Re: [lojban] tu'o usage

[And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>]

pc:
#a.rosta@lycos.co.uk writes:
#<<
#> {lo ro broda cu brode} means something like "some broda is brode
#> and the cardinality of the set of broda is the cardinality of the
#> set of broda" -- I can't think of a better way of putting it,
#> unfortunately. The Lojban is not tautologous like my English version,
#> but it is as vacuously uninformative. Maybe "some broda is brode
#> and lo'i broda has a cardinality" might be better.
#> 
#> So in that case, {lo ro broda na brode} means "it is not the case
#> that both some broda is brode and the cardinality of the set of
#> broda is the cardinality of the set of broda (or, alternatively,
#> lo'i broda has cardinality". Since it obviously is the case that the 
#> cardinality
#> of lo'i broda is the cardinality of lo'i broda -- or that
#> lo'i broda has a cardinality -- the inevitable inference is that
#> it is not the case that some broda is brode.
#>>
#That is, of course, interpretation.  What is said is that the cardinality is 
#ro, just another number.  

But ro functions here as a cardinal number and means "the number equal
to the cardinality of lo'i broda". As a cardinality indicator, it's hard to see
ro as anything other than a dummy filler; it is utterly uninformative.

#So, if negation is going to affect that, it changes it to {me'iro} or some 
#other version of {na'e ro}.  

But the claim made by the cardinality indicator -- lo'i broda cu PA mei --
is always linked by logical AND to some other proposition, and its
the conjunction that gets negated. So {lo ro broda na brode} means
{ga lo'i broda na ro mei gi su'o broda na brode}. Now if {lo'i broda
na ro mei}, then indeed ro would change to some version of na'e
ro. But that would be so nonsensical that the only plausible
interpretation of {ga lo'i broda na ro mei gi su'o broda na brode}
is as equivalent to {su'o broda na brode}.

#Now, that may in the end 
#give an equally contradictory component of some compound, if that is how it 
#develops, and tha component may drop out to give just the basic negative, 
#without any component about cardinality.  But what then justifies adding back 
i#n a cardinality component, namely, the one jut dropped out.  I suppose that 
#it come back in because it is a tautology (why the negation dropped out).  
#Well, at least this coheres so far, but I await a case where {lo PA broda} 
#negated turns up as {lo na'e PA broda}.  (As you point out later, this may be 
#a long wait because no one ever uses {lo PA broda}.)

The three Graces, the seven seas, the 51 states of the USA -- those are
equivalent to (ro) lo PA broda.

#<<
#Firstly, but less importantly, 'definite descriptions' -- closely
#comparable to Lojban le -- are fairly standard exx of presupposition,
#I think.
#>>
#You mean as a way to dodge the Russell cases.  

Yes. Bald French kings etc.

#Probably, although I 
#personally go with the explicit formats, the eight and ninety ways remaining 
#to do descriptions  -- all of which are also right.
#
#<<
#Second, the essence of le is specificity, with nonveridicality something
#of a by-product. My personal view is that logically specificity
#involves existential quantification outside the scope of the operator
#that carries illocutionary force (e.g. assertive force). If the
#sumti tail is held to also be outside the scope of the illocutionary
#operator, then nonveridicality is an automatic consequence. It is
#also my personal view that the essence of presupposition/conventional
#implicature that it is outside the scope of the illocutionary
#operator. Therefore I see specificity as "presuppositional existential
#quantification".
#>>
#Both of these theories of yours are interesting and need some mulling (my 
#first instinct is to like it a lot).  But I don't see that the fact that you 
#have these theories (even if they turn out to be correct -- i.e., pick of the 
l#itter) requires us to use them to explain the present case, which isn't 
#directly about that. But, of course, if specificity is a pre-illocution 
#quantifier, then INNER, which is that quantifier, is presuppositional.

Hold on: my theory/claims are:

* Specificity is a pre-illocution quantifier. {le} = "pre-illocution-{lo}".

* Everything following {le} is preillocutionary/presuppositional (i.e. the
INNER and the rest of the sumti tail).

* Everything following {lo} is not preillocutionary/presuppositional (i.e. 
neither the INNER nor the rest of the sumti tail).

#<<
#Finally, I too don't recall it ever having been established that
#the inner cardinality indicator is nonveridical (=subjectively
#defined), but I think that is the more consistent position to take.
#>>
#So, when I say {le ci mlatu} meaning those four dogs -- or even those four 
#cats -- I did not misspeak myself, since I know what I mean -- but can't 
#count -- and you know what I mean, even if you can count?  Given the history 
#of {le}, that seems plausible -- and thoroughly disastrous.  

That's right, except it's not disastrous -- it's desirable. I want to provide
info within the le sumti to help you identify the referent set, but so long
as it aids with identification I don't want to *claim* that info is true.
E.g. I want to say that those people -- those in the group that looks,
from where we're standing, like a threesome -- over there are happy.
So I say {le ci prenu cu gleki}. If you identify which people I'm
talking about, agree that they're happy, but go and count them and
find that they are a foursome, I want you to answer {ja'a go'i}, not
{na go'i}, though you are very welcome to also answer {na'i go'i}
too. 

(This is a point I picked up from McCawley, btw.)

#<<
#So I'm back to square one then, understandingwise. Never mind, I'll
#see if McCawley enlightens me.
#>>
#Sorry if I didn't fit your hypothesis.  I have trouble imagining what you 
#could have been thinking of.  The importing forms (yes, restricted 
#quantification) always entail the corresponding unrestricted ones.  If some 
#broda is brode then there are broda and something is brode -- the same thing, 
#in fact.

I had trouble imaging what I could have been thinking of, too. I know
what I was trying to grope towards, but ended up talking nonsense.

#<<
#yet it's easy to come up with examples of
#nonimporting "every": "everyone who answers all questions successfully
#will pass the course" -- this does not claim that some has answered
#or will answer all questions successfully.
#>>
#But, I would never say that but rather "Any student ,,,"

OK. Maybe there really are interlectal differences, then.

#<<
#I understand where you're coming from, treating presupposition as
#kind of analogous to parenthesis. But from what I say above, you
#can see that I see presupposition as basically a matter of scope
#relative to the illocutionary operator.
#>>
#Neat.  And I would add that negation then comes after the presuppositional 
#part, either as part of or in the scope of the illocutionary operator.  

I'm pleased you like the idea. Yes, certainly negation is within the scope of
the illocutionary operator, except of course for {na'i} which I (and you) would 
take to be a negator with scope over everything else (including stuff outside
the scope of the illoc-op.

#<<
#Of course, but you seemed to imply that there were many such cases.
#I suspect that there aren't, and that if you did find some, the
#authors might feel that their usage was an inadvertent mistake.
#>>
#Sorry about the implication (worse, I think I asserted it, without checking 
#what data I had).  There don't seem to be any cases at all one way or the 
#other.  So, no conclusion can be drawn from usage, althoug the absence of 
#usage might suggest that people just don't quite know what to do with it.  
#Or, more likely, that no occasion has arisen for both mentioning the size of 
#the set (and precious few for that alone) and negating.

Right. The infrequency of {lo PA broda} is comparable to the infrequency
of {lo broda noi brode ku} -- they both provide information that does not
restrict the referent set.

--And.