[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable
Martin Bays, On 20/10/2011 02:19:
* Wednesday, 2011-10-19 at 21:27 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
Martin Bays, On 19/10/2011 06:11:
* Wednesday, 2011-10-19 at 04:59 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
You may be likely to be misunderstood, but that's because of
philosophical differences between you, not linguistic differences.
You don't have to agree on whether{mi zukte da poi do zukte} couod be
true.
If that counts as philosophy, then it seems we do have to make
philosophical pronouncements if we want to well-specify lojban.
It would be interesting and instructive if that turned out to be the
case, though it's not yet apparent to me that it is. I think rather
than talking about "well-specifiedness", we should distinguish (A) the
rules mapping between phonological form and logical form from (B) the
rules mapping between logical form and the universe. For everybody who
wants a logical language, it is important that (A) be well-specified.
What use is a logical form if we don't know what it means? How is that
an improvement on unprocessed lojban?
You may not know *exactly* what the logical form means, but communicatively that is far better than not even knowing for sure what the logical form is.
But I'm not sure there's anything remotely approaching a consensus on
whether (B) must be well-specified. I myself incline to the view that
it needs to be specified with a certain looseness, partly for
practical reasons -- because while (A) can be specified to perfection,
(B) can never be finished
I'm not so sure I agree that it can't, actually. Of course it depends
exactly what you mean by (B). I take it to mean a notion of satisfaction
for the logic in question, i.e. a way of telling whether a sentence is
true in a given model, where we allow some things to be handled by
pragmatics (a separate module wherein all ambiguity lies, and which is
less likely to be susceptible to clear and definite description). So
e.g. (B) is complete for the formal logics logicians talk about (with no
pragmatic component).
Completing (B) for lojban is clearly a non-trivial task, and we may well
find that we're better off settling for a partial solution (e.g. which
assumes boolean truth values, and so doesn't really handle {jei}) than
a complete one... but I don't see any obvious reason for considering it
impossible.
If you declare that the stuff that can be done falls under (B) and the stuff that can't be done falls under Pragmatics, defined in effect as the bits of B that can't be done, then you're right by definition.
-- and partly because speakers with different views on the nature of
the universe ought still to be able to speak the same language.
That seems reasonable only if "nature of the universe" is understood in
its everyday sense, rather than the technical logical sense we're
talking about here.
Or at least, which I'm talking about here. I'm not entirely sure that
we're not talking at cross-purposes. In the case of Chierchia's kinds
(which I'm mostly identifying with xorxes', modulo his domain-switching
addition), it's fairly clear: he has us adding to the universe for each
(sufficiently regular) expressible unary predicate a new entity, in
a new sort over which some but not all quantifications range. Whether we
have such is clearly a question of the setup of the logic. I don't know
whether the same applies to your types.
Speakers should be able to call upon their own logic, i.e. the logic their own model of the universe operates under, without making communication impossible. One of ensuring perfect communication is to limit the things speakers can try to communicate, but I think it's better to do without the limits and the perfection.
My question is whether you perceive a "jump" between individual lions
and the kind 'lions' of a different kind from that between the kinds
'fierce lions' and 'lions'. I don't think it's actually a precise
question about the structure of the partial order... it's rather that
I'd split "subtype" into two relations - "instance of" and "subclass
of".
I understand your questions. The answer is a very definite No. There
are only types, related by the Subtype relation; and there are no
instances.
Then I don't think I know at all what your "types" are. They seem to be
different from xorxes' kinds, which seem (or at least so my
uncontradicted impression was) to correspond to properties of
individuals at the level below.
Hmm. I don't consciously find myself disagreeing with xorxes. Are
there further diagnostic questions you could pose in order to
discriminate between my view and the one you attribute to xorxes?
Well, I understood him as agreeing with Chierchia that for certain
predicates, like x1 of "is in", kind predication always ends up being
equivalent (switching domains as necessary) existential quantification
over instances of the kind - as in the "lions are in my garden" example.
If your kinds don't have instances, presumably you don't agree with
this!
I'm still not clear what the diagnostic question is.
I think it would be good to have other gadri based on a model in which
there are no types, only instances.
And not worry about interactions?
Between what? Different types of gadri? Probably yes -- don't worry.
Or at least, it's interesting to discuss, but doesn't have to be
addressed as part of the basic specification of Lojban.
But then it seems more that you're talking about forking the language
into multiple sublanguages, with the gadri you use as the only
indication as to which language you're using.
No, just talking about expanding the lexicon and the range of semantic space it addresses.
See my comments above about the two types of specification. I think
human languages are thoroughly specified for type (A) (even tho the
rules allow ambiguity)
They are? Potentially or actually?
Actually.
With what "logical form"?
That's still being discovered.
but not for type (B). So I understand the goal of a logical language
as to be like a human language, but for the type (A) rules to exclude
ambiguity.
Nevertheless, I can understand how you might want not only a fully
specified language, but also a fully specified model of the universe,
because it promises perfect communication not only at the level of
logical form but also at the level of semantics.
But the only Lojbanists I've ever seen ask for fully specified
semantics are John Clifford and you, so I'd say that your
understanding of well-specifiedness is not the normal one.
Well, plenty of people want the language to be better-specified than it
is. I'm not sure how to view this push to specification if not as a push
towards (B).
As a push towards (A), obviously. The specification that the plenty of want is of (A). Which is not to say some of them wouldn't like (B) if it was on offer.
--And.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "lojban" group.
To post to this group, send email to lojban@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to lojban+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/lojban?hl=en.