
> quality of the set, some of these "stones" may be
> shells or nuts or seeds or all may be plastic.

But in /this/ situation, they are not.

> If your description is meant to be complete as it
> stands, it may well lead to picking up things
> that ought not be picked up and leaving things
> that ought be picked up.  Of course, the hearer

Only if I, as a speaker, have no idea what I percieve the situation to
be. I'm going to make this clear: in my perception, there are no other
random stones on the table. They're playing Go or Renju, so they're
using stones, not shells. There are two bags, and not 20. When A says
"in the white bag", they mean "in this white bag", and not "in a white
bag". Etc. My strategy for percieving the situation is simple: don't
add any excess.

And my description, even by your "one situation is actually 100
different situations" perception, could not leave out things that
ought be picked up, though it could pick up what is unintended.

> > No. I see that you're trying to argue that you
> > can never restrict
> > absolutely, though you avoid explicitly saying
> > this for some reason.
>
> That is not exactly my point, which is that any
> restriction can be restricted farther to meet a
> possible problem and also that many restrictions
> tht you take to be m"more complete" are simply
> superfluous in a given case (as here). You
> imagine problems in this case and so restrict to
> meet these imaginary difficulties but stop before

These 'difficulties' are not imaginary. They are quite clear given the
circumstances: if there are or could be stones that are not on this
table, and the speaker means the ones on this table, this is a
problem, so he restricts it to those stones that are on this table.

> dealing with further ones that I imagine.

You have yet to present a further difficulty (as you term it) that is
either neccisary, or doesn't stem from what seems to be a belief that
the situation is vague in the mind of the speaker.

> > You seem to be expanding the example towards
> > including an entire
> > rainbow of hundreds of stones that are now upon
> > this table. But no,
> > there are simply black stones, and white
> > stones. If you want, we'll
> > call them light stones (>=50% of some
> > scientific color measurement),
> > and dark stones (<50%). You're adjusting the
> > situation to make my use
> > of certain words incorrect, but this still
> > doesn't show that you can't
> > restrict completely. The restriction /was/
> > complete, in accordance
> > /with the example given/.
>
> But more than was needed for the example given,
> therefeore, adding problems seems a legitimate

Not by changing the given situation. If you want to "add problems",
give me a /new/ situation. Otherwise, you're just playing no true
Scotsman with me: "ah, yes, but what was /really/ meant by aleks's
description was probably...", or "but what if he actually meant..." -
- well, I assume that he didn't mean something complex and obscure. I
have to make an assumption based on context somewhere, because he
wasn't (and could not be) specific as to what his speakers had in
mind. Now, my assumption may be wrong, but the restriction that I gave
based on that assumption is not.

> (though "the price of exact
> > precision is exact verbage" may
> > apply)
>
> Do you mean something secial by the pleonasm
> "exact precision"?  It does nto seem to apply to

Yes, like when I say "all the stones on the table", and mean exactly
that. Not just the game pieces, not just the white ones, not just
anything. "The group of all such that are stones that is supported
directly by the top of this table". That's what I mean by "exact
precision", by "complete restriction", by "not relying on context to
determine the referent"...

> . Regardless, this assumption (that you
> > cannot completely
> > restrict) is wrong.
>
> I await the evidence or the argument for that.  I
> take it you mean "restrict to the point that only
> one thing or group of things satisfies the
> description."  That may be true in a given
> situation, but you seem to want one that is
> situation independent and that seems a lot less
> likely.

Oh, I see the problem - I don't want a situation independant one. I
don't understand where or how you got that idea. You can't have a
situation-independant antecedent. You percieve the situation to be a
certain way, and you'll restrict based on that. Your perception might
even be wrong - maybe you didn't notice that there were some non-game
stones on the table or whatever. But your restriction would still be
right based on your perception.

> > Adding those restrictions does nothing. It's
> > like saying "that which
> > is an elephant... and (poi) that which is a
> > mammal and that which is
> > an animal and that which is a thing...". No,
> > I've given a complete
> > restriction.
>
> Not at all.  You do not specify how the captures
> are related to the last game. To be sure, in this

aleks's description of of the situation does not indicate that there
is more than one way for the captures to have been related. And surely
you wouldn't call "sneaking a piece off the board" a capture? If there
was an elephant on the table, it is enough for me to say "a mammal has
broken the table" - I could, but I don't need to actually specify
elephant.

> > But I assumed that the referants in the
> > speaker's mind were "all three
> > games of the last set that we played"/"all
> > three just-previous games",
> > so that's how I said it, and based on my
> > (perfectly reasonable)
> > assumption, my restriction was complete.
>
> But as redundant as you claimed my line above
> was.

Redundant to what? Where else was it specified that "all three
just-previous games". Are you saying that context has already
specified this? Because that's the exact problem that I'm trying to
address: when context is the only thing that "specifies" something,
and it (context) is ambiguous (as it always is, to some extent).

> > You're correct, though it would probably be
> > "all the stones related to
> > the game set (board, bags...)" (here I'm
> > assuming that the speaker
> > doesn't consider that some stones may have
> > rolled into the grass long
> > ago).
>
> Though, if they should find one, it should
> probalby (you don't actually say in your
> "complete" description) go into the bag, too.

I don't see how that's relevant: the speaker is saying "I think I got
all of the stones into the bag", he isn't saying "I did my best to get
all of the stones into the bag".

> > Here we're deliberating on the best way
> > to make a complete
> > restriction, but this doesn't indicate that a
> > complete restriction
> > cannot be made, which seems to be your
> > position.
>
> Well, insofar as restrctions you claim to be
> complete are not, it does count as evidence.  At

As evidence of what? It just shows that there are many ways to
complete a restriction.

