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[lojban] Re: A (rather long) discussion of {all}

On 5/20/06, John E Clifford <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:



--- Maxim Katcharov <maxim.katcharov@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On 5/19/06, John E Clifford
> <clifford-j@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
> > MK>
> >
> > <<Yes, though the bounds of this set may vary
> > from
> > > individual to
> > > individual. >>
> [...]
> >
> > I think that this admission is a tactical
> > mistake.  If the set of all bears (actual,
> > possible, past, present and future, etc.)
> varies
> > from person to person, then you have
> essentially
> > conceded xorxes' point.  First, if every
> person
> > has such a set, then there is a maximal set
> which
> > embraces all of these (their union --
> available
>
> The union of all of these bear sets is /not/
> what I would call the
> "maximal set". The union of what I call this
> set is "everything" (as
> in including pencils), because surely there are
> crazy people out there
> who think/have thought that beds are bears, or
> that knives are bears.
>
Once you have relativized the bear set to
individuals, you  can no longer say (you
especially) that some individuals bear sets don't
count.


They factor in minimally in guessing this "average set". "Maximal set"
is simply wrong, since the implications appear to be that everything
that ever was considered a bear is included. "Perfect set" is also a
misnomer. "Average set", or "set predicted to have the most utility in
communication" are good terms.

When *you* say "bears", *you* have *your* criteria in mind. You have
in mind neither someone else's criterea, nor an exact "ideal
criterea". You have your own, and if you are a sane person, your brain
will automatically do its best to make your criterea match what you
*think* the average criteria is - your brain standardizes for you. But
your criteria is not the "perfect average criteria", it can't be,
because you can't really ever know where /everyone's/ boundaries are,
unless everyone has very simplistic boundaries, and "everyone" is only
a small group of people (perhaps you're on an island).

When listening to you, I attempt to use *your* criteria. The best way
for me to try to do this given that I don't know your criterea, is to
use *my* criterea. Why? Because I assume that both our brains are
standardizing for us.

http://www.upa.pdx.edu/IOA/newsom/pa551/venn.gif

For "child", our criteria/bounds (represented by circles) probably
have a shared variance of 75%. For "future", probably 99.99%. For
"bear", 75%. However, since we rarely see bears that deviate much from
the center, for all practical purposes our SV for "bear" is 99%.
Things that can be referenced as "children" have a near-perfectly even
progression out into "not children", so their practical SV is 75%.


This uncertainty is not a problem to my model. The uncertainty exists
between two people, not within the speaker's own bounds.

I can grasp the concept of "all permutations of anything -
things/events/feelings". I need not be able to imagine every single of
the infinite permutations. When I think of or say "all bears" I have a
perfectly definite and exact concept of bears - that is, if I /were/
to think of every single permutation, I could theoretically (if my
brain was fixed in time) by my definitions judge everything to be a
bear or not a bear.

I need not imagine each to grasp the concept of this mega-set. I have
very fixed lines at one point in time that determine what is a bear
and what isn't. The objection is that people's sets of bears are
vague. They are not. People have an uncertain chance of agreeing on
fringe cases, and that's the sort of vagueness that I'm asserting
exists.


count.  Knives and beds are possible bears --
indeed, in your story, actual ones -- since they
are in some person's bear set.  The rest of us
may disagree, but we all disagree with one
another about some cases.  You seem to be working
with two criteria here; pick one.


If you still think that I have two criterea, what are they?



> Perhaps the /average/ of these sets, and surely
> the /consensus/ of
> these sets would be the very closest we're ever
> going to come to this
> "*ideal* mega-set".

We are not after an ideal mega-set, just the set


Sorry, subset of the mega-set that is "bear". The bear mega-set.


of all actual (whenever) and possible bears, and


Are you looking for some sort of objective criteria for "bear"? Sorry,
there's no such thing. There may be one for "future", or for "atom"? I
don't know. I don't care about it. I care that the speaker is capable
of judging things to be bears/not bears at the point in time that he
says the word, and that there is the hypothetical concept of "every
permutation of anything that could be" (mega-set). These two things I
assert are true.


that is, by you definitions, the union of all the
personal bear sets.  It is also the one


The ideal (most useful) mega-set of bears is most certainly *not* the
/union/ of all sets of bears, though it may be the /average/ - "the
ideal average set".


guraranteed to exist (well, the intersection


Yes, it exists theoretically (as opposed to in full detail of every
permutation that[...]) in the mind of the speaker as he concieves of
the word.


does, too -- even if it happens to be empty,
though that not for L-sets).  I agree that this
is a reasonable way to go, but not one available
to you starting as you do (which is why I think
itwas a bad move).


