Re: [lojban] No title, since the subject will have changed by the time it gets there

[maikxlx <maikxlx@gmail.com>]

On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 9:32 AM, John E Clifford <kali9putra@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Well, sorta.  A maximal bunch is a bunch (L-set, plurality) in a single domain
> of discourse that contains all the relevant objects (the current ones almost
> always, the past ones often. the possible ones occasionally -- probably only the
> possible ones from proximal worlds).
>
It's not clear to me how that would work or how you'd want it to work,
and I doubt the issue could be sorted by marking distinctions using
the gadri.*  You do want to refer to a bunch, which I think is roughly
equivalent to an extension, both to obtain a generic reading at a
given world-time index when desired and to allow quantification when
desired.  However, you do not want to mix extensions across possible
worlds willy-nilly.  Intensions, which do span possible worlds, do so
in a well-defined way, and they have totally different properties than
do extensions.  Intensions "contain" the extension (possibly empty) of
some thing-a-ma-jig at every possible state of affairs.  In other
words, intensions are functions that say, "give me a possible world
and time, and I'll give you exactly the extension that you're looking
for."  This is the closest thing to a mathematical formalization of
"meaning" that I have yet encountered.  Extensions are myopic entities
that unable to interact with anything outside their own state of
affairs, and they have no way of determining the intensions they are
related to or are derived from.  We notice this when we notice that
there are many possible states of affairs in which the extensions of
{se risna be da} and {se livga be da} are identical.  If all you have
is a bunch (i.e. L-set or C-set of entit(y/ies) in a given state of
affairs), how would you know which intension they came from? However,
by going to the intension, by expanding the domain to include possible
worlds in which {se risna be da} and {se livga be da} are not
identical, then we are able see _precisely_ what the "meanings" of
these two phrases really are.   Thus typically I conceptualize a
domain of discourse as naturally containing not just one, but
virtually _countless_ possible worlds when an intension is invoked,
and I see an intension invoked whenever xorlo is used.

Largely, this is not a problem.  As I indicated, I doubt that we need
to distinguish intensions from extensions on the gadri because, again,
in most cases* as soon as you specify or glork the world and time your
working with, the intension will automatically give you the extension
you need.  Most of the time, context will give you the world and time,
but you can also be explicit.  If you apply {ca'a}, then you shift
into the actual world and get a set of actual {nanmu}.   When you
posit a fictional and counterfactual state of affairs, you posit
exactly a world with the characteristics that you have given it.  If
there is any lack of clarity in all of this, it's due to the
"headlinese" style of prose that Lojban licenses.  Ultimately,
distinguishing intensions from extensions is the responsibility of the
aspectual and modal system in Lojban, not to the gadri.

*Except for possibly two cases: specificity, which I suspect is
already covered by {lo / le}; and true kinds (i.e. what I would
somewhat tentatively and arcanely call "non-generic idealizations of
intensions"), which arguably should be marked insofar as they do
disallow any existential reading.  In the latter case, we seem to be
dealing with the intension per se rather than as a function back to
extensions.

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