Re: [lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all}

[John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net>]

Okay.  My position is that your proposition is
not what Lojban does now and does not fit in well
enough with what Lojban does not to be a possible
modification.  I also hold that your move is
unnecessary and futile.

--- Maxim Katcharov <maxim.katcharov@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 5/14/06, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> >
> > I'm not sure why a referent needs to be
> gotten by
> > restriction rather than by buiding up:
> starting
> > from a blank we add on qualities until we hve
> an
> > adequate represssntation of what is intended.
>  I
> > don't say that this opposite approach makes
> any
> > significant difference in the result, just
> that
> > the chopping away idiom is not forced by what
> > actually occurs.
> 
> Because this is what occurs. The referent could
> be anything to start
> (by the listener's reckoning). Then, we apply
> the first restriction
> {__ cribe}. This restricts what our referent
> could be to bears. Then
> we add a second restriction {__ cribe poi
> bajra}. We start with
> anything, cut it down to bears, and cut it down
> again to runners. The
> proposition that we start with nothing does not
> work: we would start
> with nothing, and then that means "bears" ...
> and then we chop bears
> down to bears that run? And if we don't place
> even the first
> restriction, this means that we have nothing in
> mind? No, this does
> not work. We add /words/, but as we add the
> words, we /narrow down/. I
> meant what I said exactly as I said it: we let
> the listener know what
> we're referring to via restriction.

I see saying {cribe} as adding to a blank canvas,
but this may be just a matter of what metaphor to
use to describe what is going on.
 
> > > 1: all the black stones, all the white
> stones
> > > -- all black stones that
> > > are now on this table, [same for white]
> >
> > and are not already in the bag on the table.
> and
> 
> This is a a different issue, but I do not
> consider the stones within
> the bag to be on the table. They may be above
> the table, but they are
> not on it. By a stretch they may be on the
> lower fabric of the bag,
> but not on the table. The thing that is on the
> table is the group of
> (white, black) stones. But again, this is a
> different issue, unrelated
> to our current argument: yes, if you want to
> see it that way, the
> restriction "not in the bag" needs to be added.
> 
> > we mean only the game stones, not other
> stones
> > that are incidentally on the table. And by
> 
> There were no other stones on the table
> mentioned, and so I was
> operating under the absolutely reasonable
> assumption that there were
> none.

The fact that they are not mentioned does not
mean that they are not there; thjey may be
irrelevant to what the speaker wants to say and
still be in the environement, a possible source
of confusion to the unwary.  Note, by the way,
that "stones" here presumably means "playing
piece," since, depending on the game and the
quality of the set, some of these "stones" may be
shells or nuts or seeds or all may be plastic. 
If your description is meant to be complete as it
stands, it may well lead to picking up things
that ought not be picked up and leaving things
that ought be picked up.  Of course, the hearer
in this case has no trouble doing the right
thing, even without your additions.

> > "black" we mean the darker grays as opposed
> to
> > the distinctly lighter grays.  And so on
> forever.
> >
> 
> No. I see that you're trying to argue that you
> can never restrict
> absolutely, though you avoid explicitly saying
> this for some reason.

That is not exactly my point, which is that any
restriction can be restricted farther to meet a
possible problem and also that many restrictions
tht you take to be m"more complete" are simply
superfluous in a given case (as here). You
imagine problems in this case and so restrict to
meet these imaginary difficulties but stop before
dealing with further ones that I imagine. 
Chasing imaginary difficulties is a mug's game as
well as unneeded.
 

> You seem to be expanding the example towards
> including an entire
> rainbow of hundreds of stones that are now upon
> this table. But no,
> there are simply black stones, and white
> stones. If you want, we'll
> call them light stones (>=50% of some
> scientific color measurement),
> and dark stones (<50%). You're adjusting the
> situation to make my use
> of certain words incorrect, but this still
> doesn't show that you can't
> restrict completely. The restriction /was/
> complete, in accordance
> /with the example given/.

But more than was needed for the example given,
therefeore, adding problems seems a legitimate
game to play, since you started it.  Once you get
going, you can hardly say "thus far and no
farther."

 
> Your objection may be due to your perception
> that restrictions build
> up instead of narrowing down.
 
No.

It may be because
> you've heard that "the
> price of infinite precision is infinite
> verbosity", which does not
> apply here 

It actually does -- or at least is not nullified
by these cases -- since each restriction you add
add a significant amount of verbiage.  To be
sure, you don't really ("complete"
notwithstanding) aim for infinite precision, but
you move in that direction beyond "good enough
for present purposes" and so open the door.

