[lojban] Re: semantic primes

[John E Clifford <lojban-out@lojban.org>]

--- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com> wrote:

> On 3/23/06, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > > > --- Jorge Llambías <jjllambias@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > > > And the thesis that a language can be
> > > > > "completely defined" must
> > > > > be taken as self-evident?
> > > >
> > Well, I don't know about your experience, of
> > course, but in my experience, difficult
> concepts
> > can be -- and are -- defined in terms of more
> > basic ones and, if pushed on, the process
> > eventually comes down to something where I
> say
> > "Gee, if you don't know what that means, I
> don't
> > see how I could explain it to you."
> 
> We're going in circles now. I certainly agree
> that
> difficult concepts can and are explained in
> terms
> of more basic ones, to any degree required
> under
> the circumstances. I thought we had agreed
> about that.

I am sure we did, but that was never the point at
issue  -- at least for me.


> But these explanations are never complete
> definitions,
> they are simply good enough for all practical
> purposes.

I wouldn't say "never" (see above);they do not,
however, aim at complete definitions.
 
> For example, I find the cited NSM definition of
> "X loves Y"
> very clever, perspicuous and interesting, but I
> would
> never call it complete or definitive.

Well, we may be talking at cross purposes here. 
In a traditional sense, what NSM offers are not
definitions at all, but -- as they keep insisting
-- reductive paraphrases.  It ought to be the
case for a reductive paraphrase that the
"defined" expression (a complete sentence, note)
can be replaced by the paraphrase without loss of
meaning.  I think the proposal about "x loves y"
works pretty well.  If there is something
missing, it can be added in once it is
formulated.  I haven't come up with anything more
that a small discomfort the lenght of the
paraphrase and some stuff about physiological
reactions  -- which do seem to me to be both
needed and hard to do in NSM as I have seen it so
far.

> > > Or that every concept is itself undefinable
> in
> > > the strong sense.
> >
> > Ah, now that is an interestingly different
> point.
> >  But it does seem that at least some are,
> even in
> > a strong sense (short of "everything is
> > definable").
> 
> For example? Would you say that any of the
> cited
> definitions are final and undisputable?

No, or at least I wouldn't want to stake much on
it even though I often can't see what more might
be needed.
 
>  This position is not going to get
> > much traction, since it makes systematic
> > semantics impossible.  It may eventually turn
> out
> > to be true, of course, but it is way too
> early to
> > consider it seriously.  And in the mentime we
> > seem to be generating a lot of
> counterevidence
> > (not merely in NSM but in other semantic
> theories
> > as well).
> 
> I think systematic semantics is very useful. I
> don't
> think it requires complete and final
> definitions to
> be possible.

I wonder if you know much about systematic
semantic theory then.  It is based in almost
every case on Logic and the metatheory that goves
with it, one feature of which is exactly the
completeness of the metatheory (even when the
object theory is not).
 
> > > > Thus, pooling these resources, we
> > > > get a set of undefinable concepts in
> terms of
> > > > which all the others are defined.
> > >
> > > That's the main NSM hypothesis. Attractive,
> but
> > > highly unlikely
> > > from my perspective.
> >
> > What part of the argument leading to this
> point
> > do you either not understand or disagree with
> > (and, if the latter, what is your counter
> case)?
> 
> I disagree with the premise that complete and
> final
> definitions of concepts are possible. Only
> definitions
> good enough for some purpose are possible. Or
> at
> least those are the ones we have available. We
> don't
> seem to have any definite and final definition
> available.

Well, I am not sure.  We have some claimed to be
such and to which no significant exceptions have
been taken.  Of course, it is always possible
that such an objection may come along, but in the
meantime we at least seem to have final cases --
in NSM and in other theories as well.
 
> > > Well, without the notion of complete
> definition
> > > everything else seems to fall apart.
> >
> > But it is essential to the notion of
> definition
> > as intended in semantic theory.  Now, you can
> say
> > "Screw semantic theory" but the argument is
> one
> > within semantic theory, so for that field the
> > dismissal is not available.
> 
> Is semantic theory is impossible without
> complete
> definitions? Why can't there be a semantic
> theory
> based on approximate, good enough for a
> purpose,
> definitions?

As a practical matter, because such a theory is
devilishly hard to work with, if possible at all.
 We might, of course, develop a theory with
perfect definitions and then allow that the
realizations of that theory, the observable
paroles, are only make-do (that is, we might have
a semantics just like syntax).  So then the
definitions we actually give would not be quite
the theoretical ones but would evaluated on their
approximation to that.  NSM, since it holds that
each language is capable of being its own
semantic metalanguage, can't quite take that
line, but many other semantic theories could and
(off the record) do.  So, it is fair to attack
NSM if one of its paraphrases is incomplete --
but the attack does have eventually to say what
is lacking.  At which point NSM should be able to
meet that objection.  I suppose this means that
the NSM program is a process not entirely to be
evaluated in terms of results at a given moment,
but at least it is a process actually under way,
unlike quite a few other semantic theories, which
are still bogged down in arguing fundamentals.
 
> > > > But notice that your
> > > > definition is not one of the canonical
> form
> > > and
> > > > the NSMers insist that the sentential
> forms
> > > > allowed are as much a part of the system
> as
> > > the
> > > > concepts.
> > >
> > > That's another good way out. I suppose the
> > > "canonical form" is
> > > something too complicated to explain in a
> few
> > > lines?
> >
> > Au contraire, in any given language and for
> each
> > word, it is a simple expression that is
> available
> > to every competent speaker of the language
> (say
> > adult or some such neutral criterion).
> 
> And how is "X is the opposite of good" not
> available to
> every competent speaker of English?

Well, as I understand the situation it (and this
may be completely wrong -- it is hard to get some
of this nailed down) "X is NP" means that X is
among the referents of NP.  That is, X would be a
member of the class of opposites of good, not (as
is presumably wanted) be characterized by the
property opposite to goodness.  As I said, "the
opposite of good" is not an adjective, as "bad"
is in English.  I think this can be worked around
in various ways, but -- as noted -- there are
claimed to be other reasons for not taking
OPPOSITE as a prime.



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