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Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural variable
Well, I'm not sure about most, but the ones that do are ambiguous, by definition.
Sent from my iPad
On Oct 24, 2011, at 19:04, And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com> wrote:
> John E Clifford, On 20/10/2011 03:22:
>> Odd notion of ambiguity which doesn't occur but still presents a sentence which
>> is both true and false.
>
> What's odd? You don't think there's such a thing as an unambiguous sentence that can be true or false depending on the proposition it's taken to express? Don't most sentences fall into that category?
>
> --And.
>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----
>> From: And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>
>> To: lojban@googlegroups.com
>> Sent: Wed, October 19, 2011 3:27:55 PM
>> Subject: Re: [lojban] {zo'e} as close-scope existentially quantified plural
>> variable
>>
>> Martin Bays, On 19/10/2011 06:11:
>>> * Wednesday, 2011-10-19 at 04:59 +0100 - And Rosta<and.rosta@gmail.com>:
>>>
>>>> Martin Bays, On 18/10/2011 04:26:
>>>>>>>> For example, {na ku lo cinfo cu zvati lo mi purdi}
>>>>>>>> has at least the two following meanings in terms of actual lions:
>>>>>>>> 1. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as a plurality of mundane lions, giving
>>>>>>>> roughly:
>>>>>>>> For L some (contextually relevant) lions: \not in(L, my garden)
>>>>>>>> (which probably means that there exists a lion among L which is not in
>>>>>>>> my garden)
>>>>>>>> 2. {lo cinfo} is interpreted as the kind Lions, giving
>>>>>>>> \not in(Lions, my garden)
>>>>>>>> which is then resolved existentially, giving
>>>>>>>> \not \exists l:lion(l). in(l, my garden) .
>>>>>> Sorry, I was unclear. I meant that English seems to allow only
>>>>>> reading (2), and that the same might go for Lojban.
>>>>> Ah! Have {lo} *only* able to get kinds, you mean?
>>>> Yes. With anything that looks like a 'mundane' reconceived as a kind.
>>>
>>> So how would you rule out interpretation 1 in the above?
>>
>> By whatever rules out "it is not the case that Obama is in my garden" or "it is
>> not the case that chlorine is in my garden" from being true in a circumstance in
>> which some (but not all) Obama/chlorine is in my garden. I suppose the principle
>> is that referents are treated as atoms rather than as complexes some bits of
>> which do broda and other bits of which don't necessarily broda; but I'm really
>> only thinking aloud in saying this.
>>
>>>>> The "temporal stages of Obama" example could be dealt with by
>>>>> intepreting Obama as the kind 'Obama-stages', I agree, but it could also
>>>>> be dealt with just by using tenses. I'm not sure how to deal with "an
>>>>> unusually exuberant Obama"... but since it's a rare construction, a hack
>>>>> like transforming it to "Obama, who was unusually exuberant" would seem
>>>>> reasonable.
>>>>
>>>> The point is that English does allow restrictive modification of
>>>> _Obama_, so does recognize subtypes of Obama.
>>>
>>> "It was the exuberant Obama who spoke today rather than the dour Obama
>>> we're used to"? That kind of thing? The hacky solution still seems
>>> reasonable.
>>
>> That kind of thing, yes. A hacky solution may or may not be reasonable, but
>> legitimate justifications for seeking a hackysolution do not include the alleged
>> absence of this phenomenon from natural language.
>>
>>>>> So if I choose to omit kinds from my universe but otherwise use the same
>>>>> rules, I am likely to be misunderstood by a kind-using lojbanist, even
>>>>> if I avoid using lV. Xorxes just gave a nice example, the other way
>>>>> round: {mi zukte da poi do zukte} makes a sense with kinds that it
>>>>> doesn't without them.
>>>>
>>>> You may be likely to be misunderstood, but that's because of
>>>> philosophical differences between you, not linguistic differences.
>>>> You don't have to agree on whether{mi zukte da poi do zukte} couod be
>>>> true.
>>>
>>> If that counts as philosophy, then it seems we do have to make
>>> philosophical pronouncements if we want to well-specify lojban.