(though "the price of exact
> precision is exact verbage" may
> apply)
Do you mean something secial by the pleonasm
"exact precision"?  It does nto seem to apply to
your examples, any more than "exact verbiage" (if
that makes sense at all) does.

. Regardless, this assumption (that you
> cannot completely
> restrict) is wrong.

I await the evidence or the argument for that.  I
take it you mean "restrict to the point that only
one thing or group of things satisfies the
description."  That may be true in a given
situation, but you seem to want one that is
situation independent and that seems a lot less
likely.

> Now, I may be mistaken, so I ask: is it your
> position that you cannot
> restrict until you are left with only the
> intended referents? (That
> is, that one cannot restrict completely?)

Yes and no.  As just noted, you can often do that
in a particular situation, but it is at least not
clear that you can do it against all situations
at once.
 
> > > 2: all the captures -- all the captures
> related
> > > to that last game
> >
> > That is, actually occurring in the last game
> and
> > made in accordance with the rules of that
> game
> > ...
> 
> Adding those restrictions does nothing. It's
> like saying "that which
> is an elephant... and (poi) that which is a
> mammal and that which is
> an animal and that which is a thing...". No,
> I've given a complete
> restriction.

Not at all.  You do not specify how the captures
are related to the last game. To be sure, in this
situation as far as we know it, there is no
reasonable doubt.  But then, there was no
reasonable doubt without your addition either:
witness the ease with which the conversants
identify the right things. 
> >
> > > 3: all three games -- all three
> just-previous
> > > games (or all games today?)
> >
> > Well, some unspecified  (as noted) three
> games
> > with no other games of this sort between any
> two
> > of them and ending with the one just
> finished.
> > The time span involved is indefinite but --
> we
> > assume -- known to the conversants, who keep
> > track of the games they play.
> 
> The example given implies a set of games. I'm
> trying to determine what
> actually happened based on an English
> description of it. If I'm wrong,
> and they actually mean "all the last three
> games in this garden", or
> whatever, then I would have made my
> complete-restriction reflect that.
> But I assumed that the referants in the
> speaker's mind were "all three
> games of the last set that we played"/"all
> three just-previous games",
> so that's how I said it, and based on my
> (perfectly reasonable)
> assumption, my restriction was complete.

But as redundant as you claimed my line above
was.
  
> >
> > > 4: all the stones -- all stones related to
> that
> > > last game
> >
> > I thought it was the ones on the table. 
> These
> > need not be all used in the last game but
> should
> > be picked up and put away anyhow.
> 
> You're correct, though it would probably be
> "all the stones related to
> the game set (board, bags...)" (here I'm
> assuming that the speaker
> doesn't consider that some stones may have
> rolled into the grass long
> ago). 

Though, if they should find one, it should
probalby (you don't actually say in your
"complete" description) go into the bag, too.

> Here we're deliberating on the best way
> to make a complete
> restriction, but this doesn't indicate that a
> complete restriction
> cannot be made, which seems to be your
> position.

Well, insofar as restrctions you claim to be
complete are not, it does count as evidence.  At
best you are -- as you yourself keep pointing out
-- making a restriction complete for a given
situation.  But you seem eventually to want more
than this.
 
> >
> > > 5: all the stones that are along the path
> --
> > > all stones that are along
> > > this path (now?)
> >
> > The presentation seems to make this just the
> > ornamental stones along the path, not
> incidental
> 
=== message truncated ===

<<> The presentation seems to make this just the
> ornamental stones along the path, not
incidental
> rocks, but, given the rest of the senrtence,
this
> is probably unimpotant (unless, of course, the
> hearer slips on one of the rocks and says "Hey,
> you should have warned me about these, too").
>

Yep, but if I was a speaker, I wouldn't make this
restriction. In
fact, I may very well say "take care not to trip
on stones along
paths" (which wouldn't restrict to ornamental
stones or this certain
path at all, and would have a better ring to it
in Lojban).>>

That is, the "complete" restriction you give
originally is not the "real" complete
description?
I rather thought as much.  I'm not sure why this
has a better ring in Lojban; it merely says
something different.

<<> > We see that the given antecedents (left)
are
> > not restricted
> > completely, except for perhaps 5a.
>
> Notice that all the right one also have furhter
> relevant restrictions which are nonetheless
> correctly omitted as obvious from the
> presentation.  As are most of what is added in
> moving from left to right.

