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Re: [lojban] Re: tersmu 0.2

Jorge Llambías, On 09/10/2014 23:08:

On Thu, Oct 9, 2014 at 5:07 AM, And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com <mailto:and.rosta@gmail.com>> wrote:

    Jorge Llambías, On 08/10/2014 23:40:

        On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 4:40 AM, And Rosta <and.rosta@gmail.com <mailto:and.rosta@gmail.com> <mailto:and.rosta@gmail.com <mailto:and.rosta@gmail.com>>> wrote:
             Jorge Llambías, On 07/10/2014 21:59:
        I do think the nonpresuppositional version fails
        to capture what I take "lo" to mean by introducing a claim that is
        not there.

    But, to repeat my question, why is it that you take this to be the meaning of "lo"? I'm seeking to understand your reasoning (not to challenge it or disagree with it).

Why don't I take it to make a claim? Because I don't think referring
expressions are meant to make claims. I don't know how else to say
it.


Okay, but you must see that in principle it's perfectly possible for "lo" to be referential yet for "broda" to be part of the claim. Referentiality doesn't entail the description not being claimed.


        I think the sentence "zo'e noi broda cu brodu" and the sentence "zo'e
        ge broda gi brodu" don't express the same proposition, because the
        result of negating each of them results in sentences that express
        different propositions.


    Which of these do you mean;
    (1) Because the negated versions express different propositions, we should make it be the case that the noi and ge sentences express different propositions.
    (2) Because the negated versions express different propositions, it follows logically/rationally that the noi and ge sentences express different propositions.


(2), I think.

    If (1), I don't follow the reasoning. If (2), I think the reasoning is incorrect. It is perfectly possible for -- due to the workings of whatever rules translate morphophonological forms into logical forms -- the unnegated sentences to express the same proposition and the negated sentences to express different ones, and indeed that is actually my current understanding of them. I recognize that if -- contrary to what I have been supposing -- noi has the meaning of English nonrestrictive relatives, then the unnegated versions do express different propositions (where 'propositions' include illocutionary operators and not just their propositional content).


I don't see noi as very different from English nonrestrictive relatives.

My point is that:
(a) the sentence "zo'e ge broda gi brodu" expresses a single
proposition, and in the absence of any explicit illocutionary
operator it is used to assert that proposition.
(b) the sentence "zo'e noi broda cu brodu" expresses two separate
propositions (not the single proposition that results from their
conjunction). When using it without explicit illocutionary operators,
one of the propositions is asserted normally as in (a), and the other
proposition is... I don't know exactly, side-asserted? btw-asserted?
In any case it is not a part of the main assertion. This
side-assertion is closer to, and more easily identifiable with, a
presupposition than the main assertion is.


In English, nonrestrictive relatives have independent assertive force, which is preserved even if the relative is within, say, a question or a command. If you think Lojban "noi" works that way, then I accept your reasoning, merely noting that there are other viable candidate meanings for "noi" (such as the one I had been thinking it had) that would invalidate your reasoning. (It's possible to have nonrestrictiveness without the independent illocutionary force, and I had supposed that in the absence of any specification of independent illocutionary force, noi is merely nonrestrictive.)


        This reminds me that, if I recall correctly, we had different views
        when working on Xorban on whether it makes sense for two sentences
        with different illocutionary force to be logically connected. For me
        logical connection only applies to bare propositions, and not to
        propositions-in-use.

    My palpably deteriorating memory isn't pinging, so even if you recall correctly, I still don't. I do think that illocutionary operators can themselves be arguments of predicates (e.g. "Is it dinner time yet, for I'm hungry") tho, and since I take logical connectives to be predicates it follows that in principle I must allow illocutionary operators to be logically connected. I'm not sure how this bears on the current discussion, tho.

Yes, that was a good example. My view was that the underlying logic for that is:

1: I (hereby) ask whether it is dinner time yet.
2. The reason for my asking whether it is dinner time yet is that I am hungry.


I (hereby) state that the reason for my asking whether it is dinner time yet is that I am hungry.


1 and 2 are different propositions, but 2 happens to contain 1. Since
both illocutionary acts make use of the same proposition, it is
convenient to utter the sentence expressing that proposition only
once, but that doesn't make the first illocutionary act (as opposed
to just its propositional content) an argument of the predicate used
in the second act.


By my thinking, (1) consists of an illocutionary operator "I hereby ask wh", with 'propositional content' "it is dinner time yet". So if (2) is "the reason for X is that I am hungry", X is not the propositional content of (1) but rather is (1) itself, i.e. the illocution. Can you reexplain where exactly you differ?

--And.

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