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[lojban] Re: May Lojban be considered as an ideal language philosophy?



Wittgenstein continues in 3.325 that Begriffsschrift comes close to being such a language. That seems to indicate that he has in mind not necessarily a speakable language but a notational convention to write down logical formulae. You can do that in Begriffsschrift, and you can do that in modern notational conventions. But you can also verbalise logical formulae, arguably somewhat easier in (a subset* of) Lojban than in (twisted) English/German/Esperanto/whatever.

The passage you quote from refers to the kind of superficial ambiguities of the kind that Lojban grammar seems to eradicate, in contrast to English/German/Esperanto/whatever grammar.

* I say 'subset of Lojban' because, even though Lojban's 'unambiguity features' should prevent the kind of confusion between <scare quote>underlying logical structures</scare quote> of spoken sentences that your TLP quotation mentions, Lojban allows you to underspecify the <scare quote>underlying logical structure</scare quote> of your sentence (tanru and {pe} and friends come to mind).

I don't know if it would be helpful to call a Begriffsschrift kind of language 'ideal'. The Tractatus presupposes quite a lot of logical voodoo, what with 'logische Gegenstände' and 'Der Gegenstand ist einfach' (2.02) and the whole 'Bildtheorie' (sorry I don't have a translation at hand). I guess an 'ideal' language in a Tractatus context would be one the symbols of which correspond to the 'einfache Gegenstände', and I'm not sure if Wittgenstein thought that Begriffsschrift etc. live up to that.

The later Wittgenstein would perhaps like the fact that 'prane' has an x2, and would not care if Lojban is an ideal language or not. ;)

iesk

Le jeudi 19 juillet 2012 18:43:46 UTC+2, enc a écrit :
Hello,

I suppose Lojban is a very suitable language to do philosophy in a formal way, or mathematics. But I am wondering if Lojban can be a ideal language, perfectly logic and representative of the facts of the reality described by the early Wittgenstein.

He wrote (Tractatus):

3.323 -- In the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same word signifies in two different ways -- and therefore belongs to two different symbols -- or that two words, which signify in different ways, are apparently applied in the same way in the proposition.

Thus the word "is" appears as the copula, as the sign of equality, and as the _expression_ of existence; "to exist" as an intransitive verb like "to go"; "identical" as an adjective; we speak of something but also of the fact of something happening.

3.325 -- In order to avoid these errors, we must employ a symbolism which exlucdes them, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar -- of logical syntax.

Can Lojban really resolve all problems figured in 3.323? Can Lojban be this symbolism which obeys the rules of logical grammar -- of logical syntax?

If so, maybe we can suppose that we can map each Lojban proposition to a fact, and that there exists an correspondence between Lojban language and reality.

Regards.

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