These structures may be relevant, but they would
be unneccisary. If
you mean that they are neccisary to provide a
complete restriction,
I'd like to know what you think they are.>>

Well, I have set a particularly obtuse conversant
into the situation and the strictures are needed
to guide him.  On the other hand, your additions
are clearly not needed in the situation as
presented, since the conversant get along fine
wihtout them.


<<> > However, when reading the complete
restrictions
> > on the right, we know
> > exactly what the referents are, and they're
> > exactly the referents
> > intended.
>
> As of course is the case with the left ones in
> this situation.

No, it is not the case. You'll notice that both
the left and the right
have been taken out of their context, but not out
of their setting.
The ones on the left become vague, the ones on
the right mean exactly
what the speaker intends them to mean.>>

Against a more abstract situation, perhaps.  Once
you take them out of the situation, there is no
longer any reason to object to my additions,
since they were objected to only as not fitting
the given situation.  But if we stick to the
given situation, then your additions are
unnecessary as well.  You can't really have it
both ways, you know.


<<> > context - for example, for 1a, the listener
> > would fill in based on
> > context "...that are now on this table".
>
> It is doubtful that the hearer actually does
such
> additions, he probably just acts on what is
given
>  in the light of his understanding of the
> situation.  If he does something wrong, his
> explanation is not usually in terms of a
mistaken
> addition to the given, nor is his explanation
of
> how he knew what to do right.

I don't understand what you're saying. The hearer
makes these
additions. This is how context works to help the
listener determine
what the referent is.>>

Making these additions is a reconstructive
explanation: he gets it right, so he must have
made these additions.  Examining what the person
really does shows no (or at least no general) use
of such additions.  The alternatives that the
restrictions foreclose simply do not occur to the
person, so adding something to avoid them is not
part of the process.


<<> > English lets the listener know that the
> > restriction is complete with
> > an emphasis on "all", or with additional
> > explanations.
>
> Examples?  I don't see cases of "all" used in
> this way as common.  And, if the description is
> complete, what is the additional explanation?

Of the many examples that I've used just in the
course of this
discussion, the most prevalent one is probably
how I'm always forced
to either say "all (ever) bears", or "*all*
bears".>>

Are these meant to be examples of "all" used to
show completeness of the description or are they
examples of adding on explanations.  They seem to
be the latter, for they show that "all" by itself
 does not correspond to a complete description.

<<I'd also like to
point out that it doesn't have to be common, it
has to be important.
You can make it as uncommon as you like, by
relying only on incomplete
restrictions, by relying on context. And I can
make it as common as I
like, by challenging myself to finding the most
terse set of
restrictions that would do their job completely.

The additional explanation is given when the
restriction is
incomplete: "all bears (ever, imaginary, past,
present, future,
hypothetical...)" - in brackets is the additional
explanation.>>

So, if this comes after the "all" is used, how
does "all" mark completion and, if this is part
of the completion "all" maks, how is it
additional information?  I just don't understand
the point you are aiming at here.


<<> > Adding an explicit number into the inner
> > quantifier will let the
> > listener know that they should restrict down
to
> > that number. {L_ pa
> > cribe} hints that the number of referents is
> > one.
>
> It doesn't hint.  It says the number of things
> being referred to is one.  "Restricts" seems
even
> less apt here, the number is where you end up,
> not how you get there.  To be sure, if you end
up

To say that that number is where you end up and
not how you got there,
is like saying that "cribe" is where you end up,
not how you got
there.>>

No, you go looking for bears, you find that there
are three of them.  If I was looking for three
bears, I would say {cribe cimei} or some such (to
be sure, xorxes would say {ci cribe}, but that is
idiosyncratic at the moment).  Internal
quantifiers are incidental to the description,
not a part of it.


<<> > Now, when we say {L_ cribe} (blank inner)
we
> > leave the user to
> > restrict using context. The listener will
pick
> > out the most applicable
> > referents.
>
> Ahah! Here is where you are going to try to
make
> some sort of move.  By stressing that {lo
cribe}
> is a case where the hearer picks things out
using
> context, you are setting up some other case --
> presumably {lo ro cribe}, given all the talk
> about "all" -- as a case where the hearer picks
> thigs out without context.  I don't see this --
> if it is the way you want to go.  It certainly
is
> not how Lojban works now and it does not seem
to
> be a useful way to change (even if it can be
made
> clear).

What certainly isn't how Lojban works now? My
statement just above?>>

No, the one I was anticipating your making about
{lo ro cribe}.  The one about {lo cribe} (and {lo
Q cribe}, for any Q) is substantially correct.

