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Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable
Odd notion of ambiguity which doesn't occur but still presents a sentence which
is both true and false.
----- Original Message ----
From: And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com>
To: lojban@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wed, October 19, 2011 3:27:55 PM
Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural
variable
Martin Bays, On 19/10/2011 06:11:
> * Wednesday, 2011-10-19 at 04:59 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
>
>> Martin Bays, On 18/10/2011 04:26:
>>>>>> For example, {na ku lo cinfo cu zvati lo mi purdi}
>>>>>> has at least the two following meanings in terms of actual lions:
>>>>>> 1. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as a plurality of mundane lions, giving
>>>>>> roughly:
>>>>>> For L some (contextually relevant) lions: \not in(L, my garden)
>>>>>> (which probably means that there exists a lion among L which is not in
>>>>>> my garden)
>>>>>> 2. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as the kind Lions, giving
>>>>>> \not in(Lions, my garden)
>>>>>> which is then resolved existentially, giving
>>>>>> \not \exists l:lion(l). in(l, my garden) .
>>>> Sorry, I was unclear. I meant that English seems to allow only
>>>> reading (2), and that the same might go for Lojban.
>>> Ah! Have {lo} *only* able to get kinds, you mean?
>> Yes. With anything that looks like a 'mundane' reconceived as a kind.
>
> So how would you rule out interpretation 1 in the above?
By whatever rules out "it is not the case that Obama is in my garden" or "it is
not the case that chlorine is in my garden" from being true in a circumstance in
which some (but not all) Obama/chlorine is in my garden. I suppose the principle
is that referents are treated as atoms rather than as complexes some bits of
which do broda and other bits of which don't necessarily broda; but I'm really
only thinking aloud in saying this.
>>> The "temporal stages of Obama" example could be dealt with by
>>> intepreting Obama as the kind 'Obama-stages', I agree, but it could also
>>> be dealt with just by using tenses. I'm not sure how to deal with "an
>>> unusually exuberant Obama"... but since it's a rare construction, a hack
>>> like transforming it to "Obama, who was unusually exuberant" would seem
>>> reasonable.
>>
>> The point is that English does allow restrictive modification of
>> _Obama_, so does recognize subtypes of Obama.
>
> "It was the exuberant Obama who spoke today rather than the dour Obama
> we're used to"? That kind of thing? The hacky solution still seems
> reasonable.
That kind of thing, yes. A hacky solution may or may not be reasonable, but
legitimate justifications for seeking a hackysolution do not include the alleged
absence of this phenomenon from natural language.
>>> So if I choose to omit kinds from my universe but otherwise use the same
>>> rules, I am likely to be misunderstood by a kind-using lojbanist, even
>>> if I avoid using lV. Xorxes just gave a nice example, the other way
>>> round: {mi zukte da poi do zukte} makes a sense with kinds that it
>>> doesn't without them.
>>
>> You may be likely to be misunderstood, but that's because of
>> philosophical differences between you, not linguistic differences.
>> You don't have to agree on whether{mi zukte da poi do zukte} couod be
>> true.
>
> If that counts as philosophy, then it seems we do have to make
> philosophical pronouncements if we want to well-specify lojban.
It would be interesting and instructive if that turned out to be the case,
though it's not yet apparent to me that it is. I think rather than talking about
"well-specifiedness", we should distinguish (A) the rules mapping between
phonological form and logical form from (B) the rules mapping between logical
form and the universe. For everybody who wants a logical language, it is
important that (A) be well-specified. But I'm not sure there's anything remotely
approaching a consensus on whether (B) must be well-specified. I myself incline
to the view that it needs to be specified with a certain looseness, partly for
practical reasons -- because while (A) can be specified to perfection, (B) can
never be finished -- and partly because speakers with different views on the
nature of the universe ought still to be able to speak the same language.
>>> My question is whether you perceive a "jump" between individual lions
>>> and the kind 'lions' of a different kind from that between the kinds
>>> 'fierce lions' and 'lions'. I don't think it's actually a precise
>>> question about the structure of the partial order... it's rather that
>>> I'd split "subtype" into two relations - "instance of" and "subclass
>>> of".
>>
>> I understand your questions. The answer is a very definite No. There
>> are only types, related by the Subtype relation; and there are no
>> instances.
>
> Then I don't think I know at all what your "types" are. They seem to be
> different from xorxes' kinds, which seem (or at least so my
> uncontradicted impression was) to correspond to properties of
> individuals at the level below.
Hmm. I don't consciously find myself disagreeing with xorxes. Are there further
diagnostic questions you could pose in order to discriminate between my view and
the one you attribute to xorxes?
>> I think it would be good to have other gadri based on a model in which
>> there are no types, only instances.
>
> And not worry about interactions?
Between what? Different types of gadri? Probably yes -- don't worry. Or at
least, it's interesting to discuss, but doesn't have to be addressed as part of
the basic specification of Lojban.
>>>> The objections to that are that it is metaphysically biased,
>>>
>>> Why is that a problem?
>>
>> Avoidance of metaphysical bias was one of Lojban's aims. A fairly
>> obvious and sensible one, since the language should not tell the
>> speaker how the universe is, but rather should allow the speaker to
>> describe how the speaker thinks the universe is.
>
> This seems to be in direct competition with an aim of lojban with which
> I'm more familiar, namely that it be well-specified. Having a thorough
> model-theoretic formal semantics seems to me an important part of
> satisfying that aim - and it would involve specifying a metaphysics (by
> your definition of metaphysics).
See my comments above about the two types of specification. I think human
languages are thoroughly specified for type (A) (even tho the rules allow
ambiguity) but not for type (B). So I understand the goal of a logical language
as to be like a human language, but for the type (A) rules to exclude ambiguity.
Nevertheless, I can understand how you might want not only a fully specified
language, but also a fully specified model of the universe, because it promises
perfect communication not only at the level of logical form but also at the
level of semantics.
But the only Lojbanists I've ever seen ask for fully specified semantics are
John Clifford and you, so I'd say that your understanding of well-specifiedness
is not the normal one.
>>>>>> "Not every mammal gives birth to live young" -- false for kinds, true
>>>>>> for mundanes; but that doesn't mean "mammal" is ambiguous.
>>>>>
>>>>> So you'd say the statement is simply false, with the kind 'porcupines'
>>>>> as a witness?
>>>>
>>>> I don't understand the question.
>>>
>>> Does every mammal give birth to live young?
>>
>> At the species level yes (afaik), at the organism level no.
>
> And yet 'mammal' wasn't ambiguous? What in the question was?
Nothing. It's not ambiguous. I mean it's not technically linguistically
ambiguous. In the more general sense of being susceptible to multiple distinct
interpretations, it is of course ambiguous, and the ambiguity has to do with
which mammals there are in the universe of discourse.
--And.
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