Jorge Llambías, On 08/10/2014 23:40:
On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 4:40 AM, And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com <mailto:and.rosta@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jorge Llambías, On 07/10/2014 21:59:
I do think the nonpresuppositional version fails
to capture what I take "lo" to mean by introducing a claim that is
not there.
But, to repeat my question, why is it that you take this to be the meaning of "lo"? I'm seeking to understand your reasoning (not to challenge it or disagree with it).
Far better to introduce an experimental cmavo for presupposition than to put about an incorrect paraphrase.
It would be a cmavo with very limited use though, mostly just in
linguistic discussions rather than ordinary discourse. Maybe it can
be covered with a sei-clause, once we figure out exacly how these
clauses work.
At least don't use "zo'e noi ke'a broda" as a definitional paraphrase (unless "noi" gets redefined as presuppositional).
I think the sentence "zo'e noi broda cu brodu" and the sentence "zo'e
ge broda gi brodu" don't express the same proposition, because the
result of negating each of them results in sentences that express
different propositions.
Which of these do you mean;
(1) Because the negated versions express different propositions, we should make it be the case that the noi and ge sentences express different propositions.
(2) Because the negated versions express different propositions, it follows logically/rationally that the noi and ge sentences express different propositions.
If (1), I don't follow the reasoning. If (2), I think the reasoning is incorrect. It is perfectly possible for -- due to the workings of whatever rules translate morphophonological forms into logical forms -- the unnegated sentences to express the same proposition and the negated sentences to express different ones, and indeed that is actually my current understanding of them. I recognize that if -- contrary to what I have been supposing -- noi has the meaning of English nonrestrictive relatives, then the unnegated versions do express different propositions (where 'propositions' include illocutionary operators and not just their propositional content).
This reminds me that, if I recall correctly, we had different views
when working on Xorban on whether it makes sense for two sentences
with different illocutionary force to be logically connected. For me
logical connection only applies to bare propositions, and not to
propositions-in-use.
My palpably deteriorating memory isn't pinging, so even if you recall correctly, I still don't. I do think that illocutionary operators can themselves be arguments of predicates (e.g. "Is it dinner time yet, for I'm hungry") tho, and since I take logical connectives to be predicates it follows that in principle I must allow illocutionary operators to be logically connected. I'm not sure how this bears on the current discussion, tho.