If I remember rightly, the main point
Wittgenstein was making that death
isn't a timeless state; it is not a state (or
even an event) at all. We
only have a concept of death because of the way
language works, not
because there is any state we can point to and
call "death".
A tad opaque, as I said. But that is what I was
saying in my opaque way, more or less. In
Lojban, that someone is dead, lo nu ko'a morsi,
counts as an event and lasts as long at least as
this {ko'a} has a referent available for
conversation (the domain of conversation being at
least somewhat cumulative temporally). Further,
that event is a state since it does not change in
any relevant way throughout its duration. But it
is a state of the world, not a state of ko'a, who
participates in no states. I suspect that the
difference here is marked in Lojban by the
difference between {nu} and {li'i}: no da li'i
ko'a morsi kei ko'a. And, of course, by the
difference between a particpant and an observer
(glossed over for {li'i}).