>>
>> It would be interesting and instructive if that turned out to be the case,
>> though it's not yet apparent to me that it is. I think rather than talking about
>> "well-specifiedness", we should distinguish (A) the rules mapping between
>> phonological form and logical form from (B) the rules mapping between logical
>> form and the universe. For everybody who wants a logical language, it is
>> important that (A) be well-specified. But I'm not sure there's anything remotely
>> approaching a consensus on whether (B) must be well-specified. I myself incline
>> to the view that it needs to be specified with a certain looseness, partly for
>> practical reasons -- because while (A) can be specified to perfection, (B) can
>> never be finished -- and partly because speakers with different views on the
>> nature of the universe ought still to be able to speak the same language.
>>
>>>>> My question is whether you perceive a "jump" between individual lions
>>>>> and the kind 'lions' of a different kind from that between the kinds
>>>>> 'fierce lions' and 'lions'. I don't think it's actually a precise
>>>>> question about the structure of the partial order... it's rather that
>>>>> I'd split "subtype" into two relations - "instance of" and "subclass
>>>>> of".
>>>>
>>>> I understand your questions. The answer is a very definite No. There
>>>> are only types, related by the Subtype relation; and there are no
>>>> instances.
>>>
>>> Then I don't think I know at all what your "types" are. They seem to be
>>> different from xorxes' kinds, which seem (or at least so my
>>> uncontradicted impression was) to correspond to properties of
>>> individuals at the level below.
>>
>> Hmm. I don't consciously find myself disagreeing with xorxes. Are there further
>> diagnostic questions you could pose in order to discriminate between my view and
>> the one you attribute to xorxes?
>>
>>>> I think it would be good to have other gadri based on a model in which
>>>> there are no types, only instances.
>>>
>>> And not worry about interactions?
>>
>> Between what? Different types of gadri? Probably yes -- don't worry. Or at
>> least, it's interesting to discuss, but doesn't have to be addressed as part of
>> the basic specification of Lojban.
>>
>>>>>> The objections to that are that it is metaphysically biased,
>>>>>
>>>>> Why is that a problem?
>>>>
>>>> Avoidance of metaphysical bias was one of Lojban's aims. A fairly
>>>> obvious and sensible one, since the language should not tell the
>>>> speaker how the universe is, but rather should allow the speaker to
>>>> describe how the speaker thinks the universe is.
>>>
>>> This seems to be in direct competition with an aim of lojban with which
>>> I'm more familiar, namely that it be well-specified. Having a thorough
>>> model-theoretic formal semantics seems to me an important part of
>>> satisfying that aim - and it would involve specifying a metaphysics (by
>>> your definition of metaphysics).
>>
>> See my comments above about the two types of specification. I think human
>> languages are thoroughly specified for type (A) (even tho the rules allow
>> ambiguity) but not for type (B). So I understand the goal of a logical language
>> as to be like a human language, but for the type (A) rules to exclude ambiguity.
>>
>> Nevertheless, I can understand how you might want not only a fully specified
>> language, but also a fully specified model of the universe, because it promises
>> perfect communication not only at the level of logical form but also at the
>> level of semantics.
>>
>> But the only Lojbanists I've ever seen ask for fully specified semantics are
>> John Clifford and you, so I'd say that your understanding of well-specifiedness
>> is not the normal one.
>>
>>>>>>>> "Not every mammal gives birth to live young" -- false for kinds, true
>>>>>>>> for mundanes; but that doesn't mean "mammal" is ambiguous.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So you'd say the statement is simply false, with the kind 'porcupines'
>>>>>>> as a witness?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't understand the question.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does every mammal give birth to live young?
>>>>
>>>> At the species level yes (afaik), at the organism level no.
>>>
>>> And yet 'mammal' wasn't ambiguous? What in the question was?
>>
>> Nothing. It's not ambiguous. I mean it's not technically linguistically
>> ambiguous. In the more general sense of being susceptible to multiple distinct
>> interpretations, it is of course ambiguous, and the ambiguity has to do with
>> which mammals there are in the universe of discourse.
>>
>> --And.
>>
>
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