> Yep, but if I was a speaker, I wouldn't make this
> restriction. In
> fact, I may very well say "take care not to trip
> on stones along
> paths" (which wouldn't restrict to ornamental
> stones or this certain
> path at all, and would have a better ring to it
> in Lojban).>>
>
> That is, the "complete" restriction you give
> originally is not the "real" complete
> description?

No, I'm just saying that I would say something different, something
that has a different restriction on it.

> <<
> These structures may be relevant, but they would
> be unneccisary. If
> you mean that they are neccisary to provide a
> complete restriction,
> I'd like to know what you think they are.>>
>
> Well, I have set a particularly obtuse conversant
> into the situation and the strictures are needed
> to guide him.  On the other hand, your additions
> are clearly not needed in the situation as
> presented, since the conversant get along fine
> wihtout them.

Who? You mean "a" or "b"? Yes, they got along fine. I wasn't using
that as a demonstration of where my complete restrictions are
neccisary, I was just showing what complete restrictions were and all
that. If you want an example where a complete restriction is
neccisary, look no further than aleks's description of the situation.

> No, it is not the case. You'll notice that both
> the left and the right
> have been taken out of their context, but not out
> of their setting.
> The ones on the left become vague, the ones on
> the right mean exactly
> what the speaker intends them to mean.>>
>
> Against a more abstract situation, perhaps.  Once
> you take them out of the situation, there is no
> longer any reason to object to my additions,
> since they were objected to only as not fitting
> the given situation.  But if we stick to the
> given situation, then your additions are
> unnecessary as well.  You can't really have it
> both ways, you know.

No, if we stick to the given context, my additions are unneccisary
(unless one wishes to be clear in what they're referring to). If we
stick to the /setting/, then my restrictions are neccisary, if you
want the listener to know what the referent is.

> <<
> Of the many examples that I've used just in the
> course of this
> discussion, the most prevalent one is probably
> how I'm always forced
> to either say "all (ever) bears", or "*all*
> bears".>>
>
> Are these meant to be examples of "all" used to
> show completeness of the description or are they
> examples of adding on explanations.  They seem to

The one with the brackets is the one with the added (short)
explanation, the one with the asterisks is the stressed.

> <<
> The additional explanation is given when the
> restriction is
> incomplete: "all bears (ever, imaginary, past,
> present, future,
> hypothetical...)" - in brackets is the additional
> explanation.>>
>
> So, if this comes after the "all" is used, how
> does "all" mark completion and, if this is part

"All" doesn't mark completion. "*All*", and "all (ever)" do (usually,
English isn't good at being consistant). Because we express that we
mean "*all* such that are...", the listener doesn't think "all ...
based on context", and so he doesn't have to determine what the
remaining restrictions are based on context, and so the restrction
that we've given is a complete one.

> The CLL also implies that an inner {ro} is an
> assertion regarding how
> many bears exist. My position wants nothing to do
> with that.>>
>
> So you are proposing something new, as has been
> clear all along.  Further, you want {lo ro cribe}
> to be of a different order from, say {lo ci
> cribe} or even {lo rau cribe},where the internal
> quantifier tells how many things are in the
> referent.  Even when {lo ro cribe} referred to

Unless I'm unbelievably mistaken, saying that an inner {ro} refers to
*all* - well, that tells how many things are in the referent.

> the set of bears, it did not, of course, say how
> many bears exist, since "all" is a
> merelytautological answer.  It does say how many
> out of the posible referents are in the referent,
> however.

Sure, that's the use I want, and it has nothing to do with that whole
"inner pa means only one exists" confusion.

> It /is/ about the number of things in the
> referent. When I say "all
> bears", I damn well mean all bears - "all such
> that are bears". Do I
> mean "all relevant things such that are bears"?
> No. I mean "all such
> that are bears". This extra "relevant things"
> that has been tacked on
> seems to /me/ perverse.>
>
> Okay, we can leave off the "relevant" bit (and,
> indeed, usually do).  that does not mean that we
> are not talking only about relevant bears.  You
> say you damned well mean all bears -- which ones?

Uh. All bears. I don't mean some bears, I don't mean just "all the
bears in context", I don't mean just "the ones that exist". I don't
mean "just" anything. I mean all bears. All bears. Each and every
single thing such that is/was/etc. a bear. When I say "all bears", I
always mean this. I had previously stated that I always meant this.

>  all the ones around here?, all the ones that
> currently exist?, all the ones that have ever
> existed? all the ones that can turn up in
> philosophical ponderings?  If you "obviously"

No, I mean "all bears", which includes all of these.

> mean one of these, how do you distinguish this
> case from the others? Do you always mean the same
> ones?   This seems to me to be the weakest part

Yeah, I do mean the same ones. How could "*all* bears" ever not mean
the same ones?

> <<If we have the clear and simple "all such that
> are bears", then the listener doesn't have to
> worry that the
> restriction is incomplete, that the speaker has
> ommited anything.>>
>
> Yeah, IF we had that; but, of course, we don't.

Uh, right. If we had it, then I wouldn't be arguing for its inclusion
into your version of the language.

> <<I urge you to try to construct some
> sentances using my proposed definitions, to get
> some idea of how
> they're used. I've done the very same using your
> definitions.>>
>
> I take it that your examples of your usage are
> correct and they do not do what you want them to
> do, hence I conclude that my constructing
> examples are even less likely to succeed.

Ok, then don't. I'll continue assume that you don't understand my position.