* Tuesday, 2011-10-25 at 10:32 +0100 - And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com>:
> Martin Bays, On 25/10/2011 03:15:
> > * Tuesday, 2011-10-25 at 02:07 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
> >> Martin Bays, On 25/10/2011 01:25:
> >>> * Tuesday, 2011-10-25 at 00:45 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
> >>> I think the referent of any term, {la foob} and {do} included, is
> >>> a bunch. There are minimal ("atomic") bunches, i.e. ones with no
> >>> subbunches other than the bunch itself - we can call these individuals.
> >>> We can say that a bunch is a bunch of the individuals which are its
> >>> minimal subbunches.
> >> Encouragingly, then, I think we're in agreement here.
> > Surely some mistake!
> > So is this all you meant by "these biggest bunches are treated like
> > individuals", not that you actually introduce new individuals to the (or
> > a second) domain to substitute for the bunches?
>
> Yes. But:
>
> > I understand xorxes as doing the latter.
>
> I think "introduce new individuals" is your way of describing using
> counting criteria that give a smaller cardinality than your favoured
> ones do. Count the bunch one way, you get one cardinality; count it
> another way, you get another cardinality, which you see as introducing
> new individuals.
>
> To take an example I was thinking about because of the lion discussion
> below: Suppose that on each day of last week there was exactly one
> lion in my garden. Then, taking the week as a whole, what is the
> cardinality of the bunch of lions that were in my garden? You would
> want to say that it is some unknown number between 1 and 7, whereas
> xorxes and me would say it is any number between 1 and 7, tho if you
> know nothing more about the lion(s) then the numbers 1 & 7 would be
> the most natural choices.
>
> > Now I'm not sure that you aren't being really perverse.
> >
> > If Lion X is equal to Lion Y, then they satisfy the same predicates. So
> > if we can agree that Lion X is called Nigel while Lion Y is called
> > Samantha, or if X likes to eat gazelles while Y prefers humans, then we
> > must agree that there are at least two lions. Right?
>
> So not one lion that changes its name and dietary preferences?
The use of the present tense was intended to rule that out.
> > Now you might say that there is just one lion, Lion, which has an
> > instance which is called Samantha and has an instance which is
> > called Nigel. But if you claimed this in english, I would suggest
> > that you look up 'lion' in the dictionary, which will make it clear
> > that lions aren't things which have instances - they're things which
> > have claws. You are of course free to talk about this entity, but you
> > can't call it a lion, because it isn't. I think the same should go
> > for lojban and {cinfo}. It's part of the definition of the word
> > {cinfo} that an individual which cinfos is a lion, not something
> > which has instances which are lions.
>
> Lion certainly has claws, so there's no question of calling clawless things lions.
>
> So, you'd say that the feature [+/-can have instances] is specified in
> the semanticon for the lexical item? So, for example, Monday is [+can
> have instances], and so is Barbie (the doll), and so is cinfo-2, that
> means "lion that can have instances".
>
> And likewise Obama can have instances, since the predicates that hold
> of Obama as he is on Monday are not those that hold of Obama as he is
> on Tuesday, but you allow us to treat these as the same Obama.
>
> But actually, what you'll want to do, I think, is say that semanticon
> entries distinguish [+/-can have instances distributed through time]
> from [+/-can have instances distributed through space].
>
> You'd need particles to mark sumti-places for this, though, since we'd
> want four different versions of every sumti place, for each combo of
> the values of the two attributes.
OK. So in John's lion-hunting context, after his having shot the left
lion, you'd say "lo pa cinfo noi zu'a se cmene zo samantas.uu cu zu'a
morsi gi'e ku'i ri'u pu'o zi gunta .ii mi'o"?
I can see that John might be dangerously confused. Perhaps there are
sound evolutionary reasons for natural language making sharper
distinctions between lions and Lion than you seem to want lojban to?
As for what has instances... I currently don't see what's wrong with
identifying the "is an instance of" relation with {ckaji}.
So Obama doesn't have instances, although of course (like any individual
or bunch) he can satisfy different predicates at different times.
Analogously, if you want to draw that analogy, the Lion of the above
sentence, which is dead on the left and attacking on the right, would
also not have instances; it would also not satisfy {cinfo}, because
that's reserved for lions. I guess it could satisfy {cinfo marji}, or
maybe {cinfo rolpavza'i} or similar.
Is it arbitrary to treat Obama as a single entity but lions as multiple
entities? Does it involve treating time differently from space? To an
extent, I suppose it does - at least, I don't see a wholly coherent way
to rationalise the counting by reference to just the topology of the
subset of space-time at which there is Obama or Lion or whatever. But in
a language that's meant to be speakable by humans, I don't find time vs
space asymmetry too objectionable.
Martin
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