* Wednesday, 2011-11-23 at 13:34 -0800 - John E Clifford <kali9putra@yahoo.com>:
> Summary
Good idea!
> 1. {zo'e}, as implicit in unfilled places, can't mean either "what I (would
> have) had in mind" or a particular quantifier, because there are too many cases
> where it has to mean the other.
Pardon?
> It can't be {zi'o} either, since that really
> does both the sense and reference of the underlying predicate (think of all
> those places which can't be gone to from anywhere by any route on any means of
> transportation -- the center of the Earth, say, pace Edgar Rice Burroughs).
> Ideally (I think), unfilled places should be particular quantifiers,
Surely not just that. {ta melbi} is quite a different assertion from {ta
melbi da}.
> {zo'e} should be stated when a fixed, though perhaps unspecified,
> referent is intended.
I think having a word which literally acts as if the place were unfilled
is a useful enough feature that we shouldn't do away with it unless
necessary.
Perhaps we can use {lo du} for the meaning you suggest?
> While I'm at it, we should change {ce'u} over to a variable-binding
> operator so we can do abstractions right.
Pardon?
> 2. {lo broda} refers to a bunch of brodas (either an L-set or a plural
> reference, as your ontological conscience guides you), fixed by context but
> possibly not terribly specific. The bunch may have a single member or encompass
> all brodas that have ever been and maybe more (all in this universe of
> discourse, of course, though maybe not in this world
But all satisfying broda(_) in this world, right, whether or not
zasti(_)?
(This relates to maikxlx's intensionality remarks)
> ). These latter, maximal, bunches represent brodakind for all
> practical purposes. Because of the transparency of bunches, such
> a bunch of brodas is also a bunch of kinds of brodas, etc. These
> maximal bunches might usefully have a separate gadri.
>
> Another bunch type which could use its own gadri is a mass, which can be viewed
> either as the kind parts of brodas which can still broda (atoms, molecules,
> cells, ....) or as constructed by going through all the parts of brodas, sorting
> out ones that are not broda and gathering the rest into the new bunch, to be
> further analyzed.
> Some few problems remain: letters (though this can be made to fit in, if you
> don't mind considering all the even transient occurrences of a character in
> 4-space), geometric figures, things with the order type of the reals, and so on
> (mainly mekso, so we can forget about them for another twenty years).
>
> 3. Bunches relate to predicates in a variety of ways, for none of which does
> Lojban have an explicit marker, though some can be inferred from other factors
> (quantifiers, modals -- though we are somewhat defective there as well, or maybe
> just more pragmatic or rhetorical devices -- I'm not sure what generalization or
> stereotype is). I don't have a complete list and am unsure about the status of
> some I do have, so some discussion would be welcome.
Right, this is the part of your approach I'm unhappy with. I'm loath to
give up the simple version of plural semantics, whereby a selbri is
interpreted in a given world just as a relation on the set of bunches.
Complicating this with your "modes of predication" (conjunctive,
disjunctive, collective, statistical...) seems to fit lojban ill,
precisely because lojban has no way to mark them.
The alternative is to further complicate the domain - adding more
derived entities beyond bunches. The marking can then be done with gadri
and quantifiers.
I don't have a coherent scheme to propose for that, though... in
particular, although the "bunches of slices" approach And & I were
formulating the other week seems to deal with many problems, I don't see
how it fits with generic predication.
> 4. We need a way to sort out the official meaning (sense, a function on worlds)
> and the ordinary meaning, an area in in the web of other meanings (probably not
> a spot in the Platonic tetrahedron anymore). And then say which one we are
> talking about.
Pardon?
> 5. I always told my students that, for me, memory is not a pramana, but tends
> to be spotty and self-aggrandizing, so I won't argue with Lojban about what I
> said twenty yeara ago; he has the records (but I bet he can't find 'em). And,
> of course, I may well have changed my mind over the years. But still I am
> shocked to think I ever was pleased with a modal "can and does". The need for a
> logical necessity operator is less pressing that a variety of strong modals and
> their duals for the major kinds of compulsions (logic is rarely relevant except
> in the most hair-splitting arguments). I am not sure about where they belong
> grammatically, but in Logic they function pretty much exactly like negation and
> tense.
I'm liking xorxes' suggestion that some "irrealis" UI act like modal
operators - e.g. {ei} for deontic, {ia} for doxastic etc - using
a correctly placed e.g. {ca'a ei} when we want non-default scope.
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