> > even for L-sets).  Since, ex hypothesi, no
> one
> > actually has this as his set, then no one
> really
> > means ALL bears when he say {lo ro cribe},
> only
> > "all the things I think of as bears."
> Further,
>
> There is no such thing as a universal set "all
> bears". There is only
> what is considered "all bears" by each person,
> and what may be
> considered "all bears" mutually by two people
> when they have changed
> (even in minor details) the bounds of their
> model of what constitutes
> a bear and reached a consensus. Each person has
> a model of something
> like the most ideal or typical bear, and then a
> certain tolerance to
> deviation - a certain bounds at which something
> is no longer a bear at
> all.

This is psychologically an implausible model for
how we do these things, so it is not a good


It is a perfectly plausable (and accurate!) model. If you are going to
make these objections, please detail the errors. Examples and
explanations are always of great aid.


rational reconstruction.  It also, of course,
does not fit your earlier discussion about bear
sets in a very clear way.


I think it does. Perhaps our definitions of words used went out of tune.



> My tolerance may be smaller than yours. My
> 'typical bear' may be
> a bit different than yours. This is simply a
> fact, and I'm not going
> to gloss over it by saying "there is one ideal
> of 'bear' that is based
> on the mind of no mortal".

Wise, but irrelevant to where you were the last
time 'round.


It's good that you say this, as it indicates that you believe not in
the existance of this sort of set.



> > once you allow that what counts as a bear
> varies
> > from person to person, you have to allow that
> for
> > each person it varies with time (as it
> clearly
> > does as the person grows in knowledge, but
> not
> > obviously only that).  And once you do that,
> the
> > step to "it varies with the person's
> interests at
> > the time" is hardly a step at all.  And then
> we
> > are at xorxes' place "all bears" is
> everything I
> > count as a bear at the moment.
>
> No, you've made a jump from "everything I
> consider a bear at the
> moment" to "those bears that I am referring to
> at the moment".

My point is that, once you allow that what I
consider a bear may fluctuate from moment to
moment, you have to allow that the reason for the
fluctuation may simply what I happen to be
referring to.  You have built in no way to


That the thing that you're referring to fluctuates? No. The
fluctuation is due to your brain trying to constantly adjust to what
it percieves the best definition to be. As you make rationalizations
for drawing the bounds in this place or that place, your bounds shift.
If you froze a person's brain in time and made it not scared of being
decisive, and prevented it from constantly rationalizing regarding the
bounds, and then made it judge the mega-set as bears-or-not, it would
after an infinite amount of time provide you with a group of things
that are bears.

The referent can't fluctuate (from one moment to the next things
change, but when I say "this pen" I mean it 'now'), so I don't think I
understand you there.


prevent this other than *saying* that it ain't
so, which is hardly decisive (or, maybe, even
relevant).

> Both
> can be expressed by the ambiguous "everything I
> count as a bear at the
> moment". xorxes' position is that
>
> "all bears must be accounted for..."
>
> refers not to *all* bears, but the bears in the
> X.

Not quite the point; his bears need not be
restricted in any easily describable way (other
than "the relevant ones," say).


The bears in that contract have a sticky spatial restriction applied
to them. I consider that a very real restriction.

Even "bears such that are relevant to our conversation" is a very real
restriction.



> Now, someone who
> says the above would still
> considers/counts/etc. a bear that is not in
> the X a bear - they're simply not referring to
> it. It doesn't "count"
> as a bear that they're *referring to*, but it
> still clearly counts as
> a bear. The vagueness that I've asserted exists
> is as follows:
>
But as soon as the question about another bear
arises, it becomes a referred to bear, and so
comes to count.  It does not seem that you can
say that something not referred to still counts
as a bear, because it can only be counted by
being referred to.


...I can't communicate without having referents. So, uh, yes, the
bears become referents in *our* conversation here. But these bears
(mega-set) do not come to count as referents in *that* example. So
when I raise the question of this bear-set in our conversation, it
makes no sense for you to suggest that it becomes the referent in that
hypothetical example.


> Anyway, point is, the argument is wrong because
> it fails to
> differentiate between "think truly is" and "am
> currently referring to
> as".

Again, the point is that you have not left a
basis for making that distinction.  A person who
is currently referring to something as a bear
currently thinks it truly is one and conversely


Yes.


and, having relativized what is a bear to this
situation, you cannot not absolutize to some part
of that situation.


I don't understand you here.


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