djuno: the key issue (was: Re: Fwd: Re: [lojban] Random lojban questions/annoyances.)

[And Rosta <arosta@uclan.ac.uk>]

Lojbab:
#At 06:52 PM 03/27/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
#>Lojbab:
#>At 05:00 PM 03/26/2001 +0100, And Rosta wrote:
#>[....]
#>#>Whether this means that *I* can truthfully say "ko'a djuno fe homosexuality-
#>#>is-a-sin fo fundamentalist-jegvo-dogma", I'm not sure. I suppose the answer
#>#>is Yes.
#>#
#>#It seems key to me that ANYONE should be able to say that truthfully if
#>#indeed ko'a is satisfied with the dogma as a means of establishing truth.
#>
#>Hmm. So we haven't resolved this after all. If I don't accept that the
#>ve djuno entails the se djuno, but the x1 does believe that the
#>ve djuno entails the se djuno, then according to you I can honestly
#>describe this by DJUNO. 
[...]
#The difference to me between djuno and jinvi is in the x1s attitude towards 
#the x2.  If I jinvi something, I am admitting subjectivity and indeed the 
#possibility of error as to whether x2 is indeed true or whether x2 is 
#justified by x4.  When I claim to know/djuno something by epistemology x4, 
#I am not admitting that I could reach any other truth by that veldjuno.

It seems to me that the discussion has converged on just two rival
definitions that differ on one point: for "x1 djuno x2 x3 x4" to be true,
does x2 have to be entailed by x4 (Position I), or is it sufficient for x1 
to believe (possibly erroneously) that x1 is entailed by x4 (Position II)?

Lojbab says (II), and (II) is what I would advocate too. But I think (I)
is closer to established usage and also to the views of the Three
Magi (pc, John & Jorge).

--And.