<<> > What's the difference between {L_ cribe}
and
> > {L_ ro cribe}? There
> > isn't any practical difference.
>
> As noted, this is controversial.  To be sure,
CLL
> says that {lo cribe} is just the implicit form
of
> the explicit {su'o lo ro cribe}, but I don't

The CLL also implies that an inner {ro} is an
assertion regarding how
many bears exist. My position wants nothing to do
with that.>>

So you are proposing something new, as has been
clear all along.  Further, you want {lo ro cribe}
to be of a different order from, say {lo ci
cribe} or even {lo rau cribe},where the internal
quantifier tells how many things are in the
referent.  Even when {lo ro cribe} referred to
the set of bears, it did not, of course, say how
many bears exist, since "all" is a
merelytautological answer.  It does say how many
out of the posible referents are in the referent,
however.


<<> > In the former,
> > it is said "we don't
> > say anything about the number", in the latter
> > "all those that are
> > relevant". These are two perspectives on (or
> > parts of) the same
> > underlying principle: "Listener, we're not
> > giving you a
> > number-restriction, so just use context to
> > guess what the referent
> > is".
>
> "Guess" seems a little harsh; there are good,
> albeit fallible, argument patterns to get to
the
> answer.

It's not meant to be harsh, it's meant to be
accurate. I'm not at all
arguing that we should completely restrict every
single referent - not
at all. In fact, I think that it is very
important for this ability to
not have to restrict fully to exist. However, the
ability to restrict
completely is more important, though much less
practical.>>

"Guess" usually implies a lack of proper
argumentation to support the claim.  Finding the
referent -- in those rare cases where there is
some doubt -- has proper procedures.  In most
cases, guessing -- or reasoning, for that matter
-- is not even an issue.


<<> > Lojban seems to have one way to signal that
the
> > restrictions are
> > complete: with additional explanations.
>
> I am not sure what you mean here: what would
> count as an additional explanation added to a
> complete set of restrictions?  This seems
> paradoxical.

I mean what xorxes was getting at: "Now, taking
into account not just
the twenty bears that we've been talking about
but other bears as
well, ...". But I don't really know. All I know
is that Lojban doesn't
have a solid way to do what I describe - to make
an antecedent that
doesn't rely on context.>>

As noted before, if there is such a way of doing
things (doubtful, I would say), then Lojban has
it too.

<<> > I find this more than strange. {ro}, being
> > synonymous with a blank
> > inner quantifier is readily available (and
> > perhaps may have been
> > intended) to serve as the marker that the
> > restriction is complete and
> > that the listener shouldn't add any other
> > restrictions using context.
>
> This seems to me perverse.  Internal {ro} is
> about the number of things in the referent, not
> about the completeness of the referring

It /is/ about the number of things in the
referent. When I say "all
bears", I damn well mean all bears - "all such
that are bears". Do I
mean "all relevant things such that are bears"?
No. I mean "all such
that are bears". This extra "relevant things"
that has been tacked on
seems to /me/ perverse. 

Okay, we can leave off the "relevant" bit (and,
indeed, usually do).  that does not mean that we
are not talking only about relevant bears.  You
say you damned well mean all bears -- which ones?
 all the ones around here?, all the ones that
currently exist?, all the ones that have ever
existed? all the ones that can turn up in
philosophical ponderings?  If you "obviously"
mean one of these, how do you distinguish this
case from the others? Do you always mean the same
ones?   This seems to me to be the weakest part
of all this, the notion that what {ro} counts is
always the same even for the same description. 
Indeed, even if you hit upon one such group, your
"all" is probably subject to modification
depending on what is said ("All bears have four
legs" is, of course, strictly false for most
cases of "all" but we may well accept it because
"bears that have lost a leg or even been born
without one don't count.")

<<If we have the clear and simple "all such that
are bears", then the listener doesn't have to
worry that the
restriction is incomplete, that the speaker has
ommited anything.>>

Yeah, IF we had that; but, of course, we don't.

<<I understand how your inner ro, inner su'o, and
blank inner work.>>

Well, it is not perfectly clear that you do,
since you say some strange and some controversial
things about them.

<<Since you do not see how my inner ro meaning
*all* corresponds to it
being an indicator that a restriction is
complete, I conclude that you
don't understand my position.>>

Well, think I do understand your position and, as
I understand it, it doesn't work and can't. 

<<I urge you to try to construct some
sentances using my proposed definitions, to get
some idea of how
they're used. I've done the very same using your
definitions.>>

I take it that your examples of your usage are
correct and they do not do what you want them to
do, hence I conclude that my constructing
examples are even less likely to succeed.